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FROM THE AXIAL AGE TO THE MORAL REVOLUTION

John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea

Eugene Halton

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For Barbara

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Preface

Imagine what it is like to discover buried treasure, hidden in plain sight. I hope to share that buried treasure with you in this book. Like some Hollywood archaeology movie such as "Indiana Jones," unearthing the hidden treasure involves exploring swaths of history and prehistory, from the Ancient Near and Far East, the philosophical and religious revolutions of Greek and Chinese philosophers, of Buddha and Jesus, of kingship and cosmos.

Finding the treasure also involves a missing person, a Scottish scholar who was known for his writings during his lifetime, and figured in prominent debates of the time. But within just a couple of years after his death in 1910, he had sunk into total oblivion, leaving prescient ideas buried within the leaves of his books, ideas clearly far ahead of their time. This scholar has provided a buried treasure of thought, whose time has finally come to be brought to light. His work deals with one of the most revolutionary and transformative periods of all human development, from over two millennia ago: a time of emergent religious, intellectual, and sociopolitical changes, which produced ideas which still have hold over billions of people. He called this period "The Moral Revolution," but it has become known as "The Axial Age."

The theory of the Axial Age is associated with Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), who, in his 1949 book, *The Origin and Goal of History*, claimed to be the first to develop a full theory of the phenomenon, despite a few earlier scholars who noted the facts, "but only marginally." Yet 75 years earlier, in 1873, unknown to Jaspers, John Stuart Stuart-Glennie

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(1841–1910) elaborated a fully developed and nuanced theory of what he termed "the Moral Revolution" to characterize the historical shift around roughly 600 B.C.E. in a variety of civilizations, most notably ancient China, India, Israel, and Greece, as part of a broader critical theory of history.

The shift involved the appearance of a new outlook, with a new emphasis on the inner resources of the person as against the centralized power structures characterizing civilized societies, new emphases on conscience over custom, and on religious and political democratization. Across diverse civilizations figures arose voicing inner power over the status quo of external power. Take, for example, Confucius (c.551–479 B.C.E.): "What the superior man seeks is in himself; what the small man seeks is in others." Or Buddha (560–480 B.C.E.): "Self is the fleeting error of samsāra; it is individual separateness and that egotism which begets envy and hatred…The attainment of truth is possible only when self is recognized as illusion;" or Socrates (460–399 B.C.E.): "The unexamined life is not worth living." or Jesus (6 B.C.E.–27 CE): "And he said unto them, the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." Consider that Jesus, like Socrates a construction worker and social agitator who was tried and sentenced to death, became the basis for the years of the calendar used throughout the globe today, displacing the God-like power of Roman emperors, even if they hung on to some of the months. Both Jesus and Socrates manifested what Vaclav Havel has called "the power of the powerless." But it was also a time of the establishment of world empires, such as that of Cyrus the Great of Persia, as well as the beginnings of democracy in ancient Greece.

Though there were even earlier scholars who noted the theme, such as Ernst von Lasaulx in 1856, Viktor von Strauss in 1870, and possibly Anquetil-Duperron from the eighteenth century,[1] the theory of "The Moral Revolution" articulated by John Stuart Stuart-Glennie as early as 1873, and in numerous subsequent works throughout the rest of his life, marks the first fully articulated theory of the concept, a theory for which Jaspers unknowingly claimed to have been the originator.

If Stuart-Glennie had lived in complete obscurity, the absence of his ideas in discussions of this historical phenomenon might be understandable. But he did not live in obscurity. He returned again and again to the theme of the Moral Revolution in books and articles. Over 30 years after he articulated the theory in 1873, he presented his ideas yet again to a major meeting of the sociological society in London, where his

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papers were discussed and commented upon. But virtually no one there noticed his theory of the moral revolution. The emergent social science of sociology let slip by a theory that would come back decades later from growing interest in Jaspers' work. And historians of sociology to this day are unaware that the theory of the "axial age" proposed by Jaspers had already been articulated decades earlier in a sociological context by John Stuart Stuart-Glennie.

The recent publications of Robert Bellah's book in 2011, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, and Bellah and Hans Joas's edited volume in 2012, *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, mark comprehensive collections with a broad array of scholarship on the topic. These works have sparked renewed interest in the idea, yet Stuart-Glennie remains missing from the debate (despite a quotation from his work in a footnote to the bibliography in the Bellah and Joas edited volume). Where those books are comprehensive, this book aims to be exploratory, opening up ideas for consideration. Though I will make some use of materials from these and other works, this book has a more limited scope, dealing primarily with issues related to the origins and context of the theory of what Jaspers called the axial age.

This book brings to light Stuart-Glennie's now-eclipsed theories of the Moral Revolution and "Ultimate Law of History," compares his ideas with those of Jaspers, and proposes a new context for understanding the phenomenon. Lewis Mumford (1895–1990), who was one of the first scholars after Jaspers to make use of the idea of the axial age, is the only scholar after Stuart-Glennie's eclipse to note his original contribution, though he never discussed the content of Stuart-Glennie's ideas, and mistakenly took his last name to be "Glennie." I first became acquainted over three decades ago with Stuart-Glennie indirectly from Mumford's passing mention of him as a predecessor to Jaspers, and cited him myself in the mid-1990s. I had begun to be interested in the phenomena of the axial age from the time I was still a graduate student in the late 1970s, discussing it with a number of Ancient Near East students and scholars, as well as historians such as Arnoldo Momigliano. And I was interested in the parallels and contrasts between Jaspers' view of history and Mumford's. But I had not gotten around to reading Stuart-Glennie directly and at length until 2009, and immediately realized that he had developed a far-reaching understanding of the phenomenon.[2]

There are a number of reasons why Stuart-Glennie's eclipsed work needs to be reconsidered. I wish to claim: 1) that Stuart-Glennie deserves

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to be given full credit as originating the fully articulated theory well in advance of Jaspers; 2) that his term "Moral Revolution" provides a more accurate depiction of the phenomena than the term "Axial," with its assumption of one key pivot in history; 3) that Stuart-Glennie's understanding of the prior historic and especially prehistoric eras provides a sounder context than that of Jaspers, despite some significant shortcomings which I will note; and 4) that Mumford's position provides another valuable though rarely discussed perspective, more critical of the legacy of the era than Jaspers, or even of some recent commentators. Neither Bellah, Shmuel Eisenstadt, or the contributors to the Bellah and Joas edited volume even mention Mumford, despite his prominence over decades as a public intellectual.[3] Though these last three claims may be open to question to some, they merit being brought into public discussion.

But there is more, another discovery, that I will bring to light. In the final chapter I will introduce more buried treasure, another unlikely predecessor to Jaspers, who, though a well-known writer, remains unknown to the decades of scholarship on the axial age. Yet he laid out an original theory on the phenomena almost two decades before Jaspers. And where Stuart-Glennie's writings were out of print for more than a century and difficult to find, this writer's relevant works have been hiding in plain sight for anyone to read, and remain in print today. He is D. H. Lawrence (1885–1930).

In contrast to Jasper's depiction of a singular world-historical "axis," both Stuart-Glennie and Mumford, while acknowledging its profound significance, provide a more nuanced view of the phenomena and their larger context, especially of the prior historic and prehistoric eras. By the ethics of terminology, Stuart-Glennie and his term deserve to be given credit, and the history of this fascinating idea needs to be revised.

Given the broad acceptance of the term "axial" today, it may seem presumptuous to call for a revision of the originator of the theory and of the term. But what if, say, psychoanalysis had been discovered 75 years earlier than Freud by someone and given a different name?

The scientist and philosopher Charles Peirce, who also worked professionally as a lexicographer, claimed that a scientific ethics of terminology should include not only a scientific name for a scientific conception, but that "The author of a scientific conception has the first right to name it; and his name ought to be accepted, unless there are grave substantial objections to it" (Peirce, 1992, 230).[4] There is an accepted ethics of terminology that an original theory should be credited to its originator, and the originator of the theory I am discussing clearly preceded Jaspers. This does not mean that

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Stuart-Glennie's theory of the moral revolution is without some serious flaws, as I hope to show, just as Jaspers' theory of the axial age is.

Yet Stuart-Glennie also introduces gradations unexplored by Jaspers, such as a view of prehistory as *panzoonist* (sometimes spelling it "panzooist") in outlook, revering "all life" as a religious basis for conceiving nature. *Panzoonism* is a term introduced by Stuart-Glennie to depict a worldview that has also been characterized as animism, and I shall discuss it in more detail in Chapter 2. Yet Stuart-Glennie makes a good case for why animism does not accurately characterize prehistoric outlooks, though his argument is not always the easiest to follow. Similarly he invented a term, *bioticon*, to characterize matter, as I shall discuss in Chapter 3. His writing, terminology, and outlook can be in places thorny, and so I take it as my task to attempt to "translate" Stuart-Glennie's sometimes difficult prose and ideas into a fluid compelling narrative as best as I can.

I also will compare Lewis Mumford's critical discussion of the axial age with that of Jaspers. Mumford was one of the first thinkers after Jaspers to elaborate on the idea, in 1956, along with Eric Voegelin, who first took up the theme of the axial age the year after Mumford in 1957 in the second volume of his book *Order and History Volume Two: The World of the Polis*. Voegelin's discussion of Jaspers in a few brief pages of an almost 500-page book has entered into the literature on the axial age, but Mumford's multiple uses of the idea over the years has not, which is regrettable. Mumford and Jaspers not only shared an interest in the axial age and its place in history, but both were among the first thinkers to engage the consequences of nuclear bombs and the nuclear age, reflecting on the meanings of the axial age for contemporary technological civilization. The alternatives to Jaspers provided by Stuart-Glennie, Mumford, and D. H. Lawrence open new ways of conceiving the meaning of what has thus far been termed the axial age. Yet Stuart-Glennie, the originator of the theory, is unknown, as are Lawrence's contributions, and Mumford's discussions only rarely mentioned. All three need to be put into the picture, because their respective theories change the picture.

Notes

1 As Johann P. Arnason (2005: 21) points out concerning Anquetil-Duperron, this may be "marginal intuitions" which only later are "developed into fully-fledged concepts." He states: "Aleida Assmann (1989) traces the idea of

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the Axial Age back to the eighteenth century, more precisely to Anquetil-Duperron's description of the period in question as 'une grande révolution du genre humain' (she mentions D. Metzler as a source of information, but there is no reference to a publication). Its history would thus be comparable to the notion of civilizations in the plural: both go back to marginal eighteenth-century intuitions that are later developed into fully-fledged concepts." Johann Arnason, "The Axial Age and Its Interpreters: Reopening a Debate." In *Axial Civilizations and World History*. Edited by J. P. Arnason, S. N. Eisenstadt, and B. Wittrock, 19 (Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), 21.

2 Eugene Halton, "J. S. Stuart-Glennie and the Moral Revolution, Later Known as the Axial Age." Paper presented at the Midwest Sociological Society Annual Meeting, April 1, 2010.

3 Bellah, for example, calls attention to Voegelin and Eisenstadt. Robert Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 271–272.

Where Eisenstadt did much over decades to draw attention to the axial age idea, Voegelin made slight use of it. The absence of Mumford, an internationally renowned public intellectual, in the literature on the axial age for over a half century illustrates the unhappy tendencies of academics to remain hidebound within self-enclosed academic circles, all the more strange given the multidisciplinary nature of the debates.

4 Charles S. Peirce. *Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898*. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 230.

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Jaspers, Stuart-Glennie, and the Origins of the Theory

Abstract: *Karl Jaspers published his theory of an "Axial Age" 1949, which was translated into English in 1953. He claimed credit for elaborating the first full theory of the axial age. Yet 75 years earlier, in 1873, unknown to Jaspers and to contemporary scholars today, folklorist John Stuart Stuart-Glennie elaborated a fully developed and nuanced theory of what he termed "the Moral Revolution" to characterize the historical shift around roughly 600 B.C.E. in a variety of civilizations. He continued to write and develop his theory, and also presented his ideas to the Sociological Society of London in 1905. This chapter provides evidence for Stuart-Glennie's claim to be the first to develop a fully articulated theory of what later became known as the axial age, as well as his three stage "ultimate law of history." It also considers Lewis Mumford's original contributions to the theory.*

Keywords: Karl Jaspers; Axial Age; John Stuart Stuart-Glennie; The Moral Revolution

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Jaspers' axial thesis

Karl Jaspers published his theory of an "Axial Age" in his book *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* in 1949, which was translated into English in 1953 as *The Origin and Goal of History*. The German term "Achsenzeit," literally "axis-time," translated as Axial Age, signifies axis or pivot, and characterizes the historical shift that occurred largely between 800 and 200 B.C.E. in a variety of civilizations, though inclusive of later figures including Jesus and Mohammed. Jaspers cites Hegel's remark, "All history moves toward Christ and from Christ. The appearance of the Son of God is the axis of history." But he notes that this really applies only to believing Christians, and that if there is an axis of history, it must apply to all humankind. Let me quote at length his depiction of the axial age to give a sense of his understanding of its breadth:

> It would seem that this axis of history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C., in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C. It is there that we meet with the most deep cut dividing line in history. Man, as we know him today, came into being. For short we may style this the "Axial Period."
>
> The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and Lao Tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu, and a host of others; India produced Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to skepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the philosophers—Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato—of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes. Everything implied by these names developed during these few centuries almost simultaneously in China, India, and the West, without any one of these regions knowing the others.[1]

Other characteristics include the rise of "rationally clarified experience" over myth; religion becoming increasingly ethical belief; the appearance of philosophers, speculative thought, and longing for transcendence, whether through Buddhist Nirvana, Greek ataraxia (lucid freedom from agitation), or Chinese alignment with the Tao; and a heightening of "the *specifically human in man* which, bound to and concealed within the body, fettered by instincts and only dimly aware of himself, longs

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for liberation and redemption and is able to attain to them already in this world."[2]

Jaspers notes further:

> What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence.
>
> All this took place in reflection. Consciousness became once more conscious of itself .... In this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still think today, and the beginnings of the world religions, by which humans still live, were created.[3]

Through the axial age, Jaspers claimed, "the spiritual foundations of humanity were laid simultaneously and independently ... And these are the foundations upon which humanity still subsists today."[4] In providing "the spiritual foundations," the axial age appeared to Jaspers as the prime pivot of all of human development.

Jaspers takes credit for elaborating the first full theory of the axial age. He does cite Ernst von Lasaulx and Viktor von Strauss as the earliest scholars to call attention to the *facts* of the axial period, in 1856 and 1870 respectively:

> Lasaulx writes: "It cannot possibly be an accident that, six hundred years before Christ, Zarathustra in Persia, Gautama Buddha in India, Confucius in China, the prophets in Israel, King Numa in Rome and the first philosophers-Ionians, Dorians and Eleatics-in Hellas, all made their appearance pretty well simultaneously as reformers of the national religion."[5]
>
> Viktor von Strauss, in his wonderful Lao-tse commentary...(1870), says: "During the centuries when Lao-tse and Confucius were living in China, a strange movement of the spirit passed through all civilised peoples. In Israel Jeremiah, Habakkuk, Daniel and Ezekiel were prophesying and in a renewed generation (521–516 [B.C.E.]) the second temple was erected in Jerusalem. Among the Greeks Thales was still living, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Xenophanes appeared and Parmenides was born. In Persia an important reformation of Zarathustra's ancient teaching seems to have been carried through, and India produced Sakyamuni, the founder of Buddhism."[6]

Both of these quotations denote the phenomenon explicitly, and the Lasaulx quotation cited by Jaspers continues, in Hans Joas's

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translation: "this remarkable coincidence can have its foundation only in the inner substantial unity of mankind and the life of peoples . . . , not in the particular effervescence of one national spirit." Joas notes, "It would seem as if Jaspers had directly taken it up from here."[7]

Jaspers did acknowledge these forerunners, yet also notes that "Since then these facts have now and then been noted, but only marginally. As far as I am aware, they have never been grasped as a whole, with the aim of demonstrating the universal parallels obtaining for the entire spiritual being of the humanity at that time."[8] In his early 1919 book, *Psychology of Worldviews*, Jaspers had drawn heavily from his mentor Max Weber's work on world religions, and was aware later of Weber's suggestion of the parallel rise of prophecy "in connection with the reconstitution of the great world empires" in the eighth through fifth centuries B.C.E.[9] But again, Weber's statement was at best a marginal footnote to Jaspers' independent development of the axial age theory. Weber had stated in his book, *Economy and Society*, posthumously published in 1922:

> The period of the older Israelitic prophecy at about the time of Elijah was an epoch of strong prophetic propaganda throughout the Near East and Greece. Perhaps prophecy in all its types arose, especially in the Near East, in connection with the reconstitution of the great world empires in Asia, and the resumption and intensification of international commerce after a long interruption. At that time Greece was exposed to the invasion of the Thracian cult of Dionysos, as well as to the most diverse types of prophecies. In addition to the semiprophetic social reformers, certain purely religious movements now broke into the simple magical and cultic lore of the Homeric priests . . . It is not necessary to detail here these developments of the eighth and seventh centuries, so brilliantly analyzed by Rhode, some of which reached into the sixth and even the fifth century. They were contemporary with Jewish, Persian, and Hindu prophetic movements, and probably also with the achievements of Chinese ethics in the pre-Confucian period, although we have only scant knowledge of the latter.[10]

This is a clear intuition of the common theme Jaspers later termed the axial age, though Weber did not develop it explicitly further. Also of note is that Stuart-Glennie had explicitly written decades earlier, in 1873, about "Prophetianism" as a new outlook characterizing emergent religions of the age of the moral revolution, when Max Weber was only nine years old.

Jaspers also took Max Weber's brother Alfred as an influence. In 1935 Alfred Weber had noted, "The three established cultural spheres—the

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Near Eastern—Greek, the Indian and the Chinese—arrived at universally-oriented religious and philosophical seeking, questioning and choosing with remarkable synchronicity and apparently independently of one another from the beginning of the second half of the age of the great migrations, that is, from the ninth to the sixth century B.C."[11] He also argued for the expanding colonization by central Asian horse cultures as an influence in the cross-civilizational simultaneity of the axial period.

Jaspers' idea of the axial age slowly spread, and began to reach a broader audience after a special issue devoted to it appeared in the journal *Daedelus* in 1975. In 1986 S. N. Eisenstadt edited an excellent collection titled *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*, and more recently co-edited *Axial Civilizations and World History* in 2005. As mentioned, sociologist Robert Bellah has also written recently on the concept, publishing a major book in 2011, and in 2008 organized a conference with Hans Joas on the topic, which resulted in the recent comprehensive volume *The Axial Age and Its Consequences* (2012). One of Bellah's chief concerns was to address the rise of "second order" or theoretic thinking in the axial age, through using Merlin Donald's approach to the evolution of culture and cognition. I shall discuss Bellah's work in Chapter 7.

But almost twenty years before the 1975 *Daedelus* issue, and three years after the translation appeared in English, Lewis Mumford devoted a whole chapter to "axial man" in his 1956 book, *The Transformations of Man*. Mumford acknowledged using Jaspers' concept of the axial age, but also claimed that he used the word "axial" independently in his 1951 book, *The Conduct of Life*, though his context for the term in that work is to argue for a contemporary axial transformation rather than to single out an earlier historical epoch. But he also mentions that the idea has been around for a while, and how "this change of direction was noted early in the present century by J. Stuart Glennie [sic]."[12]

Later, in his 1967 book, *Technics and Human Development*, Mumford again drew attention to Stuart-Glennie: "The first scholar to describe this simultaneous movement and understand its significance was an almost forgotten Scotsman, J. Stuart Glennie (sic), who also called attention to a five-hundred year cycle in culture: and both Karl Jaspers and I have independently called these new religions and philosophies 'Axial'—a deliberately ambivalent term which includes both the idea of 'value,' as in the science of Axiology, and centrality, that is the convergence of all separate institutions and functions upon the human personality, around

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which they revolve."[13] Again, Mumford's earlier use of the term "axial" was for a contemporary "axial change," not the ancient "axial age," termed by Jaspers. So it seems to me Mumford was exaggerating his independence in his uses of the term "axial age."[14]

In his annotated bibliography for this work, under Jaspers' book *The Origins and Goal of History*, Mumford also drew attention again to Stuart-Glennie by cross-referencing: "Note chapter on the Axial period. See Glennie, J. Stuart."[15] There, under Glennie, Mumford cited and commented on Stuart-Glennie's 1906 piece: "The latest and most available exposition of a thesis first set forth in the seventies, on periodicity in history. Glennie (sic) discerned five-hundred year cycles, and was the first to point out the contemporaneity of the Axial religions and philosophies, and the significance of the ethical transformation they introduced."[16]

Mumford most likely became aware of Stuart-Glennie through his mentor, sociologist Patrick Geddes, who, with Victor Branford, brought Mumford to London in 1920 to be editor of *The Sociological Review*. Geddes and Branford had both commented on Stuart-Glennie's presentation of his theory of the moral revolution in the 1906 collection, *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*. This was an annual publication by the Sociological Society which led to the founding of *The Sociological Review* in January 1908. Geddes also wrote an obituary for his friend Stuart-Glennie in *The Sociological Review* in 1910.

As mentioned, I have been aware of Mumford's reference to "Glennie" for over three decades, yet only finally got around to begin dredging up and reading the major works of Stuart-Glennie in 2009. They had long since fallen into obscurity, and had to be tracked down. It immediately became apparent that Stuart-Glennie had fully fleshed out the idea as early as 1873, had given it a term, *The Moral Revolution*, and had put it in a historical context which has some distinct advantages over that of Jaspers' conception of the axial age, despite Stuart-Glennie's shortcomings.

The strange eclipse of Stuart-Glennie

John Stuart Stuart-Glennie was born in 1841 in Aberdeen, Scotland, and died in Florence, Italy, in 1910. He was a known scholar and writer in his day. His grandfather on his mother's side was a Professor of Greek at the University of Aberdeen. Geddes notes in his obituary that

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> He was educated at the Grammar School and the University of Aberdeen and at the University of Bonn. After graduating, he travelled widely in Europe and America, was called to the Bar at the Inner Temple, and practiced in the court of his kinsman, the Vice-Chancellor Sir John Stuart. Then, giving up practice, he undertook a series of journeys of historical exploration in the East, the fruit of which was a long series of books and papers beginning with the 'New Philosophy of History' (1873), and including numerous contributions to the transactions of the Royal Historical Society, the British Association, the Congresses of Orientalists, the Folklore Congress, the Sociological Society, etc.[17]

He corresponded and did some early traveling with philosopher John Stuart Mill. Both, according to Geddes, shared the middle name Stuart from Stuart-Glennie's grandfather, Sir John Stuart, though it is not clear to me whether it is Stuart-Glennie's grandfather the Greek scholar, or the "kinsman" Vice-Chancellor, cited in Geddes' obituary above, who was a judge and well-regarded landlord. From Geddes' description it seems to be the latter:

> It was after his grandfather, Sir John Stuart, that both Stuart-Glennie and John Stuart Mill derived their names: for James Mill [John Stuart Mill's father], the son of a small tenant upon Stuart's estate, thus in later life commemorated his old laird's kindness in helping him with his own education at Aberdeen. Does not a little point like this throw light upon Stuart-Glennie's philosophy of society? His broadest generalisation of social philosophy, his evolutionary hope of the progressive interaction of all classes are thus based more deeply than he ever realized upon his early experience of that broad diffusion and general interaction of culture and capacity throughout all classes which to this day distinguish the region-city and university of Aberdeen.[18]

Stuart-Glennie also interacted with other leading intellectuals, yet his writings fell into eclipse. He was a historian and folklorist, a member of the folklore society who debated the leading ideas of Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, criticizing his understanding of animism. In the first *Sociological Papers, Volume 1*, published in 1905, he also responded to a paper given by Emile Durkheim in a session "On the Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and Philosophy," where Victor Branford had also given a paper. Other responders included Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Bertrand Russell, and Ferdinand Tönnies. Unfortunately Stuart-Glennie devoted most of his response to Durkheim to enunciating his own "principles of Method, courses of Research, and resulting Theories" rather than

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taking up Durkheim's paper.[19] He does, however, criticize Durkheim for using the term "sociology" "to signify both a causal or 'pure' science, 'a theory of the origin, growth, and destiny of Humanity,' *and* an applied science—a science concerned with 'the construction of principles applicable to the ordering of social life.' "[20] He then suggests that anthropology should be the term for a causal science, and sociology, or what Stuart-Glennie calls *politology*, to the applied general science of man. One sees that the disciplinary terms were perhaps not yet as fully fixed as they would become in the institutionalization of disciplines in universities, though they were already well on the way. Stuart-Glennie characterized himself variously both as folklorist and sociologist, though neither he nor Durkheim, nor any of the contributors to these early volumes, had degrees in sociology.

Stuart-Glennie was also an early associate of the British socialist movement known as The Fabian Society, and an early influence on George Bernard Shaw. As mentioned, Stuart-Glennie published a three-part chapter in 1906 titled "Sociological Studies," in the coauthored book, *Sociological Papers, Volume II*, in which he restated his 1873 arguments on *The Moral Revolution*, as well as his characterization of pre-civilized religious beliefs as "panzoonist." He stated there: "An essential part of the discovery of the law of intellectual development was the deduction of such an historical differentiation as was verified in the discovery of that great Asian-European movement which I have called the Moral Revolution of the sixth century B.C."[21] In his earlier work of 1879, *Europe and Asia*, he also had said, "Christianity was the second of those great movements which, at intervals of about half a millennium, have succeeded each other both in Asia and Europe since that great Moral Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C., which may be briefly indicated by recalling the approximately contemporary names of Confucius and of Buddha, of Cyrus the Great, of Isaiah, and of Xenophanes."[22] And in his original statement of 1873, "we are led to the deduction of a great moral revolution initiating a long middle Age in the history of Humanity; it is further deduced that we should find in the history of Humanity, as the history of the progressive unity of recorded Thought, three specially distinguished Ages; and further, that the Second Age of Humanity should be found to be, in its most conspicuous social phenomena, characterised by a moral transformation of the corresponding phenomena of the First Age. Having generally verified our Ultimate Law in discovering that such a moral revolution,

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as is one of the first deductions from it, did actually occur in the Sixth Century B.C. . . ."[23]

In these excerpts the outlines of his general, three-part "Ultimate Law of History" appear, wherein the moral revolution is the second phase of development, and also his idea of 500 year cycles in history, as we shall see in more detail later.

But let us return to his 1906 restatement of his theory to the sociological society. Think about it: Stuart-Glennie gave a complete exposition of "The Moral Revolution," later to become known as "the Axial Age," in a long chapter titled "Sociological Studies," in a book called *Sociological Papers*, which included a number of well-known authors and founding sociologists of the day, including Geddes and Branford. But one cannot find it discussed in sociological histories, which too frequently tend to replicate the contracted bureaucratic boundaries of the academic discipline, shedding what does not fit the expected ideas. This single sociological volume contains the restatement of Stuart-Glennie's 1873 work, as well as summarizing other of his ideas, and could have opened the discussion of the idea almost a half a century before Jaspers' work appeared.

When I first tried to locate a copy of this rare book through interlibrary loan, one of only three copies worldwide was listed as at Monmouth University, New Jersey. I knew that Lewis Mumford had donated his library and art works to Monmouth University, where it sits as a special collection, and sure enough, upon going there and examining it, the book is his signed and annotated copy. So when Mumford stated in 1956 that both Jaspers and he were preceded by "J. Stuart Glennie," he had the proof in his own library. His acquisition of the book was likely a legacy of his time spent as editor of *The Sociological Review* in London in 1920 with Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford, who brought him there, and who were also discussants of Stuart-Glennie's 1906 chapter, based on the meeting of the Sociological Society at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1905. Geddes had also contributed chapters on "Civics as Applied Sociology" in the first two volumes, which were influences on Mumford. Additional contributors to the book included Charles Booth, L. T. Hobhouse, eugenicist Francis Galton, Edvard Westermarck, Lady Victoria Welby, who was an advocate for a theory of signs she called "significs," and others. That Mumford had early working connections to sociology is a fact also lost to current sociological histories. An even greater lost history is Stuart-Glennie's work.

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There is also the broader puzzling question of why his work disappeared. As historian Richard M. Dorson noted of Stuart-Glennie in his book *The British Folklorists*: "For all his talk of steady converts, the single-minded Scot obtained no articulate supporters to his cause, and it remains another overlooked memorial of the excitement once engendered by ingenious folklore speculations."[24] Stuart-Glennie had written on a wide variety of folklore, including the legends of King Arthur and Fairies, and developed theories to interpret the origins of legends, including the likely localities of the historical Arthur in Scotland.

Dorson devotes 35 pages to Stuart-Glennie's writings on the origins of myth and civilization, including commentaries on them by leading folklorists, but there is no mention of his idea of "the moral revolution." Geddes makes no mention of it either in his obituary for Stuart-Glennie, though he had been a commentator on the 1905 presentation. Geddes also noted that Stuart-Glennie, in Switzerland at the time of the meeting in London on April 7, 1905, was unable to attend due to sickness and weather. He also remarks how the members of the Sociological Society, where Stuart-Glennie's three papers in 1905 were read and later published in the 1906 *Sociological Papers*, and which included discussions of the moral revolution, "were not a little perplexed by three papers of such difficulty and magnitude in a single evening."[25] This is completely understandable, given the complexity and sometimes obscurity of Stuart-Glennie's writing and terminology, and especially if Stuart-Glennie was not there in person to read and then respond to criticisms. Stuart-Glennie made some bold claims, but did not write in an accessible way that could make those claims and terminology transparent.

Stuart-Glennie's critical philosophy of history also attempted to give a scientific understanding to the history of Christianity, or what Stuart-Glennie distinguished as "Christianism," for the religion per se. His 1878 book, issued as "Proemia 1" or the first volume of *The Modern Revolution*, is titled *Isis and Osiris; Or, The Origin of Christianity as a Verification of an Ultimate Law of History*.[26] There he takes "Christianism" as a "transformed Osirianism," of the dying and reborn god Osiris, yet a manifestation of the broader moral revolution.

Such an outlook gave rise to some negative reactions, yet it seems to me that something more than Victorian aversion to the critical views of history and Christianity which Stuart-Glennie developed over his career contributed to his rapid eclipse after his death. Some theologians

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took positive interest in Stuart-Glennie's reconstruction of the origins of Christianity, and one even noted, "His remarkable theory of a former great moral and social revolution in the 6th century B.C. to which he ascribes the origin of monotheistic, or at least anti-polytheistic religions."[27] More likely some combination of the complexity and originality of his ideas, plus the facts that he was not affiliated with a university and left no students played a role. As mentioned, even Jaspers' idea of the axial age took some time to surface and receive wider attention across various disciplines.

Stuart-Glennie's account of the moral revolution

Before turning to his earlier discussions of 1873, I quote at length from Stuart-Glennie's 1906 paper, where he gives his description of the phenomenon, and mentions his earlier development of the theory in 1873. One also sees his idea of a sequence from panzoonist through supernaturalist conceptions of nature:

> Assyriological and Egyptological researches are more and more adding to our knowledge of the development of the earlier religions through the conflict between the primitive magical, or panzooist, and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature. The successive stages in this development cannot be, as yet, clearly distinguished. But one great epoch can be signalised—that which I was, I believe, the first, thirty-two years ago ([*In the Morningland*:] "New Philosophy of History," 1873), to point out as having occurred in the sixth (or fifth-sixth) century B.C. in all the countries of civilisation from the Hoangho to the Tiber. There arose then, as revolts against the old religions of outward observance or custom, new religions of inward purification or conscience—in China, Confucianism; in India, Buddhism; in Persia, Zoroastrianism; in Syria, Yahvehism (as a religion of the people rather than merely of the prophets), and changes of a similar character in the religions also of Egypt, of Greece, and of Italy.[28]

Here Stuart-Glennie states the facts as well as the intellectual significance of the Moral Revolution—Jaspers' Axial Age—contradicting Jaspers' claim to have been the first to grasp them as a whole in an articulated theory. He even lists the breakout of the Moral Revolution in the same order as Jaspers later did in the quotation I cited earlier, China, India, Persia, Syria (Palestine) and Greece, though Stuart-Glennie adds Egypt

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and Italy to the mix. In the sentences continuing the previous quotation, he acknowledged "religions of conscience rather than of custom," even as he had stated in his original 1873 publication: "Anterior to the Sixth Century, and to the New Religions of the Second Age of Humanity, Religion had no specially moral character."[29] He also delineated a greater remaining influence of the belief in the immanence of power in nature itself, or panzoonism, in Eastern Asian religions versus more supernaturalist conceptions in Western Asia and Europe:

> ii. But the new religions of Further Asia—though so far like the new religions of hither Asia and Europe, that they were, in their initiation at least, religions of conscience rather than of custom—were yet clearly distinguishable from the Western religions in one very important point. They retained in a much greater degree the fundamental conception of Panzooism, the conception of immanence of power in Nature itself. The new religions, on the other hand, of Western Asia and Europe, the Yahvehism of the sixth century B.C.; the Christianism of half a millennium later; and the Islamism after another half millennium, were, for the first time, supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but in their essential principle, the conception, not of a Power immanent in, but of a Creator independent of, Nature. But in the same sixth century B.C. in which supernaturalism thus, under the influence of the intellectually lower Semitic race, began first to acquire its historical influence in the West, that Greek philosophy and science arose of which the inmost principle was the inherency of power in Nature itself, and hence, law as opposed to miracle. As Aristotle, with Baconian wit, expressed it, "Nature is not episodic in its phenomena like a bad tragedy."[30]

So Stuart-Glennie also noted Greek philosophy and science as rooted in a conception of natural law, and the appearance of general reflection and speculation concerning philosophical history. His distinction of a panzoonist outlook and emergent supernaturalist religions provides a more differentiated conceptualization of the phenomena involved in the moral revolution than that of Jaspers. He also viewed panzoonism as key to aboriginal religion, and as a true primitive intuition of the workings of nature, albeit unquantified and clothed in false conceptions, that modern science would develop and complete. This is a marked contrast to Jaspers' idea that the axial age was the central pivot of all history, and that aboriginal religions were of little consequence. Panzoonism, as we shall see later, provided a basis for Stuart-Glennie's continuous stages of history, as well as an unlikely connection to the progress of modern scientific civilization.

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Intellectual, religious, and social dimensions of the moral revolution

Many commentators on the axial age have written on the significance of the religious dimension, as Joas has noted.[31] Stuart-Glennie also drew attention to the revolutionary religions which emerged as well, seeing the new religious outpourings as central. Yet he did not limit his discussion to the religious aspects of the revolution, but included the intellectual and socio-political as well, repeatedly returning to these three dimensions. At times in his 1873 statement he uses the terms *Intellectual Revolution, Religious Revolution, Social Revolution* to distinguish three dimensions of the general revolution from around the sixth century B.C.E. Similarly he used the term *Modern Revolution* in his three volumes published under that heading between 1876 and 1879 to characterize the legacy of the period:

> The main part of the work to which this is the last of the introductory volumes, will—if I am permitted to accomplish what I have for so many years been working-out principles, and collecting materials, for—give such outlines of the history of Eurasian Civilisation since the Sixth Century B.C. as will, at least, indicate the causes and consequences of those changes, political, religious, and economic, which we name in their totality, the Modern Revolution.[32]

He also took a secularist position regarding the phenomena, though allowing both the historical significance of religion as well as its continuing role for a new phase of history, albeit transformed. Here, in his original 1873 statement Stuart-Glennie describes three aspects of the moral revolution under the headings of philosophy, religion, and polity:

> Under these three heads, therefore, we shall summarise the events which make of the Sixth Century B.C. such an era of Revolution, intellectual, moral, and social, as would appear to be unsurpassed in the recorded annals of Humanity. Note, then, first, as illustrative of the *Intellectual Revolution* of this Century, three great general facts. Throughout the civilised world, in Japan (?), China, India, Persia, Judaea, Greece, and Egypt, we find a new intellectual activity in collecting, editing, and for the first time writing down in alphabetic characters the Literature of the preceding centuries. It is only in this century that a Profane, as distinguished from a Sacred Literature arises; only from this time forth that, speaking generally, we have independent and nameable individual authors; and only now that, in the speculations of Thales, philosophical, as distinguished from religious

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> Speculation, begins. And further, it is to this century that is to be traced, in the down-writing of the Ormuzd-and-Ahriman Creed of the Persians and the new development of the Messiahism of the Jews, the first beginnings of general reflection on the Past, and speculation on the Future of Mankind; the first beginnings, therefore, of Universal, and Philosophical History; the first beginnings of such reflection and speculation as that with which we are ourselves now occupied. Such are the three great general facts which will, I think, be acknowledged as marking the Sixth Century B.C. as an Era of immense Intellectual Revolution.[33]

Stuart-Glennie drew attention to how changes in literacy influenced the Intellectual Revolution, including the collecting and editing of works, the emergence of alphabetic writing (from earlier logographic), and identifiable authorship. A number of later commentators from Jaspers on have also drawn attention to the importance of literacy for the diffusion and institutionalization of the "axial breakthrough."[34] Philosophical speculation also emerges as independent from religious speculation. He then goes on to describe the profound religious changes that simultaneously occurred:

> But far more extraordinary still will this Century be found as an Era of Religious Revolution. Independent investigators of the history of Japan (?), of China, of India, of Persia, of Assyria, of Judaea, of Greece, and of Egypt have found that the Religion of each of them underwent a great moral change or transformation in the same Sixth Century B.C. In Japan (?), there then arose the religion of Sinto; in China, that of Confucius; in India, that of Buddha. If the Polytheisms of Assyria, of Greece, and of Egypt did not, like that of India, give birth in this century to a distinctly new religion, to this century we trace a profound disorganisation of them, and change in their spirit. And the Aryan and Semitic Monotheisms of Persia and of Judaea, Mazdayacnianism and Jehovianism, came now, at Babylon, into contact, and, in the new enthusiasm of the Messiahism of the one, and the World-conquest of the other, exercised the most profoundly revolutionary effects on the creeds and institutions of Mankind. Such were the revolutions accomplished by that vast tidal wave of new religious emotion which, in the Sixth Century B.C., swept round the whole globe of Humanity, from Japan and China to the European shores of the Mediterranean.[35]

Note in the quotation above that he allows that "the Polytheisms of Assyria, of Greece, and of Egypt," though not giving birth to a "distinctly new religion," still exhibited a "profound disorganisation of them, and a change in their spirit," suggesting that the moral revolution was at work in these cultures, even if it did not result in transforming the

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religious aspect of them. He also singles out Babylon as a focal point, a point of contact, implying the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great in 539 B.C.E. as he expanded his empire, and his subsequent release of the captive Judeans, who had been brought there by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.E. Unlike the earlier wholesale captivity of the northern Israelites by the Assyrians 150 years earlier, Nebuchadnezzar selectively removed primarily the intelligentsia, as Assyriologist Irving Finkel puts it, "with the intention of acculturating them—of getting them to be 'Babylonianized'—so that, once reeducated, they might be reinstated back home."[36] With Cyrus's victory and permission for the Judeans to return to Judea, a process of return that has been described as a "trickle" rather than a sudden event occurred, involving a literate elite and pressing needs to inscribe an identity rooted in monotheism distinguishable from the Babylonian culture.[37] The empire building of Cyrus and its consequence of the return of the Judean intelligentsia mark an interesting meeting point in the emergence of the moral revolution.

The third revolutionary aspect of the moral revolution that Stuart-Glennie notes is the socio-political dimension, wherein state formation, the ideas associated later with Christianity, and the origins of republicanism are to be found:

> But, just as there can be no important change in a man's opinions and beliefs without a change in his conduct; so, on the great stage of History we shall find that the great Intellectual and Religious Revolutions of the Sixth Century B.C. were accompanied by a correspondingly great Social Revolution. Note, as illustrative of such a Revolution these three great general facts. First, then, we find this Century socially marked in the Further East by the drawing together of small communities into great states; and, through the conquests of Cyrus and Cambyses, in Central Asia and the Mediterranean East, the establishment of the first World-empire. Secondly, it is now, and not, as is often so ignorantly or dishonestly affirmed, on the five-hundred-years-later preaching of Christianity; it is now that we first find, and in the Literature of all the civilised peoples of the Earth, maxims of Neighbourly Love, Equality, and Universal Brotherhood; nor this only, which would be but a Literary, and not a Social Fact; but a complete disorganisation of previously existing polities directly traceable to the feelings expressed in such maxims; and in India, more particularly, a revolution which aimed at, and for a time accomplished the utter annihilation of Caste. And thirdly, we have to note the foundation in this Century of European Republicanism by Greece and Rome. A Social Revolution, therefore, I think we must, in this Sixth Century, acknowledge of the greatest magnitude.[38]

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Great states and the establishment of first world-empire by Cyrus the Great, new ideas of neighborly love, equality, and universal brotherhood, and the beginnings of democratic republics mark the "social revolution." Stuart-Glennie then summarizes these three perspectives and notes that they may be characterized as a time when human consciousness made a differentiation between subjective and objective:

> I think it must be allowed that, in the Sixth Century B.C.—though the races to the east and west of the Indus hardly then even knew of each other's existence—great, and similar revolutions took place among every one of the civilised peoples of the earth; and hence, that that century was an era of one universal revolution in the intellectual activities, religious aspirations, and social institutions of Humanity. Nor this only. For if we reflect on the essential meaning and significance of such facts as those above stated in illustration of the character of the Sixth Century Revolution, I think it will be found that, as clearly as any facts in the history of the individual consciousness, these facts in the history of the general human consciousness bespeak, or may be generalised as, a differentiation of Subjective and Objective. I can here, however, only suggest for special consideration the central, most general, and largest fact of all—the rise of New Religions; the distinctively moral character of these Religions; and the subjective nature of their chief determinants—the reflections of great prophets on human depravity, idolatrous worship, and social misery.[39]

As mentioned earlier, Jaspers' mentor Max Weber had delineated a wide-ranging discussion of the place of prophets in the development of world religions. We see Stuart-Glennie making the same observation concerning "the Prophetianism of the Second Age" decades before Weber, but as explicitly a manifestation of the moral revolution. And again, using the term *Prophetianism* to characterize the religions of the moral revolution:

> . . . we find the religions of this Age of a far more abstract character. They are also, though in one aspect certainly, great social growths, yet in such a way as we find no example of in the previous Age, founded by individual Moral Teachers, after whom these religions are called Buddhism, Christianism, and Mohammedanism. And hence we distinguish the Religion generally of this Second Age as *Prophetianism*.[40]

The common assumption, widely held today, that the essence of religion is moral belief is shown to be based on a historical shift that increased the centrality of morality in religion. The warring and often wanton gods of the Babylonians and ancient Greeks, for example, lived by supernatural rules beyond human morality, and even there they sometimes broke the

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rules. So one can see how revolutionary a shift it was to make morality a primary characteristic of religion. The pronounced differentiation of subjective and objective to which Stuart-Glennie in the quotation above drew attention is seen by him as a developmental achievement of the moral revolution on the way to a projected third age of humanity.

Clearly Stuart-Glennie not only grasped the significance of what he termed the moral revolution, of its universalizing character and development of reflective consciousness, its differentiating of subjective and objective, but characterized it with a deep and broad command of the historical facts and their historical import. Where Jaspers' discussions tend toward the theme of transcendence as a source of axial ideas, Stuart-Glennie roots his understanding of the phenomena, of history and religion, in a social conception of causality. He sought a social scientific perspective that could give a concrete basis for the origins of beliefs and development of consciousness. Hence the differentiation of subjective and objective, as well as the sense of transcendence, also furthers the development of supernaturalism as transcendence, as above nature.

Stuart-Glennie distinguished his three-stage account of the history of thought, what he termed "the Ultimate Law of History," from Hegel's (as did Jaspers later), and also from Hume and Comte's schemas, emphasizing that science required verifiable empirical facts, and that "…the development of Thought must be stated as relative to terrestrial Conditions…*Thought, in its differentiating and Integrating Activity, advances, under terrestrial Conditions, from the conception of Onesided Determination, through the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective, to the conception of Mutual Determination.*"[41]

"Terrestrial Conditions" were key to the development of mind, a view that suggests some analogies to Marx and Engels' "historical materialism," where changes in practices of production produced changes in social relations and dominant ideologies. Yet though Stuart-Glennie was a socialist politically, and was aware of Marx and Engels' work, there was no explicit influence of Marx and Engels on his view of history, and unlike them, he explicitly denied the equality of races.

It is instructive to compare Stuart-Glennie's tripart model of historical development to that of Comte's "Law of the Three Periods." Like Comte, Stuart-Glennie sought a universal law, and was sympathetic with Comte's attempt to delineate one scientifically. Comte had stated near the opening of his 1830 work, *Course of Positive Philosophy*: "In thus studying the total development of human intelligence in its different spheres of activity,

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from its first and simplest beginning up to our own time, I believe that I have discovered a great fundamental law, to which the mind is subjected by an invariable necessity."[42] Comte's law of three stages of "the progressive course of the human mind" claimed a movement from fictional to true conceptions:

> The truth of this law can, I think, be demonstrated both by reasoned proofs furnished by a knowledge of our mental organization, and by historical verification due to an attentive study of the past. This law consists in the fact that each of our principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes in succession through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive state. In other words, the human mind—by its very nature—in each of its researches makes use successively of three methods of philosophizing, whose characters are essentially different, and even radically opposed to each other. We have first the theological method, then the metaphysical method, and finally the positive method. Hence there are three kinds of philosophy or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, which are mutually exclusive of each other. The first is the necessary starting point of human intelligence; the third represents its fixed and definitive state; the second is destined to serve only as a transitional method.[43]

Comte imagined a movement from "theological" mind, as based in a "fictitious" outlook which held "phenomena as being produced by the direct and continuous action of more or less numerous supernatural agents, whose arbitrary intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the universe."[44] In the subsequent metaphysical stage, "the supernatural agents are replaced by abstract forces, real entities or personified abstractions." And finally, the positivist stage gives up the quest for absolute knowledge as not validly attainable, and "only endeavors now to discover, by a well-combined use of reasoning and observation, the actual *laws* of phenomena."[45] Hence the human mind progresses from fictionalizing to a mode of knowing based on reasoning from positive observation, that is, to positive science.

Stuart-Glennie acknowledged the place of Comte's thinking as part of an "earlier synthetic period which marks the history of all great theories," a period including the theories of Hume and Hegel. But he argues that the relevant ascertained facts of the time were simply too limited to produce anything more than "suggestive hypotheses."[46] His criticism amounts to claiming that subsequent empirical research has revealed far more "adequate collections of facts" which bear directly on such things

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as "the distinctive character of primitive (or relatively primitive) conceptions of nature … discovery of the main conditions of the origins of civilization, and therewith of intellectual development," as well as "the unity and synchronous epochs of civilization."[47] By this last he meant his discovery of the moral revolution. But it is also important to realize that Stuart-Glennie was a practicing folklorist and classicist who did his own fieldwork as well as followed the latest archaeological and philological research of his time.

As against Comte's initial theological or "fictitious" stage, Stuart-Glennie argued for a less arbitrary first stage, allowing true *intuitions* of the laws of nature, only clothed in fictional or fantastic *conceptions*. Hence his first stage included causal determination of mind by "terrestrial conditions," even if "one-sided" and inadequately conceptualized. And to Comte's second "metaphysical" stage, Stuart-Glennie argued for a somewhat parallel transitional phase, only one in which supernaturalism first emerged, and was then later given a new character in the moral revolution. With Comte, Stuart-Glennie held that the third stage is characterized by science, but his conception of science allowed that it was continuous with the first stage, only transforming the true intuitions and false conceptions of the first stage into true intuitions expressed in validly determined conceptions, a movement from "one-sided determination" to "mutual determination."

Thus the history of human consciousness, in Stuart-Glennie's outlook, involved three great stages, tied to progressively emerging conceptions of causality. The first was the panzoonist, an outlook in which a unity of nature was expressed through "supernal" or "sentient powers," experienced as immanent in nature and emanations of it. This first stage was yet a "Onesided Determination" of mind, a religious outlook he elsewhere characterized as "Naturianism." The second stage involved a change from supernal to supernatural conceptions of causality, from powers and gods embedded in nature to gods above nature, a change beginning to occur in the development of early civilizations but radically heightened in the age of the moral revolution. Through its differentiation and elaboration of subjective and objective realms, and even its necessary fictions, the moral revolution brought about a movement toward a future reconciliation of naturalism, cosmos, and science, a third stage of "Mutual Determination" yet to emerge, as we shall see.

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Notes

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2 Ibid., 3–4.
3 Ibid., 2.
4 Karl Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 98.
5 Ernst von Lasaulx, *Neuer Versuch einer Philosophie der Geschichte* (Munich, 1856), 115.
6 Jaspers, *Goal of History*, 8–9.
7 Hans Joas, "The Axial Age Debate as Religious Discourse," in *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, ed. R. Bellah and H. Joas (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 16.
8 Jaspers, *Goal of History*, 9.
9 Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkely: University of California Press, [1922] 1978), 442.
10 Weber, *Economy and Society*, 441–442.
11 Cited in John D. Boy and John Torpey, "Inventing the Axial Age: The Origins and Uses of a Historical Concept." *Theory and Society* 42.3 (2013):243.
12 Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), 57.
13 Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Human Development* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1967), 258.
14 "The present crisis calls for an axial change in our whole system of thinking and in the social order based on it. Deliberately, I use the word 'axial' in a double sense, meaning first of all that there must be a change in values, and further a change so central that all the other activities that rotate around this axis will be affected by it" (Mumford, 1951: 226).
15 Mumford, *Technics and Human Development*, 308.
16 Ibid., 305.
17 Patrick Geddes, "The Late Mr. J.S. Stuart-Glennie," *The Sociological Review* Vol A3, 4 (1910), 317.
18 Ibid., 310.
19 John Stuart Stuart-Glennie, "Written Comments," in *Sociological Papers, Volume 1*, ed. Francis Galton et al. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1905), 232.
20 Ibid., 234.
21 John Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," in *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 267.
22 John Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution, Proemia III: Europe and Asia: Discussions of the Eastern Question in Travels through Independent, Turkish, and Austrian Illyria* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1879), ix.

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23 John Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland: Or, The Law of the Origin and Transformation of Christianity. Volume 1: The New Philosophy of History* (London: Longman, Greens, and Company, 1873), vii–viii.
24 Richard M. Dorson, ed., *Peasant Customs and Savage Myths, Selections from the British Folklorists*, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 515.
25 Geddes, "Late Mr. Stuart-Glennie," 318.
26 "Proemia 2," or Volume 2 of *The Modern Revolution* was actually published earlier, in 1876.
27 At the end of his book *Europe and Asia*, the publisher listed part of a review of Stuart-Glennie's previous book, *Pilgrim-Memories*, from the *Theological Review*: "As Christianity depended, according to Mr. Stuart-Glennie, both as to dogma and polity, on a philosophy of History now proved erroneous, so the modern revolution depends upon the discovery of a new philosophy of History, or ultimate Law of Human Development. This begins to be unfolded in the interesting and brilliant dialogues which constitute the real centre of the work, and together make up the chapter entitled 'The Shore of the Sea of Coral' .... Discussions, often very suggestive and fruitful to those who differ most widely from his conclusions.... His remarkable theory of a former great moral and social revolution in the 6th century B.C. to which he ascribes the origin of monotheistic, or at least anti-polytheistic religions, and the universal expression of maxims of brotherly love."
28 Stuart-Glennie, *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, 262.
29 John Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 220, fn.1.
30 Ibid., 262–263.
31 Hans Joas, "The Axial Age Debate as Religious Discourse," in *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, ed. R. Bellah and H. Joas (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 9–29.
32 John Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution*, xii–xiii.
33 John Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 212–214.
34 Jan Assman has claimed that the later canonization of the writings is more decisive than the originating figures themselves: "The decisive event is not the terrestrial existence of the great individuals but the canonization of their writings....If we insist on a first period of axialization, we could point to the years about 200 BCE to 200 CE when the great canons were established: the Confucian, the Daoist, and the Buddhist canons in the East, and the Avesta, the Hebrew bible and the canon of Greek 'classics' in the West. This is not the time when *Homo sapiens axialis*, 'the human being with whom we are still living,' came into being, but when the texts were canonized that we are still reading." Jan Assman, "Cultural memory and the Myth of the Axial Age," in *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, ed. R. Bellah and H. Joas (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 399.
35 Ibid., 214–215.

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36 Elliot Jaeger, "Meeting Irving Finkel," *Blogspot Interview*, Sept. 24, 2010, accessed October 23, 2013, http://elliotjager.blogspot.co.uk/2010/09/meeting-irving-finkel.html.

37 Lester L. Grabbe, *A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period: Yehud – A History of the Persian Province of Judah v. 1.* (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 355.

As Finkel puts it, "The exile challenged the Judeans to refine their ideas about their single God. Thinking of God as an elusive abstraction did not serve to maintain cohesion. To complicate matters further, there were local theologians in Babylon who were also arguing for one god: their patron deity was Marduk, and they held that all the other gods were but manifestations of his powers. We have cuneiform records encapsulating this dispute among Babylonian theologians.

As a single god, Marduk contributed to the insecurity of Jewish belief. The great fear was that the Judean flock would succumb to idol worship or to marrying out, or both. If that happened, the population would disappear just like the Northern Israelites in Assyria. This threat engendered the need for the biblical text to be finished, in order to solidify the Judeans' belief in their superior understanding of monotheism. What was needed was a theology.

So the "Jews" did something to prevent a replay of the Assyrian outcome. What they did was to produce the Bible, a work that practically screams out that it was written by humans.

Remember, the Judeans arrived already literate. They had with them the chronicles of their kings; trunk-loads of scrolls. They wove these into a narrative, while the missing bits—meaning, from the start of humanity until the point where their historical records began—they took from the local tradition and bent to fit ethical Jewish ideas" (Jaeger, 2010).

38 Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 215–216.

39 Ibid., 216.

40 Ibid., 224.

41 Ibid., 191.

42 Auguste Comte, *Introduction to Positive Philosophy*, ed. Frederick Ferre (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co. [1830] 1988), 1.

43 Comte, *Introduction*, 1–2.

44 Ibid., 2.

45 Ibid.

46 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," *The International Monthly* (April, 1901), 445.

47 Ibid., 445.

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2
Religion, Habitat, and Cosmos

Abstract: *Religion, as Stuart-Glennie conceived it, is rooted in intuitions and conceptions of causation, developed out of relations to the physical and social environments. This starting point allowed a perceptive and experiential element to religion as expressive of life-experience, not simply of human sociality per se. Stuart-Glennie characterized the origins of religion as Panzoonist, literally "all life," and this chapter describes how he distinguished it from anthropologist E. B. Tylor's well-known idea of animism. He argued that with civilizational structures rooted in what he terms "a* colonist-origin *theory," panzooinist belief transitioned into supernaturalist beliefs of polytheism and later, monotheism. His racial assumptions involved in his "colonist-origin theory" are criticized, and his understanding of supernaturalism as legitimating the dominant elite and its relation to the moral revolution are discussed. Stuart-Glennie's understanding of religion is contrasted with that of Emile Durkheim.*

Keywords: panzooinism; animism; supernal; supernaturalism; *colonist-origin* theory of civilization; Emile Durkheim

Halton, Eugene. *From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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> For if, in beholding the starry day of the universe, we feel ourselves to be but infinitesimal microbes, may we not console ourselves with the thought of our capacity of attaining, as parts of that kosmos, an ever more approximately true world-consciousness, and therewith of becoming ever more duly conscious of its and our infinity and eternity?
>
> Stuart-Glennie, 1901

Panzooinism versus Animism

Stuart-Glennie defined religion in 1873 as "the emotion excited by the Causes of Things, however these are conceived," and in his 1892 essay, "The Origins of Mythology," stated: "Religion is, subjectively, the Social Emotion excited by the Environments of Existence, conceived in the progressive forms determined by Economic and Intellectual Conditions; and is, objectively, the Ritual Observances in which that Emotion is expressed."[1]

Religion, as social emotion, is not characterized as simply a fictional conception, as it was in Comte's first stage of "Theology," nor even as a system of collective representations mirroring society to itself, as found in Durkheim's outlook, though Stuart-Glennie's account could include that perspective. Stuart-Glennie claimed that the social emotions and ritual observances are "excited by the Environments of Existence," that is, are in relation to the physical and social habitat conditions.

He gives a further definition in his second of three "Sociological Studies" from the 1906 collection as

> *an ideal of conduct derived from some general conception of the environments of existence.* Thus defined in its individual reference, religion may, in its social reference, be thus further defined—the observances in which environment-conceptions, determined in their forms by physical and social conditions, are authoritatively expressed. For in all stages of human society, there is a more or less definite ideal of conduct, and system of observances; the former doctrinally determined by, and the latter ritually expressing, conceptions of the environments of existence.[2]

Religion, as Stuart-Glennie conceived it, is rooted in intuitions and conceptions of causation, developed out of relations to the physical and social environments. This starting point allowed a perceptive and

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experiential element to religion as expressive of life-experience, not simply of human sociality per se, though inclusive of it. It does not disallow cultural or ideological elements, but it also does not reduce religion to something like what anthropologist Clifford Geertz defined as a "cultural system." From this starting point Stuart-Glennie based his developmental law of history as rooted in changing conceptions of causation.[3] His definition places, it seems to me, a unique emphasis on the origins of religion as involving relation to habitat and experience. One sees, perhaps, the influence of his conception of science and of socialism on his thought.

Stuart-Glennie characterized the origins of religion as panzoonist, literally "all life," which he distinguished from anthropologist E. B. Tylor's well-known idea of animism. The two views may at first seem indistinguishable, so it is useful to examine briefly Tylor's theory of animism. Tylor, attempting to explain the origins of religion, had written in his 1871 book, *Primitive Culture*, "The theory of Animism divides into two great dogmas, forming part of one consistent doctrine: first, concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body; second, concerning other spirits upward to the rank of powerful deities."[4] Animism gives an account of things as inhabited by spirits or souls. A tree, for example, can be seen as a being to be revered because of a spirit which endows it with sacredness. As Tylor put it elsewhere:

> It seems as though thinking men, as yet at a low level of culture, were deeply impressed by two groups of biological problems. In the first place, what is it that makes a difference between a living body and a dead one; what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, death? In the second place, what are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions? Looking at these two groups of phenomena, the ancient savage philosophers probably made their first step by the obvious inference that every man has two things belonging to him, namely, a life and a phantom as being its image or second self; both, also, are perceived to be things separable from the body. . . . The second step would seem also easy for savages to make, seeing how extremely difficult civilized men have found it to unmake. It is merely to combine the life and the phantom. . . . the result is that well-known conception . . . the personal soul, or spirit.[5]

Notably missing in Tylor's account here is any possible relation of the "phantom" or soul to perceptive experience. Though apparitions and supernatural figures may be merely arbitrary figments, Stuart-Glennie

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sought an account that could allow how soul phenomena might also express intuitions of causal powers *inherent in* phenomena.

Already in his 1873 book, *In the Morningland*, only two years after Tylor's book, Stuart-Glennie criticized the term "animism" as inadequate to the theory Tylor was attempting to express, claiming that "Spiritism" would have better fit Tylor's purpose:

> To the general theory of Supernatural Agents, and beliefs in Spiritual Beings, Mr Tylor, in his learned and suggestive work on *Primitive Culture*, has given the term *Animism*. But I venture to think that Spiritism would be a preferable term. For, in the first place, "Animism," as he himself acknowledges (vol. II. P. 384), is a term in great measure identified with the special theory of Stahl. Secondly, "Animism" does not, while "spiritism" does at once, explain itself as the doctrine of Spirits. Thirdly, "Spiritism" has the advantage, not shared by "Animism," of connecting the vulgar theory of what I would call Homian phenomena with the general theory of Supernatural Agents, and thus making the one throw light on the other. Fourthly, "Animism" does not, while "Spiritism" does, apply equally well to the supernatural theory of God as to the supernatural theory of the Soul. And, finally, "Animism" gives no such expressive adjective, and adjective-noun, as "Spiritist," and "Spiritists."[6]

Animism views concrete forms as animated, as though from without by a "phantom." But Stuart-Glennie argued that the livingness of things, themselves regarded as powers, was a more basic and accurate way to portray aboriginal beliefs. A tree may be revered as sacred because its powers inherently include the capacity to provide food and shelter, to appear to die to winter and be reborn in the spring. These practical and aesthetic qualities of the tree are indeed living powers it possesses, which may be personified or conceptualized, or memorialized in story or ritual. It is not so much a question of animate or inanimate, according to Stuart-Glennie, but of different kinds of powers. His conception of Panzooinism, of the livingness and living powers of things as sources of religious belief and practice, strikes me as a valuable insight, a more accurate way of understanding the phenomena that have been understood as animism since the time of Tylor. It goes well beyond Jaspers' conception of what he took to be primitive culture, as I shall show later, even if Stuart-Glennie's progressivism limited his understanding of its full evolutionary significance. In considering uncivilized peoples Jaspers resorted to biological outlooks that bypassed the beliefs and conduct of aboriginal peoples in favor of discussing physiology, and wrongly

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dismissed aboriginal religious views as insignificant, as I will discuss in Chapter 4.

Let us consider some of Stuart-Glennie's statements on *Panzooinism*, which he earlier called *Zooinism*. In his "Queries as to Dr. Tylor's Views on Animism," from 1892, he attempted to distinguish how the phenomena of nature manifest innate powers, so as to be regarded by the panzoonist mind as living and sentient rather than possessed from without: "Hence, as terms connoting this general concrete conception of Things as themselves Powers, however low the expression of it, or however high, I would propose the terms *Zoonism* and *Zoonist*, derived from the Greek ζῶον, an animal. For what is distinctive of our conception of an animal is that it has *innate* powers—powers due to its very existence, and not to something else which has taken possession of it, and acts through it, but is not properly the animal itself. In a less accurate way, one may define the Zoonist conception of Nature as a conception of all Things as living; but more accurately, as I have said, it is a conception of all Things as themselves Powers, and in which no definite discrimination is made between dead and living matter, save as possessed of *different* powers."[7] Note "all Things as themselves Powers," which is a key difference of Stuart-Glennie's conception from Tylor's animism.

And elsewhere:

> I would define Zooinist Ideas, or in a word Zoonism, as *The Conception of the Objects of Nature as Sentient Powers influencing and being influenced, according to their diverse capacities, at any distance, and even to the extent of transforming and being transformed*. This Zoonist conception of Nature as a Solidarity of Sentient Powers united by their Mutual Influences would appear to be the primitive form of man's consciousness of Nature. And its origin must, I think, be referred to that Kosmos-animating, differentiating, and integrating Energy which Mind essentially is.[8]

Here the further distinction characterizing panzooinism is introduced, in which the objects of nature are regarded as sentient powers. Nature, not simply as a projection of human society, but as a "Solidarity of Sentient Powers," is what Stuart-Glennie took to be the original object of religion. Religion originates as man's "consciousness of Nature," in which nature is living and mindful. Indeed, it is only in the post-panzoonist phase of civilization that religion refocuses its object from nature to the supernatural.

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This may seem difficult at first to understand, given that we take the idea of sentient trees, rocks, or weather as supernatural conceptions today. Modern scientific materialism has stripped nature of general sentience and telos. Yet today's commonplace represents a 180-degree turn from traditional views of nature, which emphasized animate as living *process* rather than simply living *things*. To give one example, Linguist Dan Moonhawk Alford noted the gap of consciousness between many aboriginal, more verb-based languages, and the more dominant noun-based languages, such as English, in a suggestive "Worldview Thought Experiment," he published online in 1994. He argued for animate not as "living," not as

> a fixed property of the object, but a property of the relationship… [as] potentiality working its way out into the manifest realm… Our society and its institutions, perhaps especially the medical institution, are driven by nouns. Most of our diseases are nouns, which we most often HAVE: I have a headache, a stomach ache, acne, cancer, mumps, measles, etc., etc. Each of these can also be seen as a verb or process instead of a "thing", but to talk about them in this way is weird at first: I'm headaching, stomach-aching, acneing, cancering, mumpsing, measlesing. But what a difference: now these are not things you have, but processes your body is going through, which you have more control over than if it's a "thing" that has nothing intrinsically to do with you. As you can tell by now, there could be other medical systems which exploit the verb-consciousness around dis-easing, not feeling at ease, which we usually automatically reject because of our addiction to nouns, thinking the world doesn't make any sense without them.[9]

Carolyn Merchant provides some perspective on the profound implications of the shift:

> The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos constituted the death of nature—the most far-reaching effect of the Scientific Revolution. Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles moved by external rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature. Moreover, as a conceptual framework, the mechanical order had associated with it a framework of values based on power, fully compatible with the directions taken by commercial capitalism.[10]

Where earlier worldviews took life as the given and death the great mystery, "the death of nature" described by Merchant as the result of the rise of the modern scientific paradigm reversed the process, so that the great question became how animate life could arise from inert matter. Life

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was now taken to consist of moving things, not self-directing sentience, and the belief in the presence of spontaneous soul or a reasonableness in things became transformed to a "prime mover" or great calculative "clock maker" behind the laws of nature, the ghost in the machine. How different the mechanical clock metaphor is from that of spontaneous soul expressing as the living powers of things.

Anthropologist Tim Ingold cites a Wemindji Cree man's definition of life, as reported to ethnographer Colin Scott, as "continuous birth." Ingold continues: "…It goes to the heart of the matter. To elaborate: life in the animic ontology is not an emanation but a generation of being, in a world that is not pre-ordained but incipient, forever on the verge of the actual…One is continually present as witness to that moment, always moving like the crest of a wave, at which the world is about to disclose itself for what it is."[11]

By contrast, in the modern ethos the very universe itself became redefined as a vast unspontaneous clockwork, stillborn as it were. As Kepler put it: "My aim is to show that the heavenly machine is not a kind of divine, live being, but a kind of clockwork." Even the ghost was eventually given up for conceptions of nature simply as machine, though such views are up for question today by those considering self-organizing potentialities in the material universe *per se*.[12]

Stuart-Glennie claimed that there was a transition from original "supernal" beliefs, that is, higher sentient beings yet immersed in nature, to supernatural beliefs in the beginnings of civilizations. He proposed a progression of Folk-Culture developing from Panzoonist belief, an outlook not distinguishing between subjective and objective, and involving the supernal rather than supernatural: "But the beings thus created by the folk-imagination under strong emotional impressions are *not* in the earliest, or as I term it, panzoist, stage conceived as supernatural beings. I have therefore called them simply Supernal Beings."[13] These beings may "be above," in the literal sense of the term "supernal," may be of *more than human* capacity, but they remain manifestations of ongoing nature rather than "supernatural," or literally above nature.

It is in civilizational structures rooted in what he terms "a *colonist-origin* theory," that supernal belief transitions into supernaturalist beliefs of polytheism and later, monotheism. He took the development of "the belief in Spiritual Beings," of gods and fear, as a later, secondary result of initial conflict between what he called "the higher and lower races," in which he unfortunately mixed racism with the idea of civilized and

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non-civilized peoples, though admitting it transitioned into class conflict "at a later period, [into] classes of the same race."[14] His "higher" races were lighter white, yellow, and red skinned peoples; his "lower" races were everyone else.

The racial colonist-origin theory

Stuart-Glennie wrongly thought that his racial theory of colonizing conflict between lighter and darker peoples was consistent with evolutionary principles. He was aware of the most recent archaeological findings of his time, and of the earliest appearance of literacy in Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations. He was also aware to a degree of the kinds of conflicts and colonizing that emerged in the expansionism that marks early civilizational structures. We know more about the relation of agriculture, population, and state expansionism, the rise of mass killing warfare as a new kind of warring, and related phenomena, but Stuart-Glennie still saw that conflict was a key ingredient involved in the establishment of dominant elites and laboring subordinates.[15]

Yet in the name of science, he falsely presumed that biological racial differences, in which the lighter white, yellow, and red "races" were superior, could explain those origins and conflicts. His false racist assumptions were common in the sciences of the times, including key evolutionary thinkers. The same 1906 issue of *Sociological Papers* with Stuart-Glennie's three essays, for example, began with evolutionist Francis Galton's section, "Eugenics," which argued, among other things, that indiscriminate charity was "non-eugenic," and that "Eugenics certificates" should be handed out in the future to superior potential breeders. None of this, of course, justifies Stuart-Glennie's racism, but I simply want to put it in its context of the times.

Consider, for example, what the great science fiction writer, H.G. Wells, wrote in in *The American Journal of Sociology* in response to another Galton paper in 1904:

> I believe, that now and always the conscious selection of the best for reproduction will be impossible; that to propose it is to display a fundamental misunderstanding of what individuality implies. The way of nature has always been to slay the hindmost, and there is still no other way, unless we can prevent those who would become the hindmost being born. It is in the

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> sterilization of failure, and not in the selection of successes for breeding, that the possibility of an improvement of the human stock lies.[16]

Such ideas lasted well into the twentieth century, including statements, for example, by noted evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley, who coined the term "modern synthesis" to describe the new evolutionary theories emphasizing genetics. He wrote in 1941, when Nazi eugenic medical murders had already begun: "The lowest strata are reproducing too fast. Therefore … they must not have too easy access to relief or hospital treatment lest the removal of the last check on natural selection should make it too easy for children to be produced or to survive; long unemployment should be a ground for sterilization."[17] Julian Huxley's idealized Darwinian society is as grim as his brother Aldous's fictional one in *Brave New World*.

I would not want to find myself unemployed in this future, would you? As a high school student in 1968 I heard an eminent biologist repeat Galton's call for breeding "Eugenics certificates," as though he had invented it. He did not use the term "eugenics," which had been discredited since the Nazi horrors. But he proposed that women could be implanted with birth control devices in their arms, and a couple marrying could be given two certificates, each for removal of the devices to allow fertilization, with the device re-implanted after birth. Couples could purchase additional certificates for $10,000 dollars in 1968 currency, thereby insuring that population would be optimized to superior breeders, that is, people with money. Capitalist success was naively assumed to translate into the template for natural selection by these evolutionary biologists.

So there is a long history of racism and capitalistic classism taken as science. None of it justifies Stuart-Glennie's racist assumptions, but it illustrates the cultural context, now discredited, for his thinking.

Stuart-Glennie imagined that the intellectual powers of the "higher races" remained mostly unexercised until contact with the "lower races," when domination could provide leisure, which in turn could provide new outlets for invention:

> In the original homogeneous clans of the fair race there was probably neither any considerable leisure, nor any pressing need, for the development of their latent capacities. But when, as northern immigrants, they succeeded in imposing themselves on the dark equatorial races who had extended themselves into the Nile and Euphrates valleys, the conditions of their

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> existence changed. Appearing to the dark aborigines as gods, even as white settlers in modern times have often been regarded, and inducing them, even as white settlers to this day induce dark aborigines to work systematically under direction, the colonists of Chaldea and Egypt naturally obtained for themselves wealth and leisure.[18]

Labor by subordinate peoples would have provided leisure for the dominant ones, which is a fair assessment of the increased conflict, conquest, and inequality associated with the rise of civilizations. But the establishment and legitimation of superiors and inferiors is a mark of the civilizing process itself, in both the old world and the new, whether Sumer or Assyria in Mesopotamia or the Norte Chico or Inca civilizations in Peru, rather than a consequence of racial differences. Similarly the development of systematic agriculture and settlement are systemic hallmarks of the civilizing process rather than products of it. Yet Stuart-Glennie claimed that the leisure of the higher race rulers provided the channel for intellectual development that made systematic agriculture possible: "And this leisure the very conditions of their rule would force them to devote to intellectual work, and especially to those astronomical observations resulting in the discovery of the year,—the discovery, achievement of which led to prediction of, and hence power over, the devastating inundations of the Euphrates and the Nile; made possible a systematic agriculture; and led to the institution of regularly recurring religious festivities."[19]

Had Stuart-Glennie been more consistent with his own principles of the causal influence of "environments of existence" on the development of mind, perhaps he might have fathomed that the conditions of settled agriculture in emergent civilizations bred the conflicts, higher class inequalities, and resulting leisure/labor divides. But he did not.

In his obituary for Stuart-Glennie, Geddes cites his definition of civilization from his 1907 paper, "Roman Origins and History," published in the *Proceedings of the British and American Archaeological Society of Rome*. It gives some more details to Stuart-Glennie's racial conflict origin theory: "We may now define civilization as such a relation between higher and lower races, or classes of mixed race, as results in organization of food production and distribution, followed by such economic conditions as make possible the planning and execution of great public works, the invention of recording arts, therewith intellectual development, and hence a social progress of which the goal is voluntary cooperation."[20]

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His false assumption of racial inequality remains a starting point, but he then claims it results in the organizing of food production and distribution, as well as other institutions for building and recording, setting off conditions for development of "a social progress" culminating in a democratic "voluntary cooperation." It is not clear whether such a goal would represent a non-racialist egalitarianism, but he did believe in democracy as a goal of human development. Geddes addressed the seeming contradiction in Stuart-Glennie's view in his comment on the definition of civilization, saying, "Glennie's so far kindred sentiment of aristocracy and tradition in thought and feeling was notably compensated by a corresponding passion for democracy, which made him at one time the champion of insurgent Highland crofters, and at another, in our [sociological] Society's tranquil volumes, the prophet of 'the creation of the World-State, the embodiment of justice.'"[21] So it is unclear whether or how racial differences assumed by Stuart-Glennie would be eradicated through progress, or how unequal biologies could fit equitably in socialized society.

What has emerged since Stuart-Glennie's time, and even since that of Jaspers, is a better understanding of how domestication of plants and animals, settled agriculture, and the later development of cities radically reshaped all the dimensions of human societies and even human development. Radically altered "organizing of food production and distribution" was crucial, but not, as Stuart-Glennie thought, because of racial and class conflict, but because it created the conditions for class inequality and conflict and drastically increased hierarchical bureaucratic structure.

Later research has shown the profound and systematic changes to habitat and social life that agriculture brought with it, whether in the old world or new, changes which provide a much sounder basis for understanding the conflicts Stuart-Glennie pointed out than his racialist one.[22] Domestication and agriculture made civilization possible, with new centralized power and imperial conquest, as well as new state religions with supernatural deities.[23] But Stuart-Glennie's main point was that such supernaturalism proved a means for the dominant civilized groups to legitimize their power and break up older Panzoonist customs: "And my contention is, that fear was not specially developed and exploited until the establishment—at what is now an approximately dateable period—of the Hell-Religions of Civilization."[24] And, "one very potent cause of the development of homely supernal, into stately supernatural, beings, worshipped in elaborate and grandly spectacular rites was the need, the very

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practical and pressing need of cultivating every germ of the emotions of reverence, awe, and fear, in order to the due subordination and discipline of the lower races."[25]

Stuart-Glennie provides a compelling account of how the rise of supernatural beings served purposes of legitimation. Yet his idea of colonizing racial dominance falsely makes race the factor in colonizing, rather than, say, population expansion due to agriculture, or royal greed due to exalted power and property. His theory of exploitative race/class conflict as central to the establishment of civilizational structures suggests parallels to Marx and Engels' discussions of transitions from primitive communism to class conflict. Stuart-Glennie read and commented on Marx and Engels and many other works of socialism and was a socialist politically, yet did not explicitly address his differences from their views.[26] Marx and Engels saw clearly how class struggle rather than "race" was the determining factor, a valuable insight unfortunately denied by Stuart-Glennie, despite his socialist beliefs. Indeed, in his 1892 essay "The Origins of Institutions," he explicitly denied the equality of humankind in favor of racial inequality, and his words might be taken as a critique of Marx or Engels for being "inadequately" racist:

> The Origins of Property involve the question of the Origins of Capital. Now, according to the presently dominant theory of Socialism on this subject, Capital is derived exclusively from the exploitation of labour. But consideration of the actual historical origins of Capital shows us two Races—one, which fulfilled its proper function as workers; and another which fulfilled the function, no less in accordance with its capacities, nor less necessary to the accumulation of Capital, the function of Thinkers and Rulers. The current Theory is based on the false postulate of the Equality of Human Races. The new Theory is based on that fact of Inequality of which the final outcome will be functional Oneness.[27]

The progress from racial inequality to "functional Oneness" could seem to suggest a possible goal of racial equality, or it could simply mean an acceptance of functional differentiation of higher and lower. Stuart-Glennie's socialism was not without contradictions.

From panzoonism to supernatural

The earliest civilizations produced markedly increased hierarchy and inequality, tiny elites organized around sacrilized kingship which projected

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the religious-bureaucratic legitimacy of the state in order to dominate and discipline subordination.[28] Despite his racist preconceptions, Stuart-Glennie's ideas of the rise of polytheistic and later monotheistic supernatural beliefs, and of what he called "the Hell-Religions of Civilization" as serving purposes of socio-political legitimacy, was an accurate way of understanding how the unfolding of power-based civilizations involved the emergence of power-based supernaturalism to legitimize the new way of life. Had he allowed such political and economic ideas of hierarchy and inequality their full weight, he could have realized that his racial theories were unnecessary, not to mention wrong.

Take, for example, the Babylonian creation myth, *The Atrahasis*, whose earliest extant versions date from around 1700 B.C.E. It begins with a complaint that the gods are working too hard, digging canals among other things:

> When the gods instead of man
> Did the work, bore the loads,
> The gods' load was too great,
> The work too hard, the trouble too much.[29]

So the lesser gods revolt against their overburden, and appeal to the god Ellil (Enlil in Sumerian) for relief. This creation myth embodies a human projection from the new burdens imposed by agriculturally based city living, given that settled agriculture requires a much greater amount of work than foraging. These new demands of increased labor are first projected onto the gods, who mirror mythically the actual conditions the humans are facing.

It is decided to relieve the gods of their hard work by creating laboring creatures who will do it instead: humans. The gods sacrifice one of their own in the creation of humans, mixing his blood with clay. Now the Sumerians and Babylonians wrote on clay. They built their cities with bricks of clay. Their creation myth shows humans to be made from the stuff that their city itself was made from, clay, as well as from their gods, and also represents the shift from foraging religious outlooks on the world as a *gift* to civilized perspectives holding sacredness as rooted in *sacrifice*:

> Belet-ili the womb-goddess is present—
> Let her create primeval man
> So that he may bear the yoke…
> So that he may bear the yoke [the work of Ellil],
> Let man bear the load of the gods![30]

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And so humans:

> Made new picks and spades,
> Made big canals,
> To feed people and sustain the gods.[31]

Let man bear the load of the gods indeed. Who would want to argue with the gods? The king or pharaoh, perhaps that is another story. One might want to argue with a political figure. But then the invention of kingship with civilization brought with it not only the means of societal control through coercive power, probably originally rooted in the "strong man," but also the development of divine or quasi-divine status for the king, thus insuring the same loyalty as that given to the supernaturals.

The king was the first superstar celebrity of civilization, centerpiece of brute power and religious superpower. Together these could produce, as Stuart-Glennie put it in the quotation above, "the emotions of reverence, awe, and fear, in order to the due subordination and discipline of," not "the lower races," as he believed, but the subordinated or enslaved peoples and classes. Supernaturalism helped institutionalize the emergence of anthropocentric mind, initially in the progressively human-like gods and their city-like pantheons, and culminating in the appearance of the specialized human deity in the form of the divine or semi-divine king.[32] The pyramid tombs of Egypt still stand to this day as testimony to the grandiosity of the institution of kingship and the elevation of the ideals of immortality and afterlife.

And though paradise may be the goal of some of the "supernaturalist" religions, Hell has important religious purposes as well, according to Stuart-Glennie. Noting an absence of belief in Hell or at most only a vague reference to it in "Greek and Keltic Folk-poesy" he saw a marked contrast in Egyptian and Chaldean mythology: "In Egyptian and Chaldean Mythology, however, a prodigious development is given to this notion . . . But in view of such a Conflict as that in which Civilisation appears to have originated, it must have been so evidently the interest of the leisured and learned Class to develop and systematise all the germs of terrorising superstitions among the labouring and unlearned Masses that we cannot neglect this fact as a most important element in the development of Myth and Religion."[33] The systematizing of all "the germs of terrorizing superstitions" by the ruling class to dominate its subordinates is described by Stuart-Glennie as part and parcel of the civilizing process and its religions.

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And elsewhere Stuart-Glennie noted the way in which the later developments of monotheism in the moral revolution also had to construct a place for evil in the divine framework:

> And it is to be noted that Mazdayaçnianism [Zoroastrianism] and Jehovianism were, in this First Age, more strictly Monotheistic than in the Second Age; for there began then a moral development, and therewith consciousness, that, in a single Spirit, conceived as an Almighty Person, men were worshipping a Fiend; and hence there was created another great Spiritual Person, expressly to find him guilty of evil, and so acquit Ahura-Mazda and Jehovah, whitewashed.[34]

It seems to me that in these examples Stuart-Glennie is drawing attention to an important but neglected factor in the history of religion and of civilization, not simply domination through legitimation afforded by Hell and myths and personifications of evil, but the increasing role of *idealization* in religion and life. The ideal god and its negatively idealized spiritual opposite represent the greater idealization of life, wherein, for example, religion can be revolutionized to be more narrowly associated with moral ideals: the moral revolution. This can become problematic when its effects are to idealize the passions, which are inherently sources of spontaneous conduct, not idealized conduct. Humans may need to live with ideals, but to live *by* ideals, by ideal formats for conduct, is to risk stifling the modes of passionate conduct essential for everyday life. I shall return to this theme in the last chapter.

Returning briefly to our example of the *Atrahasis*, other emergent conditions of civilization and its centralized, closely packed quarters, such as overpopulation, plagues, and famines, are given supernatural justification in this myth. Six hundred years after creating humans, the god Ellil complains:

> The noise of mankind has become too much,
> I am losing sleep over their racket.
> Give the order that sŭruppu-disease shall break out.[35]

More blights of famine and flood are sent by Ellil in 600-year cycles because of humankind's misconduct: famine, which is one of the periodic costs of large centralized populations dependent on agriculture, is given a supernatural cause.

One also sees the alienation from direct participation in wild nature: the demand for increased labor, which is a consequence of domestication and settlement, centered in irrigation and agriculture, in the direct

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manipulation of nature, is legitimated and, in effect, "divinized," by viewing it as relieving the supernatural gods. Incessant labor becomes acceptable by disguising it as obligatory service to gods. Struggle becomes civilized humankind's new way of life, a story later echoed in the account of Adam and Eve's expulsion from the garden in Genesis. As Sahlins and others have shown, traditional foraging peoples have needed to spend considerably less time on food gathering than agricultural peoples, while enjoying a much healthier and plentiful diet.[36] Our foraging ancestors did indeed live in a nutritional paradise on average, eating far better and working far less than their civilizational counterparts, at least until pushed to peripheries by expanding agriculturalists.

As mentioned, the supernaturalist development, in Stuart-Glennie's view, is later characterized especially by the Western aspect of the Moral Revolution and its "determined conflict between Naturalist and Supernaturalist conceptions."[37] But he also saw a possible bridge between religious beliefs and naturalism in Panzooinism and the scientific model of causation he attempted to develop, though transformed. The differentiation of subjective and objective occurring through the moral revolution was also a stage in that process.

As mentioned, Stuart-Glennie developed a model of causation as correlative, a model in which thought and things are interactionist, rather than idealist or materialist, and claimed that primitive culture held this as a true intuition, though clothing it in false conceptions. Citing himself from his 1873 work, *The New Philosophy of History*, he states in a footnote in his 1896 essay "The Survival of Paganism,"

> "I conceive Things and the Cognitions of Things to be, not arbitrarily related, and standing, as it were, only side by side, but mutually related. Thought and Existence are thus conceived as neither independent, as the Materialist maintains; nor identical, as the Idealist contends; but correlative…" And I submit that the discovery of the one true primitive intuition, but false primitive conceptions, of the Oneness of Nature, is an historical proof of this metaphysical theory.[38]

Stuart-Glennie allowed that aboriginal panzoonist religions grew out of felt experience of natural phenomena, of intuitive feelings for laws of nature, but clothed them falsely in fantastic conceptions. Rather than expressing only a self-enclosed human sociality, as, for example, Durkheim viewed religion, Stuart-Glennie claimed that panzoonist

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beliefs were also expressing the relations to the living world as well as human society. Durkheim held that religion involves collective representations which mirror human society. As he said in his book, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*,

> If religion generated everything that is essential in society, this is because the idea of society is the soul of religion. Religious forces, then, are human forces, moral forces. Of course, because collective feelings can become conscious of themselves only by fixing onto external objects, those forces could not be constituted without taking some of their features from things. Thus they have acquired a kind of physical nature; as such they come to be mingled with the life of the material world, and it is through them that people thought they could explain what happens in that world. But when one considers them only from this angle and in this role, one sees only their most superficial side. In reality, their essential elements are borrowed from consciousness. It seems normal for them to have a human character only when they are conceptualized in human form, but even the most impersonal and most anonymous forces are none other than objectified feelings.[39]

Thus aboriginal revering of and identification with certain animals and plants is ultimately resolved as a form of human projection of sentiments onto nature in Durkheim's view. Religious forces "are human forces, moral forces," rather than transactions in practices and beliefs with the living circumambient habitat as the "mirror" in which humanity views itself as refracted through the sentient wild other. Elsewhere he gives the example of the Tsimshian people's story of a man who "met a black bear which took him to its home, and taught him to catch salmon and build canoes."[40] The man stayed with the bear for two years, and went "native," behaving like a bear that is. When he returned people feared his ferocious bear-like manners, and ritually coaxed him back to his humanity. Yet afterwards, "whenever he was in trouble, he called upon his bear friends, who came to help him." Durkheim argues that "This relationship is a mythical representation of otherwise profound facts; but it may be omitted without causing the disappearance of the essential traits of totemism."[41] In stressing as essential that the totem is a representation of the human society, Durkheim missed the ways in which relationships with animals are like two sides of a coin: both reverential and sacred, as well as practical and informative. In this example Durkheim misses a key ingredient in the story, in my opinion, namely

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how close observation of the bear, of developing a relationship through close observation, enabled experiential learning. By following when bear congregate for salmon runs, for example, one may tune in to the salmon run. By mimicking how bear catch salmon with paw or mouth as they jump up waterfalls, one can learn to catch the jumping salmon there with hand-held nets.

Though it may be true that in many rituals, as Durkheim put it, "*the images of totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves*," that in ceremonies "the totemic animal appears there only very exceptionally," this does not disallow the sacredness of the game relationship to such animals as sources of habitat information or prey.[42] Durkheim's outlook is conceptualist, and so does not seem to allow for the possibility of "true primitive intuition" of nature that Stuart-Glennie allows, even if conceptualized falsely.

Despite the prominence he gave to Australian ethnographies of aboriginals, Durkheim found the attention given to "dreams" by aboriginals a sign of their backwardness:

> These weak beings, who have so much trouble maintaining life against all the forces which assail it, have no means for supporting any luxury in the way of speculation. They do not reflect except when they are driven to it. Now it is difficult to see what could have led them to make dreams the theme of their meditations. What does the dream amount to in our lives? How little is the place it holds, especially because of the very vague impressions it leaves in the memory, and of the rapidity with which it is effaced from remembrance, and consequently, how surprising it is that a man of so rudimentary an intelligence should have expended such efforts to find its explanation![43]

Apparently Durkheim did not agree with Shakespeare that humans "are such stuff as dreams are made on." More basically, Durkheim remained ignorant of the profound significance of the "dreaming" or "dreamtime," or what anthropologist W. E. H. Stanner has translated as "the everywhen," in the lives of aboriginals.[44] It represents a mythic way of dramatically picturing the living landscape, of connecting to it through the "songlines" walked by ancestors and connected to each person's birth locus, identified as the site of quickening in the womb, when the fetus first kicks. These songlines may also contain real habitat information concerning the past as well as present paths and sources of water.

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Such earthy possibilities inherent in mythic story and cultural tradition escaped Durkheim because of his rationalism, but are comprehensible from the perspective of panzooinism as informed by "terrestrial conditions." Those conditions varied widely for globally dispersed anatomically modern humans, requiring differing adaptations to meet differing terrains, and differing beliefs to express those varied lifeways. The term "panzooinism" may not do justice to that vast diversity of peoples, but it does seem to me to express a generalizable mindset of aboriginal belief in an informing and sentient natural world.

The Panzoonist intuition of revering the animals and plants on which one depends for living makes great practical sense as well, especially when one can track and comprehend the complex information about the habitat they hold. In such ways the original intuitions, as tempered habits of conduct, were real connections to wild habitat and nature, a kind of fantastic realism, whereas later supernaturalist conceptions progressively became mirrors of human society, as Stuart-Glennie saw. Durkheim's anthropocentric view of the "elementary forms" of religion as the mirroring of human sociality appears to be more accurately the consequence of civilizational supernaturalism as a mode of sociopolitical legitimacy. These supernaturalist conceptions can be taken as indicative of settled, agriculturally based civilizations progressively disconnected from wild habitat and re-attuned to the domesticated habitat of instinctively de-matured animals and plants in "captive" populations, and projections of human institutions, such as kingship and city. Yet they also manifested through the moral revolution as giving new emphasis to the person, to inner dimensions, heightening the distinction of subjective and objective.

Notes

1 John Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland: Or, The Law of the Origin and Transformation of Christianity. Volume 1: The New Philosophy of History* (London: Longman, Greens and Company, 1873), 220. And "Origins of Mythology," in *The International Folk-lore Congress, 1891. Papers and Transaction,* ed. Joseph Jacobs and Alfred Nutt, 215–229 (London: David Nutt, 1891), 225.

2 John Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," in *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al., 243–278 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 263.

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3 He described the place of religious conceptions as part of his developmental law of history in 1896: "But is the triumph of this Folk-conception the destruction of all Religions? Nay, it will only make evident that Religion must be otherwise and more largely defined than as 'the belief in Spiritual Beings.' It must be defined as what I submit that it has always in fact been, 'an Ideal of Conduct derived from some general conception of the Environments of Existence.' The Supernaturalist Conception of the Environments of Existence was not a primitive, but a secondary and transitional, conception. But to that Supernaturalist Conception of the Environments of Existence, another is now succeeding, which should be indicated in that definition of the Third Stage of Human Thought which must constitute the last clause of an Ultimate Law of History. And whether the following is a verifiable statement of such a Law it will be the work of the rest of my life to inquire, and with the assistance, I would fain hope, of competent critics. *From the Primitive Intuition of the Oneness of Nature in unverified conceptions of the Mutual Influences of undifferentiated Sentient Powers,* THOUGHT—*after the differentiation of Psychical from Physical Development, as result of certain Conflicts of Higher and Lower Races—has advanced and advances, under the conditions of a Conflict between Folk- and Culture-conceptions, through differentiated and progressively antagonistic and abstract conceptions of Natural Powers and Supernatural Agents, to the truth of that Primitive Intuition in verified conceptions of the Mutual Determination of the differentiated Energies of a Kosmos*" Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism." In *Greek Folk Poesy: Volume 2, Folk Prose* (London: David Nutt, 1896), 519–520.

4 E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture, Vol. 1* (London: John Murray, 1871), 385–386.

5 Ibid., 428.

6 Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 11.

7 Stuart-Glennie, "Origins of Institutions," in The International Folk-lore Congress, 1891, Papers and Transaction, ed. Joseph Jacobs and Alfred Nutt, 357–378 (London: David Nutt, 1892), 294–295.

8 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism," In *Greek Folk Poesy: Volume 2, Folk Prose*, ed. Lucy M. J. Garnett, with Essays by J. S. Stuart-Glennie, 467–520 (London: David Nutt, 1896), 478–479. Also from this work: "*Zoonism* immediately understood as denoting a doctrine, or conception, of the livingness of things, whether these are of the meanest or of the most sublime character, and whatever may be the mode or degree of their livingness" (1896: 484).

9 Dan Moonhawk Alford, "God Is a Verb: Worldview Thought Experiment," 1994, accessed March 25, 2002. http://hilgart.org/enformy/dma-god.htm.

10 Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper, 1983), 277.

11 Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 69.

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12 Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
13 John Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 260.
14 Ibid., 261.
15 Douglas P. Fry, *Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Agustin Fuentes. *Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
16 H.G. Wells, "Discussion," in "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims," ed. Francis Galton, *American Journal of Sociology* 10.1 (July 1904), 10–11.
17 J.S. Huxley, *Man in the Modern World* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1947), 70.
18 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," *The International Monthly* (April, 1901), 454.
19 Stuart-Glennie, "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," 454–455.
20 Geddes, "The Late Mr. Stuart-Glennie," 319. I have been unable to locate the original publication with Stuart-Glennie's paper cited by Geddes.
21 Ibid., 20.
22 Mark Nathan Cohen, *Health and the Rise of Civilization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
23 Douglas P. Fry, *Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
24 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism," in *Greek Folk Poesy: Volume 2, Folk Prose*, ed. Lucy M. J. Garnett, with essays by J. S. Stuart-Glennie, 467–520 (London: David Nutt, 1896), 515.
25 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 261.
26 He acknowledged Marx's place in the development of scientific socialism in a few places in his 1879 book, where he also provides a history of socialism. To give one example: "It was with the great revolutionary, or rather insurrectionary, year '48 that Socialism entered on this new stage of its [scientific] development, which is chiefly to be associated with the name of Karl Marx. Both he and Lassalle, the other great leader of the Scientific School of Socialism, have shown themselves profound historical students. Not to them, however, is due that discovery of Primitive Socialism which is really the basis of their Historical Socialism. Its discoverers were rather Hanssen, Haxthausen, and, above all, Maurer." Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution, Proemia III: Europe and Asia* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1879), 93.
27 Ibid., 378.
28 Cohen, *Health and the Rise of Civilization*; Lewis Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine: I. Technics and Human Development. II. The Pentagon of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1967). Morris Berman, *Wandering God: A Study in Nomadic Spirituality* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
29 Stephanie Dalley, *Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9.

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30 Dalley, *Myths from Mesopotamia*, 14.
31 Ibid., 18.
32 Eugene Halton, "Eden Inverted: On the Wild Self and the Contraction of Consciousness," *The Trumpeter* 23.3 (2007). I discuss my ideas on anthropocentrism as contraction of mind at more length in Chapter 7.
33 Stuart-Glennie, "Origins of Institutions," 225.
34 John Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution, Proemia I: Isis and Osiris; Or, The Origin of Christianity as a Verification of an Ultimate Law of History (A New Edition of "In the Morningland.")* (London: Longman, Greens and Company, 1878), 221.
35 Dalley, *Myths from Mesopotamia*, 18.
36 Marshall Sahlins, *Stone-Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1973), Richard Lee and Irving DeVore, *Man the Hunter* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), S. Boyd Eaton, Marjorie Shostack, and Melvin Konner, *The Paleolithic Prescription* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).
37 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 264.
38 Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism," 517n.
39 Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* translated by Carol Cosman, with an Introduction and Notes by Mark S. Cladis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
40 Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by J. W. Swain (New York: Free Press, 1965 [1915]), 145.
41 Durkheim, *Elementary Forms* (1965), 145.
42 Ibid., 156.
43 Ibid., 75.
44 W. E. H. Stanner, "The Dreaming, an Australian World View," in *Australian Signpost: An Anthology*. Ed. T.A.G. Hungerford, 51–65 (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1956).

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3

Panzoonism, the Bioticon, and the 500-Year Cycles of History

Abstract: *Stuart-Glennie did not limit his theory of history to the history of ideas, but also proposed to substitute for "the absolutist conception of the atom an entirely relative term, bioticon, fit for life, lively, of or pertaining to life." This chapter describes his idea of the* bioticon*, its relation to panzoonism and his causal theory of history. Stuart-Glennie also developed a theory of 500-year periods of history, which begin with the moral revolution of about 500 B.C.E. and culminate with the end of the twentieth century. His periodic theory of history is compared with the views of Charles Peirce and Mumford.*

Keywords: panzoonism; bioticon; 500-year cycles of history; Charles Peirce

Halton, Eugene. *From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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Panzoonism and the bioticon

To the terms moral revolution, panzooinism, supernal, supernaturalism, colonist-origin theory, we now add another that grows out of Stuart-Glennie's attempt to frame a broad, scientific theory of the progression of mind. As with some earlier terms, it may be difficult to grasp at first, but is worth considering as part of his broader philosophy of history. Welcome to the *bioticon*.

Stuart-Glennie did not limit his claims to the history of ideas, but also proposed to substitute for "the absolutist conception of the atom an entirely relative term, *bioticon*, fit for life, lively, of or pertaining to life."[1] It is worth considering Stuart-Glennie's "entirely relative term, bioticon" in the context of his law of history as a development of ideas concerning nature and causality. Many today might dismiss outright the bioticon as a substitute for the atom as unscientific, just as they would in his day. But in my view the idea of adopting a relative perspective of phenomena from the viewpoint of life, rather than an absolute perspective, also reveals a free engaged mind at work, willing to venture thinking outside the box.

The psychologist William McDougall, who was then a reader at Oxford but would go on to achieve eminence in the United States, thought the same in his written response to Stuart-Glennie's three papers of 1906, saying,

> Mr. Stuart-Glennie's three papers should be welcomed, if for no other reason, because they serve to remind us, in this age of specialization, of the need for minds that will not shrink from the attempt to group the whole of knowledge in one co-ordinated scheme, and because they remind us that a satisfactory treatment of the social sciences must be based upon some acceptable solution of some of the most fundamental problems of science.[2]

McDougall, who later would go on to become a stark critic of what he called "the mechanistic dogma" and behaviorism, also published a book in 1911 titled *Body and Mind: A History and a Defense of Animism*, and had already done psychological research with aboriginal peoples of the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.[3] He praised Stuart-Glennie's "conception of atoms as mutually determining centres of effort," as remedying a defect in other "panpsychistic doctrines." But he wished that Stuart-Glennie had defined "more clearly his attitude to two problems," which "…are of vital importance

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for sociology, namely the problem of the scope of, and the relation between, teleological and mechanical explanations, and the problem of psychic individuality."[4]

McDougall allowed the possibility of an emergent evolutionist perspective, that the conception of the atom may be "reconcilable with the view that the evolution of our world was, in its earlier stages, predominantly mechanical and that, as psychical life attained to higher levels of complexity, the teleological factor, effort stimulated by and directed by feeling, feeling in relation to events foreseen, has played an increasingly important role."[5] But he claimed that such points were not addressed by Stuart-Glennie. He also did not see how such an approach could address the hierarchical organization of the brain and the individual person.

In his reply Stuart-Glennie denied that his view was a doctrine of panpsychism, and claimed that he reserved full sentientcy, or "soul" to what he termed "the noetical life," capable of discerning, thinking, and purposing, but he did not fully address McDougall's critique. Though he admitted that Hume argued that order cannot be explained by design, and that it cannot of itself belong to matter, Stuart-Glennie differed in holding that "The principle that shows *order* to be inherent in the very constitution of things, and to belong to the very nature of the Kosmos, is that in which the new conception of causation as reciprocal action or mutual determination has been variously stated, and formulated more particularly in my Law of Existence."[6] Inherent order in things is key for Stuart-Glennie's attempt to undercut the modern divide between thought and things.

Interestingly, McDougall would later go on to argue for panpsychism in his own work, as well as animism, though he did not discuss Stuart-Glennie's alternative idea of panzooinism. He also did not address the theory of the Moral Revolution explicitly stated in Stuart-Glennie's second paper. Instead, he argued that the "higher races must have undergone a very considerable degree of social evolution in order to have achieved their superiority to those whom they afterwards conquered."[7] He thus shared the ideology of racism, though differing with Stuart-Glennie on specifics.

Other commentators on Stuart-Glennie's paper included economists Shapland Hugh Swinny and William Henry Beveridge, and sociologist Victor Branford. Swinny was a follower of Comte's positivism, and criticized Stuart-Glennie's theory of history from Comte's three stages of

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history perspective. He was also a cofounder of the "church of humanity" in England, influenced by Comte's "religion of humanity" in France. Beveridge would go on to serve on the Board of Trade under Winston Churchill, and then became director of the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1919 to 1937.

These reviewers, with one exception, also ignored the theory of the Moral Revolution. Beveridge criticized Stuart-Glennie's 500-year periods in history, though seeing the idea as having a "certain suggestiveness about it," with which Branford agreed.[8] The one exception was the chair of the session, Patrick Geddes, who noted, "It is surely no mere coincidence, but one of profound significance, that such world-shaping events as the establishment of the Jewish Law, the birth of Greek philosophy, the coming of Buddha, and the teaching of Confucius should be broadly synchronous. Such a range of historical survey we very rarely attain, and Mr. Stuart-Glennie does us great service by making us feel the importance of this period, and by unifying our perspectives of it."[9] As mentioned earlier, Stuart-Glennie was not present at the meeting to give his own reading, and Geddes observed that "the members of the Sociological Society . . . were not a little perplexed by three papers of such difficulty and magnitude in a single evening."[10]

The only other discussion of Stuart-Glennie's theory of the Moral Revolution after the 1906 publication that I have found, with the exception of Mumford's mention of it in 1956 and later, is by Havelock Ellis, the noted physician and writer, who wrote on sexuality and a wide array of other topics. In his 1919 book, *The Philosophy of Conflict*, Ellis wrote: "Then the Greeks came, and that great Moral Reformation of the sixth century B.C., throughout a new and larger world, from the Nile and the Tiber to the Hoang-ho and the Ganges, which has been called the true inauguration of our latest civilization."[11] He then footnoted Stuart-Glennie, though misspelling the last name, attributing this discovery to him:

> By J. Stuart Glennie. He used to point out that the sixth-fifth century (550–450 B.C.) is the line of division between ancient and modern civilization, as it was the century of Confucius, of Buddha, of Zoroastrianism as a power, of the second Isaiah and the triumph of Jahveism, of Psammetichus and the worship of Isis and Horus, the age of Thales and Pythagoras and Xenophanes and Sappho and Alcaios; finally, it was the age of influences which led up to the domination of so-called Aryan culture and the age in which Republics slowly began to replace Monarchies.[12]

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To return to the idea of the bioticon, it seems to me that Stuart-Glennie did not provide in those papers or in earlier works a sufficient account for how matter could possess properties continuous with mind. His claim was that atoms could be defined

> as mutually determining centres of correlatively integrating and differentiating Efforts acting through radiating Pressures. Effort, defined as the force which is manifested in Reaction, Conation and Volition, is conceived as arising from a Sentientcy which has two ultimate forms—Unease due to internal, and Unease due to external conditions—and the idea of Effort thus becomes the basis of a general psychological theory.

He then claims "Pressure becomes the basis of a correlative general mechanical theory."[13]

It seems to me that "Sentientcy" must be more than effort and pressure, and that it involves a modality of being of general sign relations that can determine existential relations but are not reducible to them. In this I follow Peirce, who sought to articulate a scientific view of physical laws of the universe as real generals or sign-habits not reducible to the physical properties they determine. Perhaps Peirce realized what Stuart-Glennie had only intuited, that mind is not reducible to matter, despite what a scientific materialist, then as well as now, might hold. Maybe Stuart-Glennie's account, like his depiction of panzooinism as "true primitive intuition, but false primitive conceptions," similarly expressed his intuition of tendencies for life and mind as inherent properties or emergent potentialities of the universe, but could not articulate his conceptions to meet the requirements of the physical sciences.

Stuart-Glennie was considered a folklorist, yet was alive with the idea of developing a scientific outlook, but on his own terms. His conception of correlative causality claimed a sociality in the nature of things rather than as a separate realm. It expresses intuitively, though not as articulately, an idea that was worked out at length in Peirce's philosophy of science and logic, wherein reality itself was of a social nature, and found in the final opinion of an "unlimited community of inquirers." Peirce stated this as early as 1868: "The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge."[14] Reality is not an isolate

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instance in Peirce's view; it is more than existence, a modality of being of the nature of a general law or habit. As he put it: "A quality is something capable of being completely embodied. A law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be."[15]

Elsewhere he said:

> Not only may generals be real, but they may also be physically efficient, not in every metaphysical sense, but in the common-sense acception in which human purposes are physically efficient. Aside from metaphysical nonsense, no sane man doubts that if I feel the air in my study to be stuffy, that thought may cause the window to be opened… Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing.[16]

Though acknowledging the brute, existential aspect of matter in his philosophy, Peirce arrived at the radical position that "all this universe is *perfused* with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs," a universe in which "All matter is mind, hidebound with habit." It led him to the opinion he expressed in 1890, as a physicist and logician, that "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws."[17] Needless to say, such a view remains in dispute today, despite growing interest in all aspects of Peirce's philosophy, especially his philosophy of science.

Generality, or what Peirce called "Thirdness," was for him a genuine modality of being, a modality of triadic relation which determined existence, or "Secondness" or dyadic relation, though not reducible to it.[18] Peirce was born in 1839 and died in 1914, and so was roughly the same age as Stuart-Glennie, though they did not seem to know of each other's work. This is a shame, given that Peirce provided a logical way to conceive of matter as continuous with mind, and suggested possible 500-year cycles of history similar to one earlier proposed by Stuart-Glennie, which I will discuss later.

But what if we extrapolate from Stuart-Glennie's idea of bioticons? What if we suppose Stuart-Glennie's proposal for bioticons as "an entirely relative term," as a substitute for "the absolutist conception of the atom," not as a rejection of the Newtonian universe of his day, but as the reintroduction of an experiential perspective in science, as a way of thinking in terms of life-propensities of matter, or a "life-centric" point of view.

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The tendency to think of "scientific" in terms of a one-size-fits-all absolute view loses sight of how the perspective being addressed can make a crucial difference. An example of this gap can be illustrated in the differing theories of color developed by Newton and Goethe. Newton's magnificent quantifying mind produced an objectivist theory of color, in contrast to Goethe's color theory, which included qualitative elements. Newton's seemed to be the scientific "survivor of the fittest" theory on this problem, against the artist and romantic scientist Goethe. Yet in the 1950s, physicist and inventor of Polaroid photography, Edwin Land, showed the severe limitations of Newton's view for perceptual problems, especially in photography. Neal Ribe and Friedrich Steinle describe this unexpected superiority of Goethe's theory for color perception:

> Newton's investigations into optics were guided by the metaphysical belief that color was merely a subjective correlate of mechanical properties of light rays. He therefore abstracted from the complex world of normal visual perception, working in a dark chamber illuminated only by a single sunbeam. The system he studied was thus a simple one, comprising entities of a single kind—rays with diverse refrangibility—whose mutual interactions, such as color mixing, were purely superpositional. Newton's approach was entirely reasonable given his aim: His mathematization of light and color could best take flight from a few particular effects. But the price paid was that his experiments had only limited relevance to color as usually perceived....
>
> Goethe and Land were interested in color as an irreducible quality, not as an epiphenomenon. Recognizing that the human eye and the external world constitute a complex interactive system, both chose to explore it under diverse aspects, performing literally hundreds of experiments during their careers. The result was a deeper understanding of the complexity of the conditions under which colors appear in the world of everyday experience.[19]

Ribe and Steinle also argue for the benefits of Goethe's approach as "exploratory experimentation." Newton's "theory-oriented" experiments stressed the demonstrative all-or-nothing, single experiment. "Where one will do, what need of many?" was how Newton put it, versus Goethe's approach of making closely connected experimental variations.[20] Newton's abstract theory of color came at the cost of excluding the lived experience of color.

Or take the example of the view of vision held by the ancient Greeks as a mode of touching, where psychopodia, the soul limbs, are sent out to touch the face of another. This experiential understanding today has

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given way to the machine view, which makes one a spectator passively receiving photons, instead of actively engaged with the other in the vision experience. Yet that older view remains a true understanding of vision experientially, as studies of the facial mirroring of micro-musculature of another face indicate. We are "touching" the other in face-to-face interaction, through subtly and subconsciously mirroring the other's facial micro-musculature: face-to-face interaction is a form of mind reading in this sense. For much of science, the photon view of light holds true, but for experiential aspects of human visual interaction, the relativist ancient Greek perspective can better explain the phenomenon. Again, the perspective can make a difference.

Almost a century after Stuart-Glennie's proposal of "bioticons," independent scientist James Lovelock and biologist Lynn Margulis proposed a view of the earth as a self-regulating organism, claiming that "early after life began it acquired control of the planetary environment and that this homeostasis by and for the biosphere has persisted ever since."[21] They claim that forces of nature such as climate and the atmosphere can be understood as products of the evolution of self-regulating life. There are also a range of emergence and biosemiotics theories that argue for tendencies to self-organization in matter, such that life could eventually develop. A recent comprehensive example is Terrence Deacon's 2011 book, *Incomplete Nature*.

Stuart-Glennie's insight that Panzoonism was an intuition from a life-based perspective allows one to view aboriginal thought as intuitively continuous with the Gaia hypothesis, even if clothed in fantastic form ("false primitive conceptions"). More recently evolutionary biologist E. O. Wilson has argued for a "biophilia hypothesis," involving "the connections that human beings subconsciously seek with the rest of life."[22] Wilson drew from psychologist Erich Fromm, who earlier had argued for a healthy human psychological disposition for biophilia:

> People look for pleasure and excitement, instead of joy; for power and property, instead of growth. They want to *have* much, and *use* much, instead of *being* much.
>
> They are more attracted to *the dead and the mechanical* than to life and living processes. I have called this attraction to that which is not alive, using words of Miguel de Unamuno, "necrophilia," and the attraction to all that is alive, "biophilia." In spite of all the emphasis on pleasure, our society produces more and more necrophilia and less and less love of life. All this leads to great boredom, which is only superficially compensated by constantly

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> changing stimuli. The less these stimuli permit a truly alive and active interest, the more frequently they have to be changed, since it is a biologically given fact that repeated "flat" stimuli soon become monotonous.[23]

Necrophilia is an apt description of technophilia, of automatism, and perhaps even of modern rational-bureaucratic technological civilization, born out of the scientific revolution and its view that the universe is a vast unloving clockwork. Stuart-Glennie's notion of the bioticon was part of an attempt to rejoin the divide between thought and things that characterizes the modern worldview, to renew that attraction to "all that is alive" which marked panzoonism, and to find a place for it in modern science.

Stuart-Glennie saw his correlative view of causation in science as leading to a future stage of resolution, "the victory of a more adequate Naturalism, or rather Kosmianism, distinguished by verifiable Conceptions of quantitatively determined, instead of, as primitively, quantitatively undetermined, Universal Interaction; by recognition of the fictional character of Supernatural Ideals and Sanctions; and by acceptance of such only as are verifiable deductions from Man's Psychology and History."[24] Panzoonism, the original insight of humanity, is not made obsolete, but rather is refined by the progress of history and the precision of science. Hence religion did not begin in make-believe belief in spirits, or in arbitrary sociality, as Durkheim believed, or in some transcendent realm of being, as Jaspers held, but in dimly perceived, but experientially true, intuitions of an interactive, living cosmos. Religion, as depicted by Stuart-Glennie, begins in that live relatedness between human, habitat, and cosmos.

The idea of "bioticons" and a living cosmos may still sound far-fetched today. Perhaps they are, unless we can allow them as intuitions of ideas similar to those expressed by scientists Lovelock and Margulis, E. O. Wilson, Peirce, emergent evolutionists, or even by novelist Herman Melville, who observed in *Moby Dick* in 1851: "O Nature, and O soul of man! how far beyond all utterance are your linked analogies! not the smallest atom stirs or lives on matter, but has its cunning duplicate in mind."[25]

The 500-year cycles of history

As early as his 1869 book, *Arthurian Localities*, Stuart-Glennie proposed a view of historical transformations occurring about every 500 years, a theory he elaborated further in his 1873 book, *In the Morningland*.

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This marks another original outlook on history by Stuart-Glennie, though one perhaps difficult to assess. I have not been able to find other scholarly discussions of this idea, with two exceptions. Philosopher Charles Peirce also independently proposed the same idea of 500-year periods in history, though later than Stuart-Glennie, in his 1893 essay "Evolutionary Love," which I shall return to. And still later, in the twentieth century the composer Dane Rudhyar also independently made an argument for 500-year cycles, though deriving from astrology rather than history.

Stuart-Glennie's 500-year periods of history begin with the moral revolution. In a prospectus published at the end of his 1879 book *The Modern Revolution*, *Proemia III: Europe and Asia*, Stuart-Glennie spelled out his early ideas of the moral revolution and 500-year cycles of history (I have added the corresponding dates):

> Among the chief ideas, or rather general facts, stated and illustrated in these introductory volumes, are those with regard to the epochs, and the unity of the history of Civilisation. A system of Ancient Civilisations is shown to have been broken up, and a new, the Modern Age, of Civilisation, to have been initiated in the general Revolutions of the Sixth Century B.C., of which the New Moral Religions, which then originated, were the most conspicuous phenomena. From that epoch the History of Europe and Asia is shown to have had a clear unity with correlative and mutually influencing developments, and to be marked by five half-millennium periods, distinguishable as (1) the Classical [500 B.C.E.-0]; (2) the Barbarian [0–500]; (3) the Arabian [500–1000]; (4) the Turanian [i.e., Turkic, 1000–1500]; and (5) the Present or Transitional [1500–2000]. And these *Outlines of the History of Eurasian Civilisation,* in which I hope to verify my Ultimate Law of History, will be set forth in five volumes, of which one will be devoted to each of these Periods successively.[26]

Stuart-Glennie's periodic conception began with the advent of the Moral Revolution in about 500 B.C.E. and culminated in the fifth period, extending from the Sixteenth century through, as he later put it, "at least, to the close of the Twentieth Century."[27] He also suggested in his 1879 book that if one were to mark the beginnings of civilization as approximately 5000 B.C.E., that one could remake the calendar to correspond with the moral revolution as a more accurate starting point for "the development of modern civilization which I have shown to be common both to Europe and Asia." He illustrated his idea with his 500-year cycles, showing length of civilization as measured by 500-year

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increments, with the exception of the last entry as approximately the year of his publication:[28]

5000 = 500 B.C	5500 = Christian Era.	6000 = 500 A.C.
6500 = 1000 A.C.	7000 = 1500 A. C.	7379 = 1879 A.C.

He did not complete his projected five volumes, but did return to the 500-year cycles of history in a number of later works. In 1901 he gave another description of each of the eras, beginning with the moral revolution and the difference between Asia as distinguishable in yet "retaining the fundamental conception of panzoism," versus the new religions of Western Asia. These included Judaism and the later Christianism and Islamism as "for the first time supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but in their essential principle," and as historically a distinctively Semitic conception. Here the dates remain the same, but his characterization of each period traces more the development of the West.

He argued that "the correlate of the Semitic belief in an absolutely conceived Creator God has been incapacity for such relativity of conception as is required in all the greater departments of intellectual effort," thus imposing "the yoke of Semitic supernaturalism on the Aryan races, the creators of science, of the drama, and of jurisprudence."[29] This meant an inherent conflict between independently developed Greek naturalist and Judean supernaturalist conceptions that would continue in Christianism and Western civilization up until the present: "in the second half millennium of the modern ages (1–500 A. D.) the conflict between Greek and Hebrew world-conceptions, between the conceptions respectively of evolution and creation definitely began in the conflict between Neoplatoanism and Christianism."[30] Science and supernaturalism might be said to be unexpected siblings, manifesting the newly achieved differentiation of subjective and objective, yet split irreconcilably.

Stuart-Glennie claimed there was a temporary cessation of the conflict with "the triumph of Christianity," which ushered in the next phase: "With the cessation of this conflict in the triumph of Christianity came the true mediaeval period, and night of the dark ages in, at least, the Western Empire (500–1000 A. D.)." But the conflict re-emerged in the next "feudal" cycle:

> The conflict was renewed in the next, the brilliant feudal half millennium (1000–1500 A. D.); and not only the ban of wizardry and atheism under

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> which scientific thinkers, and even a Friar Bacon, then worked; but the issue of scholasticism, in the fatal affirmation that a proposition might be at once dogmatically true and rationally false, sufficiently prove how opposed the fundamental ideas of science were seen to be to the established Semito-Christianism.[31]

The next cycle, from 1500 to 2000, as he saw it in 1901, marked the progressive ascendency of naturalism through the growth of science over supernatural transcendence, which would mean the completion of the second age of humanity:

> And finally, in our present fifth half millennium period since that great revolution common to the civilizations both of Asia and Europe, the conflict between the conception of immanence of power in the kosmos, and hence law, and the conception of transcendency of power in a creator, and hence miracle, entered, with the sixteenth century, what would appear to be its last stage, issuing, as it seems likely to do, in the triumph of Greek Naturalism over Hebrew Supernaturalism.[32]

The triumph of naturalism through science would give rise to the third age of humanity, Stuart-Glennie's outlines of which I will describe in Chapter 6. He provides a dialectical narrative that holds together, but it seems to me difficult to confirm 500-year cycles of history as objective facts.

I had been aware for some time that Charles Peirce also independently developed the same idea of 500-year cycles in his 1893 essay "Evolutionary Love," so it might be interesting to briefly describe Peirce's discussion, especially given that Peirce was a mathematician with a well-developed sense of what might count as factual. Interestingly, while examining Mumford's copy of Stuart-Glennie's contribution to the 1906 *Sociological Papers* in the special books collection at Monmouth University, I also examined his copy of a Peirce anthology, *Values in a Universe of Chance*, which contains the essay "Evolutionary Love." On the page where Peirce had described possible 500-year cycles in history, Mumford had inscribed "Stuart Glennie!"

Peirce notes, "If the evolution of history . . . resembles the development of individual men . . . there should be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical movement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another. Let us see if we can make out anything of the kind. Take the governmental development of Rome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates." He then lists key dates for Roman government

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development, followed by dates for the history of thought, and then for key dates in the history of metaphysics. Again, these pertain only to the West, but consider his events:

> B.C. 753, Foundation of Rome.
> B.C. 510, Expulsion of the Tarquins.
> B.C. 27, Octavius assumes title Augustus.
> A.D. 476, End of Western Empire.
> A.D. 962, Holy Roman Empire.
> A.D. 1453, Fall of Constantinople.
>
> The last event was one of the most significant in history, especially for Italy. The intervals are 243, 483, 502, 486 491, years. All are rather curiously near equal, except the first which is half the others. Successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal. Let us set down a few dates in the history of thought.
> B.C. 585, Eclipse of Thales. Beginning of Greek philosophy.
> A.D. 30, The crucifixion.
> A.D. 529, Closing of Athenian schools. End of Greek philosophy.
> A.D. 1125, (Approximate) Rise of the Universities of Bologna and Paris.
> A.D. 1543, Publication of the *De Revolutionibus* of Copernicus. Beginning of Modern Science.
>
> The intervals are 615, 499, 596, 418 years. In the history of metaphysics, we may take the following:
> B.C. 322, Death of Aristotle.
> A.D. 1274, Death of Aquinas.
> A.D. 1804, Death of Kant.
>
> The intervals are 1595 and 530 years. The former is about thrice the latter. From these figures, no conclusion can fairly be drawn. At the same time, they suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural era of about 500 years. Should there be any independent evidence of this, the intervals noticed may gain some significance.[33]

Peirce ends by stating no fair conclusion can be drawn, but that the figures *suggest*, hypothetically or what he called "abductively," "a rough natural era of about 500 years." Unlike Stuart-Glennie, Peirce did not arrive at a determinate law of history, but only a suggestion of 500-year cycles. Too bad Peirce did not correspond with Stuart-Glennie on this.

But there remains another perspective, given by Mumford's notations on Stuart-Glennie's contribution to the 1906 *Sociological Papers* volume. Mumford raised the issue of what it would mean to slice the cycles

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somewhat differently, using 600-year cycles instead of 500. He wrote at the top of the page and initialed:

> "Six hundred year phases work out better? 1200 BC–600 BC–BCAD–600 AD–1200 AD–1800 AD LM"

Mumford begins 600 years before the moral revolution, and though he left no notes for why, that is the time of the late Bronze Age collapse, so perhaps that is what he had in mind. 1200 AD (C.E.) comes close to the beginnings of the mechanical clock in the 1270s, and 1800 AD (C.E.) could roughly mark the industrial revolution. So Mumford's penciled-in notations left me wondering what historians of periods of history might make of all of these ideas on historical periodicity from Stuart-Glennie, Peirce, and Mumford. I leave it for them to ponder.

Stuart-Glennie's broad-ranging curiosity in proposing periods of history, bioticons, and panzooinism might not have fit well with the bureaucratic disciplines and hyper-specialism that took hold of intellectual life in the course of the twentieth-century. Perhaps that too may help toward explaining why his work went off the radar and was lost. But the fact remains that he articulated a theory of the Moral Revolution 75 years before Jaspers published his book on the Axial Age, and embedded the theory with a more detailed view of the conditions of early civilizations and prehistory, despite the false racial assumptions. This becomes clearer when we consider Jaspers' view of non-civilizational peoples in the next chapter.

Notes

1 Stuart-Glennie, *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al. (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 294.
2 William McDougall, "Written Communication from Dr. McDougall," in *Sociological Papers Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al. (London: MacMillan & Co. LTD, 1906), 289.
3 McDougal, *Body and Mind: A History and Defence of Animism* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1911), xi.
4 McDougall, "Written Communication from Dr. McDougall," in *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al., 289–290 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 289.
5 Ibid.
6 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 295.

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7 McDougall, "Written Communication from Dr. McDougall," 289.
8 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 285.
9 Geddes, Geddes, "Discussion: The Chairman Said," in *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, ed. Francis Galton et al., 287–288 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1906), 287.
10 Geddes, "The Late Mr. J.S. Stuart-Glennie," 318.
11 Havelock Ellis. *The Philosophy of Conflict: and Other Essays in War-time 2nd series* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), 21.
12 Ellis, *The Philosophy of Conflict*, 21.
13 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 244.
14 Charles S. Peirce. *Collected Papers, Vols. 5 and 6* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 5.311–312. Peirce's *Collected papers* are cited as paragraph and volume rather than page, eg., 5.311.
15 Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 1.536.
16 Ibid., 5.431.
17 Charles S. Peirce, *Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writing Vol. 1* (1867–1893), ed. N. Houser and C. Kloesel, *Vol. 2* (1893–1913), ed. Peirce Edition Project (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 1921, 292–293.
18 Eugene Halton. "Pragmatic E-Pistols," *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, Symposium: "Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interaction," 3.2 (2011), 41–63.
19 Neil Ribe and Friedrich Steinle, "Exploratory Experimentation: Goethe, Land, and Color Theory," Physics Today.org (July, 2002,) 47–48.
20 Ribe and Steinle make the case for Goethe's "exploratory experimentation" as providing context-rich evidence: "In his methodological essay *The Experiment as Mediator Between Object and Subject*, Goethe described the result of such an approach as a 'series of experiments that border on one another closely and touch each other directly; and which indeed, if one knows them all exactly and surveys them, constitute as it were a single experiment…' He regarded this care to connect the 'closest to the closest' as an experimental analog of mathematical deduction, which 'on account of its deliberateness and purity reveals every leap into assertion.' In that context, isolated experiments are not very informative, let alone demonstrative, as they well might be in theory-oriented work. The difference is nicely illustrated by the exchange between Newton and an early critic, the Liège Jesuit Anthony Lucas, who brought forward many new experiments (including variations of Newton's own), which he claimed could not be accounted for by Newton's theory. Newton's response was to insist that one 'try only the *experimentum crucis* [*Opticks*, book 1, part 1, experiment 6],' for 'where one will do, what need of many?'" Neil Ribe and Friedrich Steinle, "Exploratory Experimentation: Goethe, Land, and Color Theory," *Physics Today.org* (July, 2002): 46.

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21 James E. Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, "Atmospheric Homeostasis by and for the Biosphere: the Gaia Hypothesis," *Tellus*, 26 (1974), 2.
22 E. O. Wilson, *The Biophilia Hypothesis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).
23 Erich Fromm, *Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40.
24 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Papers," 265.
25 Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, ch. LXX, The Sphynx.
26 John Stuart Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution, Proemia III: Europe and Asia* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1879), no page number.
27 Stuart-Glennie, *Sociological Papers, Volume 2*, 223–224.
28 Ibid., 525
29 Stuart-Glennie, "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," *The International Monthly* (April, 1901), 458.
30 Ibid., 458.
31 Ibid., 458–459.
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33 Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. 6, paragraph 315.

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4
Islands of Light

Abstract: *Prehistory was for Jaspers a "dark world," literally in the sense that he did not think much evidence was available, and theoretically in the sense that he did not see it contributing to the development of human spirituality. He views the civilizations out of which the axial figures emerged as "little islands of light" in an otherwise unilluminated world of primitive peoples, who contributed "nothing of importance to the history of the spirit." This chapter shows the limitations of Jaspers' ethnocentrism, and provides evidence on why pre-axial and non-civilizational peoples achieved noteworthy religious outlooks of crucial significance to "the history of the spirit." Such views, characterized in Stuart-Glennie's view as panzooinism, provide a broader evolutionary context for understanding the supernaturalism of the moral revolution as a transitional phase, as Stuart-Glennie saw it, which Jaspers' theory of an axial age cannot encompass.*

Keywords: hunter-gatherer; the sacred game; the generalized other; desacralization of the wild habitat

Halton, Eugene. *From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
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Prehistory and the history of the spirit

Prehistory was for Jaspers a "dark world," literally in the sense that he did not think much evidence was available, and theoretically in the sense that he did not see it contributing to the development of human spirituality. He views the civilizations out of which the axial figures emerged as "little islands of light"[1] in an otherwise unilluminated world of primitive peoples: "We see the vast territories of Northern Asia, Africa, and America, which were inhabited by men but saw the birth of nothing of importance to the history of the spirit. . . . within their own limited range they achieved astonishing things, but they were as though bound to the substratum of natural life, into which they continually threatened to slip back."[2] "Nothing of importance" indeed. Jaspers also assumes "natural life" is categorically separate from spirit. This chapter will explore those non-civilizational contributions to "the history of the spirit" dismissed by Jaspers, and their place in Stuart-Glennie's concept of panzooinism. Panzooinism provides a broader evolutionary context for understanding the supernaturalism of the moral revolution as a transitional phase, as Stuart-Glennie saw it, which Jaspers' theory of an axial age cannot encompass.

Jaspers was not only civilizational-centric, but also profoundly ignorant of the conditions of hunter-gatherer life, and of how civilization turned away from the 2-million-year evolutionary trajectory that bodied humans into being in relatively sustainable relationships with the earth. He was unaware, perhaps because of less focus in Germany at that time of the bodies of ethnography that were already available decades earlier to scholars such as Stuart-Glennie or Emile Durkheim. And Stuart-Glennie was, after all, a practicing folklorist who spent years collecting materials. German ethology was biologically and physiologically oriented rather than ethnographic. Perhaps, to be fair, the evidence on non-agricultural foraging peoples, such as their superior diets, or sophisticated practices such as tracking, was not available to Jaspers, or even to Mumford. Many materials have come into the foreground since a 1966 Wenner-Gren conference in Chicago titled "Man the Hunter," revealing the conditions of aboriginal foragers as what anthropologist Marshall Sahlins called "the original affluent society." These conditions are markedly different from agricultural peoples, and even of proto-agricultural horticulturalists.

If we take diet as an indicator of human thriving, for example, the so-called progress brought about through civilization and the axial age

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is reversed. Agriculturally based civilization radically separated humans from the millions of years of evolved attunements to habitat in a number of ways that are not progressive at all. As one physical anthropologist put it: "Although agriculture provided the economic basis for the rise of states and development of civilizations, the change in diet and acquisition of food resulted in a decline in quality of life for most human populations in the last 10,000 years."[3] And this assumes a huge variety in foraging methods and foods, as diverse as the many habitats of foraging humanity.

One hears, for example, how people in industrialized nations have been supposedly getting taller for the past 150 years as a result of progress. But they/we are only going back to the original heights from before agricultural civilization negatively transformed human diets. As numerous archaeological studies of early civilizations have shown, agriculture brought radically decreased nutrition and increased nutritional diseases for the bulk of the population, people actually getting shorter wherever it was introduced, by some estimates four to six inches, whether in old world Euro-Asia or new North/South America.[4] And as mentioned earlier, it involved dependence on a much more limited variety of foods, such as wheat or rice grains, and significantly increased work load to maintain and attain them, including ploughing, irrigation, et cetera.[5] Hence Sahlins describes the Hazda of Tanzania and Kalihari Bushmen as rejecting, in effect, the Neolithic "bribe": "the Hazda, tutored by life and not by anthropology, reject the neolithic revolution in order to keep their leisure. Although surrounded by cultivators, they have until recently refused to take up agriculture themselves, 'mainly on the grounds that this would involve too much hard work.' In this they are like the Bushmen, who respond to the neolithic question with another: 'Why should we plant, when there are so many mongongo nuts in the world?' "[6] Jared Diamond has summarized other research on the contrast between forager and farmer diets:

> While farmers concentrate on high-carbohydrate crops like rice and potatoes, the mix of wild plants and animals in the diets of surviving hunter-gatherers provides more protein and a better balance of other nutrients. In one study, the Bushmen's average daily food intake (during a month when food was plentiful) was 2,140 calories and 93 grams of protein, considerably greater than the recommended daily allowance for people of their size. It's almost inconceivable that Bushmen, who eat 75 or so wild plants, could die of starvation the way hundreds of thousands of Irish farmers and their families did during the potato famine of the 1840s.[7]

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In short, as anthropologists Lee and DeVore put it in their groundbreaking study of hunter-gatherers in 1968, the hunter-gatherer "way of life has been the most successful and persistent adaptation man has ever achieved. Nor does this evaluation exclude the present precarious existence under the threat of nuclear annihilation and the population explosion. It is still an open question whether man will be able to survive the exceedingly complex and unstable ecological conditions he has created for himself."[8]

But the changes introduced by agriculturally based civilization were not simply nutritional. They involved profound social and spiritual transformations as well, that complicate assumptions that civilization brought unilateral "progress." Spacing between births were halved—suggesting that early socialization was thereby affected, populations exploded, and in the bureaucratic organization of the city, autonomy was radically reduced except for a tiny elite centered around a king.[9] The development of mass killing warfare institutionalized systematic violence as a legitimate expression of civilized behavior. Anthropologist Agustin Fuentes has summarized the data on violence and warfare:

> If you review the published information on the fossil record of humans and potential human ancestors from about six million years ago through about 12,000 years ago you are provided with, at best, only a few examples of possible death due to the hand of another individual of the same species. . . . Examination of the human fossil record supports the hypothesis that while some violence between individuals undoubtedly happened in the past, warfare is a relatively modern human behavior (12,000 to 10,000 years old.)[10]

This flies in the face of the Hobbesian assumption of an original state of nature consisting of a "warre of every one against every one," and against recent restatements of that position, which tend to neglect, for example, the influences of displacement and violent state intervention on aboriginal peoples.[11]

In contrast to relatively more egalitarian and leisured foraging societies, civilization could also be described as a euphemism for conditions of increased social inequality, work load, population, and the devastating effects of famine and plague for large centralized populations of city dwellers. And it brought a whole different relation to habitat, increasingly viewing nature as something to be controlled, and later, to be feared—a change noted by Stuart-Glennie but ignored by Jaspers. As archaeologist

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Dr. Ofer Bar-Yosef, whose team discovered the earliest cultivated figs from around 11,000 years ago noted, "…there was a critical switch in the human mind—from exploiting the earth as it is, to actively changing the environment to suit our needs. People decided to intervene in nature and supply their own food rather than relying on what was provided by the gods."[12]

The idea that the environment is only friendly when it is tamed expresses an outlook utterly at odds with aboriginal peoples everywhere, who accept their relationship to the wild environment as "the sacred game," as the ecological philosopher Paul Shepard called it, involving themselves as not only predators but potential prey, a basic acceptance of humans as participants in the community of life rather than controlling spectators of it.[13] This does not mean that foragers do not also selectively intervene to alter the habitat, for example, through burning to enhance conditions for the proliferation of herbivores, as Charles Mann has noted in his book, *1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus*: "Rather than domesticate animals for meat, Indians retooled ecosystems to encourage elk, deer, and bear. Constant burning of undergrowth increased the numbers of herbivores, the predators that fed on them, and the people who ate them both."[14] Such practices of subtly altering the wild habitat are very different from the elimination of it as food source through creation of a genetically altered and concentrated domesticated agricultural habitat of animals and plants.

The sacred game and the generalized other

"The sacred game" involves the interplay of predator and prey, and the literal and spiritual incorporation of the wild Other. The sacred game is where the human mind emerged, a game so subtle it required all the abilities it summoned forth from its human players, even as it fed them with those emerging abilities of tracking, expert awareness of flora and fauna, and complex ritual life, including symboling and eventually language.

Though not aware of the gulf between foraging peoples and agriculturalists, blurring foragers and early agricultural peoples as "folk culture," Stuart-Glennie was on to something very basic in the aboriginal mind: what I will call creaturely life as the original *generalized other*. Shepard has argued that animals "are among the first inhabitants of the mind's

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eye," constituting an indispensable dialogical other in the emergence of the human mind.[15] In his outlook the human mind evolved into being through attuning practically and reverentially to the living, and often edible, habitat.

Philosopher G. H. Mead's theory of the *generalized other*, the internalized and organized community as the basis for the development of the capacity for symbolic communication and reflective consciousness, tends to privilege the human others, parents and playmates, actual and imagined. All of these figures are undoubtedly important in human development, both in the general evolution of humans into symboling, language-capable creatures and also in the individual development of the child. Yet Mead's theory needs to be supplemented, as I have attempted to do, by considering the place of "the wild other" in the emergence of the human mind, phylogenetically and ontogenetically.[16]

The implication of attunement to the wild others is that the human mind emerged into being informed by its close attunement to the *animate earth*.[17] By generalizing information from its living habitat, including the non-human others who serve as role models, by "taking the attitude of the generalized other," as Mead put it, the informing animals and plants provide not only food, but soul-food, revealing characteristics of the habitat such as audio maps of disturbances and locations of likely predators and prey provided by bird calls.[18] Ruminating upon the animals and plants is informative practically as well as aesthetically. Tracking, mimicking, dancing, singing, and other ways of dramatizing them involving gestural "attitudes," gets one into their minds, and through their minds, into a closer relationship of awareness with the surroundings. It is both practical and dramatic, by no means merely a make-believe in unreal phantoms. But it makes for good playing.

This broadened conception of the generalized other I am briefly outlining here addresses not only the evolutionary origins of symbolic communicative mind, but also the origins of the religious impulse as rooted in attuning processes of the sacred game.[19] It illustrates some of the possibilities inherent in Stuart-Glennie's conception of panzoonism as involving true intuitions of the informing properties of the living habitat. Stuart-Glennie's discussions of the potentially true intuitions of folk-culture remained vague, but I am claiming that his idea of panzoonism as a way of belief in which properties of the living environment are regarded as sentient and informative is a useful way to characterize aboriginal forager outlooks.

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Jaspers' discussion of pre- and non-historical peoples makes use of general evolutionary concepts, using zoologist Adolf Portman, but does not draw from ethnographic materials, which might have given him insight into aboriginal religious beliefs as possibly not merely insignificant in "the history of the spirit." He claims, for example, as unique to axial founders that "These paths are widely divergent in their conviction and dogma, but common to all of them is man's reaching out beyond himself by growing aware of himself within the whole of Being and the fact that he can tread them only as an individual on his own."[20] This claim rings true in characterizing the departure from pre-axial state-centered polytheistic religions. But when one moves from civilizational-centric religions to those of hunter-gatherers, to those earlier and non-civilizational varieties of panzoonism, Jaspers' statement applies in interesting ways to those people as well. Panzooinism is precisely about humankind's relation to "the whole of being," though in a decentered way different from axialism: where one can tread paths as an individual, but immersed in the fabric of life, rather than "on his own."

Consider one aboriginal whose beliefs are precisely about treading religious paths on his own, fully aware of himself "within the whole of being," as he practices the sophisticated art and science of tracking. !Nqate Xqamxebe, a!Xo San hunter of the Kalahari Desert Bushmen, who is featured in the documentary *The Great Dance: A Hunter's Story* (2000), tells it this way: "When you track an animal—you must become the animal. Tracking is like dancing, because your body is happy—you can feel it in the dance and then you know that the hunting will be good. When you are doing these things you are talking with God."

Master aboriginal trackers are aware of about 5000 potential marks in tracks that can convey precise information about all the organs of the body, emotions, past injuries, and even certain intentions and likely behavior in further tracks.[21] The blinking of eyes is registered in tracks. It is a highly sophisticated art and science, a practice likely even older than humanity, and a key language in the sacred game.

Attuning oneself to the instinctive intelligence of the habitat, participating in "the sacred game" of predator and prey, formed a basis of practical and spiritual life for foraging aboriginals. It is attunement to "the whole of being" considered as the community of life, not humanity apart from it. The Native American expression, "to walk in beauty," is thus not simply a metaphor, but also literally calls attention to the conditions of stealth, tracking, attunement, and sacredness of the hunt.

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The transformation from hunter-gatherer existence to that of civilization brought about a shift in outlooks from the world considered as gift to the world as sacrifice, as the earlier discussion of the Babylonian Creation myth *Atrahasis* illustrated. Now is ritual sacrifice, which is much more common among agricultural and herding peoples than hunter-gatherers, a religious advance? Or might it be better viewed as an anthropomorphizing of the sacred game, substituting domesticated and captive animals for the wild other? Is the Christian celebration of the crucifixion and communion a great breakthrough in spirituality? In my view it is more accurately seen as representing the alienated memory of the sacred game, contracted from the wild other to the divinized human as sacred prey. Its religious poignancy is explicitly based on sacrifice, but it may ring deep because it taps the long evolutionary trajectory of the sacred game as basis of religious belief.

Consider that although axial beliefs embodied in world religions remain a central part of people's beliefs today, what people eat remains largely the product of the earlier neolithic domestication of plants and animals which spawned the original agriculturally based civilizations. Domestication, settlement, and civilization mark arguably the central transformation of humankind even to this day, fundamentally changing the relations of humans to their habitat. Yet the optimum human diet today remains that of our pre-agricultural foraging ancestors and the 2-million-year-or-more trajectory in which the human body evolved into being, the varieties of the "paleolithic diet."[22]

The axial age, Stuart-Glennie's moral revolution, can be seen as a transformation within the context of the larger transformation of human life that had been brought about by settlement and civilizational living. Its benefits came with costs. The foregrounding of the person in the moral revolution provided not only a counter-punch to those centralized power structures, as Mumford noted, but also served as a further development of the anthropocentric contraction of mind, continuing civilized anthropocentrism rather than departing from it. And this emergence of anthropocentric mind occurred, even though, as Stuart-Glennie noted more than once, panzooinism remained a stronger influence in the East Asian varieties of the moral revolution. Buddhism, for example, allows animals as sentient and spiritual beings. But in the doctrine of rebirth, being reborn as an animal is unfortunate, a lower form of rebirth than human.

The rise of the significance of the person, in itself a progressive advance within the context of power-centered civilizations, still did not address

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the de-attunement to and desacralization of the wild habitat wrought by agriculturally based civilization. In the context of ancient Israel, for example, Owen Barfield, writing about the psalms, noted that

> everything proclaims the glory of God, but nothing represents Him. Nothing could be more beautiful, and nothing could be less Platonic….If, moreover, we review the Old Testament as a whole, we shall scarcely find there suggested what we find *assumed* by both Aristotle and Aquinas, namely, that knowledge of God's creation can become knowledge of God. In the Old Testament the relation of man to God is the only thing that is of any importance at all, unless by that we mean a knowledge of the moral law. Of knowledge, as conscious participation in the divine ground of nature, and thus in the spirit of God Himself, we hear no whisper.[23]

Fruits of the moral revolution, such as the embracing Christian maxim "Love thy neighbor as thyself," excluded the wild others as sacred neighbors in the community of life; similarly the personalism of Socrates, of "know thyself," was framed for fellow city dwellers, distant from what might be the aboriginal equivalent, "know thy wild others to know thyself."

Even Socrates's prayer from the ending of Plato's *Phaedrus*, a rare non-city occasion where Socrates and Phaedrus converse in the country outside the city walls, is offered to the anthropomorphized wild other personified as Pan: "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry." Beautiful though this prayer is in seeking an outward and inward unity and wisdom as wealth, it remains filtered through the anthropomorphic half-human half-goat Pan and related gods.

The attunement to the wild habitat through the gathering, hunting, ritual, dramatic, play and identifying practices of the sacred game marked a spiritual achievement of the deepest significance in human evolution, feeding body and soul, helping propel us into our symbolizing species. Jaspers' idea that "the history of the spirit" turned upon the axial period is a conceit of anthropocentric mind, encapsulated within an all-too-human world.

Though it offered a genuine counter-culture to centralized civilization, axialism eventually became problematically incorporated as rationalizing civilization, and civilization continued its unbounded expansionism and domestication of the earth. One might say that we are living in the unsustainable culmination of that process today.

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But let us turn now to consider Mumford's position vis-à-vis that proposed by Jaspers. These two public intellectuals were both born in the nineteenth century, Jaspers in 1883 and Mumford in 1895. Jaspers is known as a psychiatrist and philosopher, and Mumford as a writer on technology, cities, and architecture. They each produced major works in the first half of the twentieth century. But they also are highly significant as early manifestations of social thought in the nuclear age, thinkers who had to come to terms with science and technology in a post-war world where unprecedented powers had been released. Each was acutely aware that a careful understanding of the past had the greatest significance for understanding the altered conditions of the present, and likely path of the future.

Notes

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6 Marshall Sahlins, *Stone-Age Economics*, 27.
7 Jared Diamond, "The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race," *Discover Magazine*, May (1987), 65.
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10 Agustin Fuentes, *Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 130–131.
11 Stephen Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Viking Adult, 2011), Jared Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?* (New York: Viking Adult, 2012), see also Jason Antrosio, "Yanomami Ax Fight: Jared Diamond, Science, Violence & The Facts," *Living Anthropologically Blog*, January 13th, 2013, accessed December 23, 2013. http://www.livinganthropologically.com/2013/02/06/yanomami-science-violence-empirical-data-facts/.
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17 See my discussion in Chapter 7 on my use of the term.
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5
Jaspers and Mumford

Abstract: *Mumford was one of the first thinkers after Jaspers to elaborate on the idea of the axial age, in 1956, along with Eric Voegelin, who first took up the theme of the axial age the year after Mumford in 1957. Though Mumford wrote on the axial age early, a few years after Jaspers' publication, his multiple writings on the idea over the years have remained curiously marginal to scholarly discussion. This chapter compares Jaspers' view of the axial age with that of Mumford, who was also aware of Stuart-Glennie's work as preceding Jaspers by decades, revealing a more critical stance by Mumford on the legacy of the axial age.*

Keywords: Lewis Mumford; axial man; Karl Jaspers; science and technology; myth of the machine; megamachine

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Axis and transformations

Jaspers and Mumford were broad ranging thinkers, and as mentioned, Mumford made early use of Jaspers' theory of the axial age, while also noting that Stuart-Glennie had preceded Jaspers. Mumford appreciated the transformation that the axial age represented, but also had a perspective on its limitations not shared by Jaspers.

Though Jaspers admits that the earlier advent of civilizations could be taken as having a significance parallel to that of the axial age, he does not consider the possibility that the rise of agriculturally based civilization itself may have been an "axis" as or more transformative than the axial age. For example, he noted that with the appearance of the first civilizations:

> At one stroke the whole atmosphere becomes different from that of prehistory. Silence no longer reigns; men speak to one another in written documents, and thereby to us once we have learned to understand their script and their language; they speak in buildings, which presuppose organization and the existence of a state, and in works of art which conceal a meaning that is strange to us in forms that are nonetheless eloquent.
>
> Yet these civilizations are destitute of the spiritual revolution which we have outlined in our picture of the Axial Period and which laid the foundations for a new humanity, our humanity….Hence the account of the history of these millennia is eventful in the extreme, and yet its events do not bear the character of historical decisions vital to humanity.[1]

Jaspers acknowledges the parallel developments of civilizations sharing similarities of highly developed organization and technical achievement, "a magical religion destitute of philosophical enlightenment," and concludes that the parallelism "consists only of the similarity of an established type, not of a spiritual movement."[2] When we compare Mumford's outlook, the moral revolution or axial age appears as one phase of a number of historical transformations, and as an emergent alternative to the power complex of civilization that yet became problematically entangled in it. It is helpful to consider some of Mumford's background to understand what shaped his interest in the axial age.

Lewis Mumford was a writer widely known as a public intellectual, a "generalist," whose writings ranged far and wide. He had a long standing interest in the role of technology, cities, architecture, and civilization on

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human development. His earlier works included *Technics and Civilization* (1934) and *The Culture of Cities* (1938). These works traced the development of Western civilization from medieval times to the present, and were part of a 20-year, four-volume project, *The Renewal of Life*, to map out what was of value in Western civilization and what destructive tendencies threatened it as the twentieth century and its world wars and totalitarian outbreaks developed.

Mumford returned to these themes in the post-war period, now enlarging his scope from Western civilization to a critical understanding of the place of civilization in the broader context of human development. His 1961 book, *The City in History*, for example, went farther back to the prehistory and emergence of cities and civilization. It was a masterly comprehensive work of scholarship and writing, and it received the National Book Award. He also returned to the theme of his book, *Technics and Civilization*, in his two-volume work, *The Myth of The Machine*. Volume 1, *Technics and Human Development*, appeared in 1967, and volume 2, *The Pentagon of Power*, in 1970.

Mumford's shorter book from 1956, *The Transformations of Man*, in effect set the stage for these later works by broadening the perspective from how the West arose to how humans emerged as a symboling species, capable of art, speech, and thought. Though written quickly, this work pictured the emergence of humans and of history and its developments as marked by a series of transformations rather than simply incremental change. As mentioned, one of these significant transformations was the emergence of "axial man." So let us consider his discussion from that 1956 work, one of the first works of scholarship to make use of Jaspers' theory, though virtually invisible to subsequent scholarship on the axial age thus far.

Jaspers depicted four stages of world history: prehistory, civilization, axial, and the age of science and technology, a chronology which could have influenced Mumford's selection of chapter themes, although altered to his own outlook. Jaspers made the axial age the fundamental pivot to all of history, though allowing the possibility of an emergent second axial age in the future.

> The appellation axis was bestowed . . . upon an era around the middle of the last millennium B.C., for which everything that preceded it would appear to have been a preparation, and to which everything subsequent actually, and often in clear consciousness, relates back. The world history of humanity

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> derives its structure from this period. It is not an axis of which we might assert a permanent absoluteness and uniqueness. But it is the axis of the short world history that has taken place up till now…[3]

In contrast, Mumford saw it as simply one of a series of historical transformations, ranging chronologically from the earliest transformation from animal into human first through the rise of symbolic communication, then the rise of early village life, herding, horticulture, and agriculture in what he called, influenced by André Varagnac, archaic man. Perhaps archaic woman might have been a better name, given that Mumford saw women as taking the lead in the domestication of plants. The next transformation brought forth the emergence of civilization as a profoundly new way of life and consciousness, followed in succession by the axial transformation, old world man, new world man, post-historic man, and world culture.

While acknowledging the significance of the axial turn, Mumford claimed that

> Though this change was a decisive one, I would not separate it as arbitrarily as Jaspers has done from the earlier developments of religion and ethics. If the theological perceptions of Ikhnaton (Akh-en-aton) had not been resisted and forcibly overthrown by the old Memphite priesthood, Egypt would probably have produced the first viable axial religion, centered in a naturalistic monotheism, appealing to all men, seven centuries or so before Zoroaster, Buddha, or Confucius."[4]

In his previous chapter, "Civilized Man," Mumford allowed more significance than Jaspers to the transformations brought about by civilization, acknowledging "the bringing together of larger bodies of men, by means of technical agents, symbolic abstractions, and centralized political authority, into a greater community of purpose than had ever existed before…by these agents of a common order and a common life mankind still continues to live."[5] Yet he also enumerated how civilization imposed "perverse derangements and criminal insubordinations: as a result, civilization has often brought about gigantic miscarriages of life, in beastialities and butcheries that simpler communities lack the animus as well as the power to inflict."[6] The transformations Mumford outlines, including that of axial man, usually come with costs as well as benefits.

Mumford's discussion of civilization in *The Transformations of Man* and in later works was more critical, both positively and negatively, than that of Jaspers, and his understanding of precivilizational "archaic man," far

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more developed. He rejected the story of archaeology that hard stone and bone tools were the most significant earliest tools of emergent humans. Instead, Mumford, again drawing in part from André Varagnac, broke new ground in taking the technics of the human body itself as central in elaborating means of communication in ritual, language, and art which helped fashion us into humankind. It took archaeologists and physical anthropologists another couple of decades to come around to address their undervaluing of the significance of social and communicative practices in human evolution, as well as "soft" technics such as textiles and nets. Mumford undervalued the place of gathering in relation to hunting, as did many anthropologists in 1956, but his considering of body technics and symbolic and communicative practices was ahead of its time.

And Mumford viewed civilization as another kind of self-fabrication, what he would later call the first *megamachine*, a system constructed by humanity whose benefits nevertheless came at the cost of increased regimentation, repression, and inequality: "Economically, the new order was based largely on the forcible exploitation of cultivators and artisans by an armed and ever-threatening minority. For civilization brought about the equation of human life with property and power."[7]

Many later commentaries on the axial age discuss its "transcendent" and religious aspects, and, in Jaspers, also "the specifically human in man."[8] Mumford did as well, and also stressed the emergence of the person as a counter to institutionalized civilizational power, a counter-culture and counter-punch to the imposed shell of centralized civilizational power and its power games and identities. As he said in his later work, *Technics and Human Development*: "We must reckon with a counter force . . . that of the Axial religions and philosophies, the diverse yet kindred systems of value that challenged and sought to lift the heavy burden of 'civilization,' by directing all change toward the transformation, not of the environment, but of the individual soul."[9]

Mumford addressed the parallel developments of axial philosophies to the axial religions, resting on similar intuitions invoking "man's higher nature;" not neglecting the "nonrational forces in the personality," but emphasizing "the rational and the humanly controllable."[10] The academy founded by Plato, or the example of Confucius in the East, showed "how much that was similar to the work of the axial religions could be accomplished without a theology."[11] The scholar took on a role parallel yet less populist from that of the prophet.

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Axial acquiescence

Though there were great and enduring achievements of the axial religions, Mumford argued they were nevertheless rooted to some degree in illusion:

> The type of personality they sought to impress on mankind as a whole is not, in fact, a universal one. The axial mask did not fit easily over every face. In its overemphasis of the "cerebral" and spiritual, the axial personality is a valuable corrective to the extroversion and shallowness of more common types: but it is not, in its isolated perfection, a sufficiently representative ideal of human potentiality, for it rejects too much that is needed for full human growth....An ideal too pure to be accepted by the world may leave a deeper corruption behind than a more pedestrian morality, as non-Christian peoples often noted in the nineteenth century when they compared the practices of the trader and soldier with the professions of the missionary... By his exclusively inward orientation, "Moral Man" gave scope, if not sanction, to "Immoral Society."[12]

Jaspers took a somewhat different view, seeing in the rise of world empires from roughly 200 B.C.E. onward the collapse of the axial period, in which the axial idea is compromised, yet does not seem to be intrinsically complicit:

> In the end, the collapse took place. From about 200 B.C. onwards great political and spiritual unifications and dogmatic configurations held the field. The Axial Period ended with the formation of great States, which forcibly realised this unity (the unified Chinese Empire of Tsin-Shi-Hwang-Ti, the Maurya dynasty in India, the Roman Empire). These great changeovers from the multiplicity of States to universal empires—world empires in the sense that they embraced the whole of the world process known at the time in the three regions, which at that period were almost completely ignorant of one another—took place simultaneously. The metamorphosis was everywhere remarkable: the free conflict of spirits seems to have come to a standstill. The result was a loss of consciousness. Only a few suitable intellectual possibilities and spiritual figures from the bygone Axial Period were seized upon to impart spiritual community, lustre and concordance to the new State authorities. The imperial idea was realised in forms founded on religion. There arose spiritually stable, long-enduring periods of great empires, attended by a levelling down to mass culture and by the sublime, but unfree, spirituality of conservative aristocracies. It is as though the world fell into a centuries long sleep, accompanied by the absolute authority of great systems and mummifications.[13]

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Mumford saw the axial idea as ingredient in this transformation, rather than a victim of it. Despite its radical alternative to power the axial transformation was ultimately reabsorbed by the civilizational institutions it had challenged:

> Now in fact axial culture produced a self far more capable of running a complex political organization covering a wide domain than was the civilizational self, with its limiting tribal and national underlayer. For the axial self, disciplined by its monastic abstentions—like those of a soldier trained for battle, as Tertullian noted—had persistence, vision, self-awareness, and self-criticism, all fortified by great powers of self-sacrifice, attached to a distant goal. All these were valuable traits far beyond those normal to the soldier and the bureaucrat, inured to only mechanical repetition, and buoyed up by the prospect of necessarily limited earthly rewards. It is no accident, perhaps, that the oldest effective transnational political organization so far recorded is that of the Church of Rome. But the very superiority of the axial self in carrying out more competently the functions of civilization produced a new danger: axial man took on the vices of the civilization he had become so adept at controlling and extending, and in that very triumph forfeited axial culture's chief reason for existence.[14]

As Mumford noted, the axial cultures became key elements of the very power structures to which they had provided alternatives. In the West the Greco-Judaic elements that fused in Christianity eventually became the religion of the Roman Empire. Later, in the transformation into what Mumford termed "New World Man," Christian civilization contributed not only to global conquest through might, but also to the processes of rationalization, as Jaspers' mentor and friend Max Weber termed it, that begat the modern world.

That axial asceticism of the other-worldly monastery became generalized by this-worldly asceticism of the reformation, as Weber noted in his work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The systematic rational conduct of life prescribed by Calvinism and related branches reversed profit making from a vice to a virtue, thus providing an ethical underpinning for rational capitalism, later to be jettisoned as capitalism became fully institutionalized. Mumford had provided a parallel understanding to Weber's argument in his chapter "The Monastery and the Clock," in his 1934 book *Technics and Civilization*. There he traced how the rational order of the Benedictine monastery, and its needs to order the seven prayer times of the day as well as work, helped give birth to the mechanical clock. The monks' systematized prayers, as it

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were, called forth *deus ex machina*, "the god out of the machine" that is the clock.

The clock set forth not simply a new technology, but an amplification of mechanical regularity that would spread to town, work, industry, and eventually become, by the seventeenth century, the metaphor of the "clockwork" universe. One can say that rational order first "escaped" the monastery, not as Weber put it, in the reformation, but even earlier, in the clock tower and its spread to the town and later home.

Nevertheless, Mumford claimed that axial man represented an advance in broadening "the province of morality" and the basis of human association, and in heightening self-direction and self-perfection. Yet,

> this transformation remained incomplete: except in isolated souls, axial man never fully supplanted civilized man or reconciled the inherent contradiction between their roles; indeed, the hope of doing so, on purely axial terms, was an illusory one. Though the introverted saint sought to replace the hero as the leader and exemplar of the new community, he was no more capable than the extroverted hero of doing justice to the whole man; nor yet was the axial philosopher.[15]

Mumford returned to the axial theme in *The Myth of the Machine*, still noting its achievements while acknowledging its flaws. There, under the heading of "The Moralization of Power," he characterized it as emanating from the margins, from villages rather than great cities, celebrating right over power, and providing alternative values to power-centered civilization. It was "the antithesis upon which the myth of the megamachine had been built."

> This revolt began in the mind, and it proceeded quietly to deny the materialistic assumptions that equated human welfare and the will of the gods with centralized political power, military dominance, and increasing economic exploitation—symbolized as these were in the walls, towers, palaces, temples of the great urban centers. All over Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—and notably out of the villages rather than the cities—new voices arose, those of an Amos, a Hesiod, a Lao-tzu, deriding the cult of power, pronouncing it iniquitous, futile, and anti-human, and proclaiming a new set of values, the antithesis upon which the myth of the megamachine had been built. Not power, but righteousness, these prophets said, was the basis of human society: not snatching, seizing and fighting, but sharing, cooperation, even loving: not pride, but humility: not limitless wealth, but a noble self-restricting poverty and chastity….Above all, the same espousal of the poor and lowly, hitherto easy victims of power.

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> …No longer was the ideal man a hero, a being of extraordinary bodily dimensions and muscular prowess, like Gilgamesh, Herakles, or Samson: no longer a king who boasted the number of lions he had killed, or the number of rival kings whose gods he had captured and whose persons he had humiliated or mutilated: nor would this ideal figure boast of the number of concubines he had engaged in sexual intercourse in a single night.
>
> The new prophets were men of modest humane disposition: they brought life back to the village scale and the normal human dimensions; and out of this weakness they made a new kind of strength, not recognized in the palace or marketplace.[16]

But as he had made clear in 1956, there were inherent limitations in the axial revolution, which he characterized in Volume 2, *The Pentagon of Power*, in terms of an imbalance between quantitative and qualitative dimensions of life:

> Now the discovery that quantification is not in itself beneficial was made ages ago, at a time when only a favored minority could command goods and services in relatively unlimited quantity. As I showed [in the first volume], the first real challenge to the ancient "civilized" power system, which was the forerunner of our modern economy of abundance, came between the eighth and the sixth centuries B.C., when a succession of prophets and philosophers, perceiving the deleterious human results of an unrestricted pursuit of unlimited quantities of food, drink, sexual pleasure, money, and power, introduced a new system of voluntary control. The exhibitionist modes of consumption that had identified the rich and the powerful were no longer accepted as desireable patterns of human achievement: instead, the Axial religions and philosophies advocated abstention, moderation, the reduction of superfluous wants and capricious, ego-driven desires, for the sake of both internal equilibrium and spiritual exaltation.[17]

The axial religions and philosophies demonstrated a real alternative to the civilized power-centered system, illustrating in their time what Vaclav Havel would call, in the context of eastern European opposition to the Soviet power-centered totalitarian system "the power of the powerless."[18] But that moral revolution was not sufficient to effect a truly axial transformation of the power system, because, ironically, in rejecting power, it failed to come to terms with power as also a real factor in life:

> Though civilization has been in some degree under the influence of these Axial religions and ideologies for roughly 2,500 years, they failed even at their moments of greatest acceptance and achievement to replace completely the earlier power systems or to forestall the present one. This for two

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> reasons. For one thing, none of these new modes of thought themselves ever became firmly enough established to abolish the dominant institutions of ancient society—war, slavery, and economic expropriation—or to overcome the social aberrations upon which they were based. But no less disabling was the fact that their systems of abstention were designed, not to bring rewards in this life, but either to make the believer content despite their absence, or to look forward to compensation at compound interest in an imagined eternal afterlife hereafter.
>
> In consequence, the Axial religions did little except in an unreliable remedial way, mainly through voluntary charity, to ensure that goods in sufficient quantity were distributed justly to the entire community. Their exclusive emphasis upon the quality of life, upon internal and subjective rewards, thus merely reversed the older tendency to overstress materialistic power; whereas in all higher organisms a balance of quantitative and qualitative ingredients, of power and love, is necessary in order to ensure the best life possible. Neither unqualified power nor impotent virtue gives an adequate answer to the human problem.[19]

The counterweight of axial love to civilized power ultimately proved insufficient to the demands of life, in Mumford's organic outlook. A marriage of contraries, so to speak, a unified balance of power and love, was absent, yet in Mumford's view are necessary to the best life possible. As poet William Blake put it: "Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate are necessary to Human existence." Put differently, without a balance of power and love, the moral virtues risk becoming idealizations of life, rather than living embodiments of it. I take the idealization of life as the dark, usually unacknowledged side of what many commentators on the axial age have celebrated as "transcendence."

Mumford's critique of the dissociation of the quantitative and qualitative in this section of *The Pentagon of Power* was aimed at the modern worldview and its tendency to take the quantitative as real and the qualitative as merely "subjective." It becomes interesting then to compare Stuart-Glennie's progressive outlook, where the original "quantitatively undetermined" true intuitions yet false conceptions of panzooinism re-emerge in the "quantitatively determined" true conceptions of modern science. In considering that science could correctly conceive the laws of nature through precise methods of quantification, Stuart-Glennie neglected those possible costs of quantification as a cultural ideal raised by Mumford, namely of the loss of real qualitative dimensions of being

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human, real though possibly immeasurable. Mumford proposed that modern science arose under a mechanical ideology that represented a new version of the old "myth of the machine," of the treating of precise portions of reality as though they constituted the whole. Mumford viewed this ideology as regressive rather than progressive, and as an inadequate model even for science. I will return to this theme in the next chapter.

Notes

1 Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, 45, 50.
2 Ibid., 12–13.
3 Ibid., 262.
4 Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), 57.
5 Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, 42.
6 Ibid., 43.
7 Ibid., 40.
8 See also, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), B.I. Schwartz, "The Age of Transcendence," *Daedalus* 104.2 (1975), 1–7, Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation: The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2006), Hans Joas, "The Axial Age Debate as Religious Discourse," in *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, ed. R Bellah and H. Joas (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 9–29.
9 Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development*, 256.
10 Ibid., *The Transformations of Man*, 71
11 Ibid., 71.
12 Ibid., 74–75.
13 Jaspers, *Origin and Goal of History*, 194.
14 Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, 78.
15 Ibid., 79.
16 Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development*, 258–259.
17 Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power*, 335.
18 Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," *Living in Truth*, ed. Jan Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 36–122.
19 Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power,* 335.

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6
The Next Transformation?

Abstract: *Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, and Mumford not only all wrote on the moral revolution/axial age, but also drew from their discussions of that revolutionary age its place in a potential transformation in the future, which this chapter discusses. These were not histories of a transformative but finished chapter of human development, but rather of a still unfolding narrative to be fathomed. Stuart-Glennie's "Ultimate Law of History" comprised a threefold dialectical process, from the panzooinist stage, through the supernaturalist, to a future "Third Age of Humanity." This new age would begin with the twenty-first century and would involve the establishment of a "United States of Europe." Mumford and Jaspers not only shared an interest in the axial age and its place in history, but both were among the first thinkers to engage the consequences of nuclear bombs and the nuclear age, reflecting on the meanings of the axial age for contemporary technological civilization.*

Keywords: Ultimate Law of History; Third Age of Humanity; United States of Europe; post-historic man

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Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, and Mumford not only all wrote on the moral revolution/axial age, but also drew from their discussions of that revolutionary age its place in a potential transformation in the future, which again makes for interesting comparisons. These were not histories of a transformative but finished chapter of human development, but rather of a still unfolding narrative to be fathomed.

Stuart-Glennie's Third Age of Humanity

Stuart-Glennie's "Ultimate Law of History" was of a threefold dialectical process, from the panzooinist stage, through the supernaturalist stage, marked especially by the moral revolution and its heightening of "the Differentiation of Subjective and Objective," to a third stage, which would involve "the conception of Mutual Determination."[1] He saw on the horizon the possibility of a "Third Age of Humanity towards the opening of which, in the establishment of a New Synthesis, Philosophical, Religious, and Social, we should seem to be approaching."[2] This new age would begin with the twenty-first century and would involve the establishment of a "United States of Europe."[3] On this point he was fairly accurate, though, as I will explain later, there were also unexpected "complications" to his forecast. Still, the European Union was established in 1993, after the cold war and its division of Europe ended, and its currency, the euro, was formally announced on January 1, 1999, and entered circulation on January 1, 2002.

The transitional age moving toward a "New Synthesis" foreseen by Stuart-Glennie represents progress, but it also validates the earliest panzooinist intuitions:

> Within what time the full development at once and victory of the conception of Natural Causation—the conception of the Mutual Determination of the differentiated Energies of a Kosmos—will be general and assured, we cannot tell. But we may say that—notwithstanding the immense economic and political forces on the side of a discredited and uncredited Supernaturalism—the ultimate triumph of that Science which is but the splendid verification of the primitive Folk intuition of the Solidarity of Nature appears as if it were in the drift of things.[4]

Where primitive panzooinism was a true intuition clothed in false conceptions, modern science allows that true intuition of the "Oneness, that unepisodic character, that Solidarity of Nature which we have found to

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be a primitive intuition," only clothed in a true conception of "the Mutual Determination of the differentiated Energies of a Kosmos."[5]

The Second Age of Humanity, beginning with civilizations and the rise of supernaturalism, and later, the outbreak of the moral revolution, figured positively into this development of consciousness. In bringing about the differentiation of objective and subjective outlooks, it also marked a conflicted period of "progressively antagonistic and abstract conceptions of Natural Powers and Supernatural Agents."[6] As mentioned in Chapter 3, rational Greek philosophy and science, with its ideas of power immanent in nature, posed a conflict with Hebrew conceptions of a transcendent God above nature. In the later fusing of these traditions in Christianity there remained nevertheless an inherent, and in Stuart-Glennie's view ultimately irreconcilable, clash, requiring a "new synthesis" for resolution, through the triumph of the scientific outlook: the new age of humanity.

This second age and particularly its moral revolution was not the central pivot of all history that Jaspers conceived it to be, a new light shining on previous darkness, but rather a phase, "the Transitional Age of Humanity," requiring a further reconciliation, which would verify the light of the earliest panzooinist intuitions in more adequate conceptions of scientific relationalism.[7] He optimistically saw the advance of science as not only dissolving supernaturalist religious belief, but providing a basis for a new religious outlook:

> Note, first, the ever advancing disintegration, not merely by scientific theories, but by the whole atmosphere of modern life, of the Christian theological theory of the origin and history of the kosmos, and of man, its highest offspring on this planet. Secondly, note the similarly advancing disintegration by European science among the more educated, and among the uneducated by Christian missions, of all the greater Asiatic religions, except Islamism; while, at the same time, the enthusiastic patriotism, the result of Asiatic success in the European-Asian conflict, will certainly drive rather to the reformation of native, than to the adoption of foreign, religions. And note, thirdly, such an increasingly synthetic character in scientific theories, whether of Nature or of Man, as promise to make of them, not the dissolvents merely of the old ideals, but the very bases of a new ideal, a New Religion of which the contemporary religions, duly reformed, or transformed, will be but sects.[8]

Christian theological theory has had to retreat in the face of scientific accounts of the physical universe and human evolution, and has by and

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large continued to come to greater acceptance of scientific findings in the century since Stuart-Glennie wrote this. Take the example of Galileo, whose scientific defense of Copernican heliocentrism provoked the Catholic Inquisition to convict him in 1633 of being "vehemently suspect of heresy," and to sentence him to house arrest for the remainder of his life. Catholic opposition to heliocentrism ended by 1835, and finally, in 1992, Pope John Paul II formally declared that the tribunal which had convicted Galileo 359 years earlier was in error: better late than never. And there are other scientific and technological issues for which Judeo-Christian positions address ethical concerns not addressed by researchers.

Still, Christianity in general, including the Catholic Church, retains a supernaturalist basis of belief not reconcilable with scientific naturalism. The gap between "Natural Powers and Supernatural Agents" noted by Stuart-Glennie that emerged with ancient Greek science has not been closed. Consider also how secularism came to prominence in the past century, including, for example, anti-religious secular Soviet and Chinese communism. Yet there has also been an upsurge in fundamentalism and religious traditionalism as well. His belief in a transvaluation of global religions seems to be overly optimistic, as was his belief in continuous progress across all human spheres, and that a developing "synthetic character in scientific theories" could provide a full and practical basis for a new religion. The reigning scientific theories today, it seems to me, do not go to the core of human life, as, for example, art can, or as religion should, perhaps suggesting that Stuart-Glennie should have considered more whether a reformation or transformation of science as well as religion might also be required. But let us consider more closely what he thought the future held.

It was Stuart-Glennie's correlative view of causation that figured into his conception of a possible third age of humanity in all three philosophical, religious, and social aspects, as, respectively, *Relationalism*, *Humanitarianism*, and *Socialism*:

> Now, if Causation is finally conceived as Mutual Determination, then, as has been said, Causes are conceived as *Relations*; and hence we may distinguish the Philosophy of the Third Age of Humanity as *Relationalism*... Then, as to the Religion corresponding to the Relational Philosophy of the Third Age of Humanity, Religion we have defined as the emotion excited by the Causes of Things, however conceived. In the New Philosophy, the Causes of Things are found in the System itself of Things. Religion will,

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> therefore, now be the emotion excited by that Oneness of Things which Science more and more clearly reveals; that Oneness, both systematic and historic, of Nature and of Humanity, the unutterable wonder and beauty of which, as Science presents it amid the infinities of Space and the eternities of Time, will be a perennial source of intellectual joy, and of moral purification; that Oneness, which Science reveals, of the Individual with the Race, which, as every ideal of Oneness with Others does, thrills with the rapture, and inspires with the heroism of Love. This higher and nobler emotion, which gives to Religion its completing development, may, as distinguished from the Naturianism of the First, and the Prophetianism of the Second Age, be named *Humanitarianism*. And as in the development of the New Philosophy of Relationalism, so in that of this new Religion of Humanitarianism, we see reason given by it to the whole previous course of the history of Religion.[9]

Stuart-Glennie's conception of religion as Humanitarianism, as the emotion "excited by that Oneness of Things" progressively revealed by science, marks a completion of the earlier intuitions of panzooinism. His idea is perhaps similar to that later expressed by philosopher John Dewey, who saw the fruits of science and art as providing liberation from "superstition" to humane religious qualities that could unify desire and purpose.

But does that "unutterable wonder and beauty . . . as Science presents it," in Stuart-Glennie's words, that "intellectual joy" and "moral purification" so produced embody the immeasurables and incomparables of human experience that may find better expression through art and ritual than through the findings of science? How could the inquiries of science, discovering, for example, valid universal laws but expressing them as fallible results, that is, as *opinions*, reach deeply enough to provide *beliefs* that involve the whole person, or *feelings* that one is prepared to act on without necessarily knowing for sure why, but feeling deeply it must be right? Would Humanitarianism as he envisioned it be a completion of panzooinism or a loss of panzooinism's appreciation of the fantastic nature and contradictions of reality, or of its appreciation for variescent life? Take D. H. Lawrence's definition of religion as "an uncontrollable sensual experience," which goes to a place deeper than the self-control required in science: "For religion is an experience, an uncontrollable sensual experience, even more so than love: I use sensual to mean an experience deep down in the senses, inexplicable and inscrutable."[10]

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To philosophical relationalism and religious humanitarianism, Stuart-Glennie's correlative causation model leads, perhaps not surprisingly, to a polity of socialism.

> As we have found, in each of the two preceding Ages of Humanity, a Polity in which the forms of social relations singularly correspond, first with the more concrete, and then with the more abstract conception of Causation as Onesided Determination; so, assuredly, will there, with the establishment of the conception of Causation as Mutual Determination, arise a new Polity in accordance therewith. Such a Polity, not of Customal, nor of Individual Government in any form, but of organised Reciprocity of conscious Rights and Duties, I would name *Socialism*. And in the reorganisation, in such a Polity, of the fundamental institutions of Society—Marriage, Property, and Government—on the new principles respectively of Co-equality, Co-operation, and Co-fraternity—principles derived from the general principle of Co-oneness, in which that of Mutual Determination has its ethical expression—reason will be found to be given to the whole course of the development of these Institutions.[11]

As mentioned, he was active in the British socialist movement and in the Fabian society, which influenced the later development of the labor party. One cannot help noting that as Karl Marx was writing volume 2 of *Capital* in the British Museum in London, Stuart-Glennie was depicting a different view of history, projecting a future socialism in which religion remained, but transformed as Humanitarianism. One can imagine a conversation between them where Marx makes his case for the elimination of religion and Stuart-Glennie for its continuation as a naturalistic outlook. Stuart-Glennie makes his case for the origins of civilization rooted in racial and class conflict, and Marx for the rise of class differentiation as the basis of conflict rather than racial differences.

Stuart-Glennie's prediction of socialism in 1873 is interesting to consider in light of another prediction he made in 1906 that the advent of socialism would not likely derive from a heavily industrialized nation, but from Russia:

> Defeated in Further Asia by Japan, and encountered on the British Indian Frontier not only by a re-organised Army, but by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the aims of Russian Foreign Policy will be redirected to the realization of Pan-Slavic dreams of unification. The Tsardom, however, will probably first be transformed or overthrown. For Russia will probably begin the new European Revolution as France began the last, more than a century ago. Sooner or later these Russian National aims will come into

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> conflict with German Imperial ambitions. And the way will thus be prepared for that general Nationalist and Socialist Revolution which will create the United States of Europe.[12]

Stuart-Glennie's prediction was remarkable, but unfortunately the "Nationalist and Socialist Revolution" manifested as the totalitarian Soviet Union and National Socialism of Nazi Germany, which led to the carnage that created the divided Europe of the cold war. A way was indeed "prepared," one could say, for a "United States of Europe," a European Union, but it was a murderous and genocidal way, not at all progressive, involving both a World War and a half century "cold war." And Russia remains outside the European Union today, its "Pan-Slavic dreams of unification" again on the march.

His view of "a sublime though tragic struggle, through vicissitudes the most terrible, yet a struggle ever onwards to a true world-consciousness . . . the struggle of the Kosmos itself to ever truer self-consciousness" ignored possibilities that history may be something other than progress through struggle.[13] To be sure, the "United States of Europe" may yet manifest through developments of the European Union, but Stuart-Glennie's imagined progressivist third age of humanity foundered on forces released that were darker and more complex than he could envision, forces in which science itself was both involved and compromised. He opened a view that admirably sought to reconcile religion with science, and, through his idea of mutual determination, to reconcile science with psyche, but he did not adequately consider how the modern conception of science might require even more radical recasting. That is an issue at the heart of both Jaspers and Mumford's writings in the post-World War 2 Nuclear Age.

Jaspers' "Present and Future"

Jaspers devotes a significant amount of discussion in *The Origin and Goal of History* to the "Present and Future," the second and largest part of his three-part book. Indeed, Jaspers says in the foreword that "The aim of this book is to assist in heightening our awareness of the present."[14] Central to Jaspers' discussion is the rise of science and technology, and its proper place in human affairs. Jaspers, writing in the aftermath of World War 2, of Nazism and the atomic bomb, was well aware of the dangers of uncontrolled technical expansion, as was Mumford, who

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denounced the use of the atomic bomb by the United States within weeks after Hiroshima. In this regard each addressed new conditions not considered by founding sociological theorists or by Stuart-Glennie, and shared humanistic concerns in how the threats posed by technological proliferation could be re-harnessed to human purposes.

Jaspers notes:

> Technology is only a means, in itself it is neither good nor evil. Everything depends upon what man makes of it, for what purpose it serves him, under what conditions he places it…Is it possible for technology, released from human meaning, to become a frenzy in the hands of monsters—or for the earth, together with its human population, to be reduced to the level of material for a single, gigantic factory, for the whole world to become an ant-heap that has transformed everything into a part of itself and lives on only as a cycle of production and consumption in the idle running of a contentless process?[15]

Jaspers eloquently calls attention to the dark side of technology, not as progress, not as contributing to "the relief of man's estate," as Francis Bacon had put it, but as "a frenzy in the hands of monsters" reducing both the earth and humans to mere inputs of a world-factory ant-heap.

The rise of the age of world-transforming science and technology raises the question for Jaspers of whether it might constitute a new equivalent of the axial age. Though outwardly it might, he argues that inwardly it is quite different.

He contrasts the plenitude of the axial age with the emptiness of the present age, and suggests that the present is more a preparatory stage, "one of real technological and political remolding, not yet of eternal spiritual creations."[16] The more accurate comparison would be with the original developments of civilization, "the epoch of the invention of tools and weapons, of the first use of domestic animals and horses, than with the age of Confucius, Buddha, and Socrates," suggesting a further axial-like response to it in the future. Such a development, indeed, would likely be informed by "the mirror of the great Axial Period of humanity."[17] The threat of a one-world empire, ruled by technical power, requires an alternative of a one-world order unified by "common decision in negotiation."[18] Science, humanism and "the churches" are indispensible preconditions to this future, though, as then currently constituted, not sufficient.

Jaspers was not arguing for some kind of rational communication society, such as that proposed by Jürgen Habermas, but one in which deep faith remains a basis for belief *and* rational communication. For

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what Jaspers foresees is "a metamorphosis of the mode of faith," in which an individual "tests and holds himself open, and takes as his foundation the authority of the whole heritage of history . . . a free faith that is undogmatic in its tenets, without diminution of earnestness and unconditionality."[19] An undogmatic faith, rooted in testing and holding oneself open, would seem to provide a common ground between the methods of science and technology and the "the authority of the whole heritage of history." He admits that such a perspective has thus far been rejected by institutional modes of faith.

In sum, Jaspers sees a potential axial-like transformation in the future that can answer the technocratic threats of today, and do so while still retaining faith as a basis for purposeful goals rooted in human history.

In this regard there are some interesting points of contact and contrast between Jaspers, Mumford and Stuart-Glennie. Stuart-Glennie also held out the possibility of a religious faith rooted in a reconciliation with science. But this was not to be the fruit of the moral revolution, Jaspers' axial age, which also involved the supernaturalism of "Christianism," but the overcoming of that supernaturalism through the completion of the correlative conception of causation. It was instead the completion of the original intuitive insights of panzooinism, which Jaspers regarded as utterly insignificant. Perhaps Jaspers' "undogmatic faith" opens a place for the kind of humanitarianism Stuart-Glennie called for, through foregrounding the humane elements of the axial legacy while backgrounding its supernatural elements.

Mumford's post-historic man and world culture

Mumford also devoted a chapter of *The Transformations of Man* to a future transformation involving a one-world model, which Mumford termed "World Culture," and which involves openness not only to history, but to the entire legacy of the organic and cultural past, including religious traditions. Such a model would offset the threat of "post-historic man," who is "governed by a deliberately depersonalized intelligence," a dehumanized system which recognizes no desires which deviate from its own purposes, the system Mumford later termed "the megamachine."

The emergent transformation just then beginning to take shape in Mumford's 1956 view is that of post-historic man. Mumford took the term "post-historic" from Roderick Seidenberg, who argued that human

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development is marked by progressive increase of rational intelligence and decrease of instinct, a process that will make humans progressively and even dangerously subject to rational scientific control and engineering calculations. Mumford disagreed with Seidenberg that such a development was a biological necessity, and transposed the term to mean something similar to the tendency of rationalization to be dehumanizing, a period in which the instinctive passions, the "primitive vitalities," might be repressed for some time, but would yet remain ineradicably significant in human affairs. He sought to draw attention to an acceleration into a new phase even beyond rationalization per se.

Post-historic man is not liberated from history, but alienated from it, from "the fibrous structure of human history" that should inform a culture. Jaspers also saw the alienating and destructive effects of the age of science and technology, influenced in part by Weber's critique of rationalization and also by his own experience of National Socialism. His response was to affirm the historical legacy of humanism, of the necessity of cultivating history itself, a point that seems to resonate with Mumford's conception of the "fibrous structure of human history." As Jaspers put it: "Every ascent above history becomes an illusion if we abandon history."[20] But Jaspers' response derives from the legacy of the Enlightenment, with history and culture as human products distinct from nature, and with the axial as still pivotal. As he put it:

> It is probable that the faith of the future [in the West] will continue to move within the fundamental positions and categories of the Axial Period, from which the Biblical religion stems: because for our overall view of history, the spiritual paramountcy of those centuries of origin is so great—because science and technology…cannot hold out against the lofty contents of the faith and humanity of that origin—because the dissolution of modern thought has not been able to offer anything of real content out of its own origin to overcome it.[21]

Compare this with Mumford's statement, in which the entire past, not simply the axial period, remains a living presence to be renewed:

> In the transformation of man, we do not begin with the static, self-enclosed village and clan and move through a series of stages, each one leaving the old behind, till we end with a single dynamic structure, without walls or frontiers, which embraces mankind. The communal polity of Neolithic times, the urban civilization of antiquity and later, the axial and national cultures that succeeded them, and the mechanical models of the New World are still with us in one form or another; and will long remain with

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> us . . . we must still make use of their helpful contributions and renew them. For these stable social structures produced the materials that have gone into the making of the human personality.[22]

Automatized post-historic man would be truly cut off from "the fibrous structure of human history," the various strata of the past which remain stubbornly embedded in societies and psyches, and which human lives touch through organic and social memory. Such a "liberation" is merely an alienation from the fibrous structure of the human self:

> . . . to overcome the blind drift of automatism mankind as a whole must deliberately resume the long effort that originally turned hominids into men . . . . Man's principal task today is to create a new self, adequate to command the forces that now operate so aimlessly and yet so compulsively. This self will necessarily take as its province the entire world, known and knowable, and will seek, not to impose a mechanical uniformity, but to bring about an organic unity, based on the fullest utilization of all the varied resources that both nature and history have revealed to modern man. Such a culture should be nourished, not only by a new vision of the whole, but a new vision of a self capable of understanding and co-operating with the whole. In short, the moment for another great historic transformation has come. If we shrink from that effort we tacitly elect the post-historic substitute.[23]

Like Jaspers, Mumford saw the need for "useable history" informing the horizon of the present. But Mumford is more inclusive, allowing the prehistorical, proto-human, and natural habitat as elements of the "fibrous structure." He viewed history as more continuous than Jaspers, allowing transformative "breakthroughs," but also allowing the continuation of "all the varied resources that both nature and history have revealed to modern man." Mumford also allows organic nature a role in some ways resonant with Stuart-Glennie's idea of an original "naturianism" purified through modern science to "humanitarianism." But Mumford did not share Stuart-Glennie's naïve optimism in science and technology. On that he is closer to Jaspers, perhaps. And in the end, his view of the story of modern science and technology remained darker than that of Stuart-Glennie or Jaspers.

Jaspers takes the rise of modern science and technology as unprecedented, but Mumford, whose first book on the theme, *Technics and Civilization*, was published in 1934, came in his later work, the two volume *The Myth of the Machine* (1967, 1970), to the provocative view that the modern complex he terms the megamachine is a transformed

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version of the original, pre-axial megamachine that was civilization itself. For Mumford it was the story of the reassembling of the ancient megamachine of civilization in modern times, of a systems-centered authoritarian ideology at odds with the democratic traditions with which it ironically co-emerged. It was an ideology that grew like the symbol of the clock and clockwork universe, under the radar, so to speak, of the emerging democratic institutions in the West.

Mumford developed a view at odds with those historians who see modern democracy and technology growing up holding hands and helping each other to prosper. In 1975 he wrote:

> Even now, perhaps a majority of our countrymen still believe that science and technics can solve all human problems. They have no suspicion that our runaway science and technics themselves have come to constitute the main problem the human race has to overcome…Strangely, the palpable rationality of the scientific method within its own accredited area gave rise in the great majority of its practitioners to a compulsive irrationality—an uncritical faith in science's godlike power to control the destinies of the human race.[24]

The myth of the machine today, specifically of its scientific and technological institutions and ideological elements, is that its continued expansion will be good for humanity, and that its continued development will inherently provide solutions, *deus ex machina*, as though on their own rather than as projections of human purposes and human prejudices.

Stuart-Glennie's progressivism did not allow him to question the possible limitations in the growth of science and technology, as both Jaspers and Mumford did. Yet Jaspers took the legacy of the axial age as the remaining viable option and model through which to attain humane control of the goals of scientific and technological development. The axial age represented spiritual progress over prior history and prehistory, and remains as the pivot to the future. In this sense, despite their differences, Stuart-Glennie and Jaspers share a progressivism that is more critically questioned by Mumford.

Mumford's multiple staged transformations, which go back to the rise of symbolic capacities, early village structure, and changes effected by domestication and agriculture, provides a richer view of early history than Jaspers' valuation of a single axis on which everything pivots, not only in this book, but in his later books, *The City in History*, and *The Myth of the Machine*. As mentioned previously, though billions of people

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today may believe axial beliefs, in Jaspers' terms, they nevertheless still eat the fruits of earlier agriculturally based Neolithic civilization. And the vegetables and domesticated animals too. One all-embracing pivot of history is simply too narrow a mode of understanding humankind, reflecting, in my view, Jaspers' idealization of the period.

Notes

1 Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 191.
2 Stuart Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 223.
3 Ibid., 225.
4 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism," in *Greek Folk Poesy: Volume 2, Folk Prose*, ed. Lucy M. J. Garnett, with essays by J. S. Stuart-Glennie (London: David Nutt: 1896), 518.
5 Stuart-Glennie, "The Survival of Paganism," 519–520.
6 Ibid., 520.
7 John Stuart-Glennie, *The Modern Revolution, Proemia I: Isis and Osiris; The Origin of Christianity as a Verification of an Ultimate Law of History (A New Edition of "In the Morningland")* (London: Longman, Greens and Company, 1878),
8 Stuart-Glennie, "Sociological Studies," 278.
9 Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 228–229.
10 D.H. Lawrence, *Phoenix*, edited and introduced by Edward D. McDonald (New York: Viking, 1936), 144.
11 Stuart-Glennie, *In the Morningland*, 229–230.
12 Ibid., "Sociological Studies," 275.
13 John Stuart-Glennie, "The Law of Historical Intellectual Development," *The International Monthly*, April, 463.
14 Jaspers, *Origin and Goal of History*, V.
15 Ibid., 125.
16 Ibid., 140.
17 Ibid., 140.
18 Ibid., 197.
19 Ibid., 224–225.
20 Ibid., 274.
21 Ibid., 225.
22 Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, 144–145.
23 Ibid., 134.
24 Lewis Mumford, "Prologue to Our Time: 1895–1975," in *Findings and Keepings: Analects for an Autobiography* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 374.

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The Moral Revolution and the Modern Revolution Today

Abstract: *Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, and Mumford all took the implications of the moral revolution as more than merely historical, as holding significance for understanding contemporary life and the future of humankind. This chapter turns to the contemporary context of the ideas of these figures, first by briefly examining Robert Bellah's recent book,* Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, then by discussing another unlikely contributor to this theme and an unknown predecessor to Jaspers, the well-known writer D. H. Lawrence, who also addressed troubling issues of contemporary global civilization. Following that Halton presents his way of framing human development as involving progress in precision, counteracted by a contraction in mind, and the place of the moral revolution within that framework.*

Keywords: D. H. Lawrence; Robert Bellah; spectator consciousness; contractions of mind; animate mind; anthropocentric mind; mechanico-centric mind

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Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, and Mumford all took the implications of the moral revolution as more than merely historical, as holding significance for understanding contemporary life and the future of humankind. Now I wish to turn to the contemporary context of the ideas of these figures, first by briefly examining Robert Bellah's recent book, then by discussing another unlikely contributor to this theme and unknown predecessor to Jaspers, the well-known writer D. H. Lawrence, who also addressed troubling issues of contemporary global civilization. Following that I will present my own way of framing human development, and the place of the moral revolution within that framework.

The moral revolution as theoretic culture

Robert Bellah's recent book, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, is a comprehensive and detailed examination of a broad sweep of human evolution and history, and represents the most recent major work on the axial age. He provides very detailed accounts of axial emergence in ancient Israel, Athenian Greece, China, and India. Most relevant for discussion here are his examination of representative tribal, archaic, and axial cultures.

Bellah's consideration of non-civilized peoples fills in the gap of Jaspers' disallowance that they might have anything of spiritual significance. Yet oddly, two of the three tribal cultures he discusses, the Kalapalo of central Brazil, and the Navajo of the southern US, are horticulturalists rather than full hunter-gatherers, in contrast to the third group, the Walbiri of Australia. Given the profound evolutionary significance of hunting and gathering not only as means of diet, but as involving patterns of socializing, social structure, and even worldviews, it is surprising he did not focus on hunter-gatherers, but instead lumped together "tribal" peoples.

Bellah excluded from consideration pygmies studied by anthropologist Colin Turnbull and other pygmy groups from around the world, claiming that they are "generally symbiotic with agricultural neighbors… or are refugees… and cannot be good examples of early *homo sapiens* evolution."[1] Yet many hunter-gatherer peoples supplement their foraging ways through trade with non-foraging neighbors, and in a number of cases have done so for long periods of time while remaining foragers.[2] Turnbull's work showed that the Mbuti Sua people, playing dumb, "used"

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their agricultural neighbors part time, both to acquire food through labor and also to scare them away from the forest domain, where the Mbuti always returned for extended periods to be free, practicing their hunter-gatherer ways. Other ethnographies of pygmy peoples, such as those of the Efe or Aka, reveal the intense sociality in parent-infant care practices that directly bear on issues of human evolution.[3] Bellah could have also drawn from the many studies of the San peoples of southern Africa, especially those who remain hunter-gatherers, whose culture and even genome are among the oldest of humans globally, yet he did not. One very telling remark is in his conclusion to his chapter in the book coedited with Hans Joas, where he said "I doubt that any of us would rather live in a tribal society than in one whose beginnings lie in the Axial Age; I know I would not."[4]

Bellah also traces some of the early key civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China, going on to richly detailed examinations of the four major axial cultures. He views the axial age from the perspective of what Merlin Donald characterized as "theoretic culture," using the term broadly:

> Theoretic culture is added to mythic and mimetic culture—which are reorganized in the process—but they remain in their respective spheres indispensable. Theoretic culture is a remarkable achievement, but always a specialized one, usually involving written language in fields inaccessible to ordinary people. Everyday life continues to be lived in the face-to-face interaction of individuals and groups and in the patient activities of making a living in the physical world.[5]

Theoretic culture includes not simply focused rational processes, but also what psychologist Alison Gopnik characterizes as a more diffuse and circumambient "lantern consciousness," characteristic of meditative awareness. The theoretic attitude involves "thinking about thinking" or "second order thinking," as an outlook. He argues that the theoretic arises not as a displacement of episodic, mimetic and mythic cultures, using Donald's four-stage division of the development of human consciousness, but as in dialogue with them, so that human development involves multiple modalities in which "nothing is ever lost." His argument is in this way similar to Mumford's call to acknowledge and live from "the fibrous structure of history," though his criteria of stages of cognition are different from Mumford's emphasis on historical practices and institutions as key.

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In his conclusion Bellah elaborates on the term "theory," whose etymology means to take in at a distance, as in the word "theater." Drawing from the work of Andrea Nightengale, he describes how the term originally derived from a practice of the *theoros*, the viewer or spectator, one who travelled to another city to view a festival or religious spectacle and returned to report on it. Plato took this meaning to another level wherein the philosopher journeys to observe truth and report on it. Bellah takes from this the idea that "One gazes at a distance, objectively, so to speak. Once disengaged vision, what I am calling active theory, becomes possible, then theory can take another turn: it can abandon any moral stance at all and simply look on what will be useful, what can make the powerful and exploitative even more so."[6] He sees Aristotle's distinction of the philosophical life from political life as threatening "the link between wisdom (s*ophia*) and moral judgment (*phronesis*), in which he still clearly believed," a link that was indeed broken in the modern era.[7]

So the legacy of the axial turn as theoretic attitude retains promises as well as dangers in Bellah's view, including the corruptions as it became institutionalized in the various cultures in religion, philosophy, and the development of science. Indeed, he believed that by the seventeenth century in the West, the theoretic became ungrounded, with potentially disastrous consequences, and that the challenge is how to "reconnect it with the rest of our historical bio-social selves."[8]

Aristotle held that *theoria* is "useless," and so the attempt to make it useful already would be a distortion of Aristotle's intent. Peirce agreed with Aristotle on this point that theory, as science, is and ought to be useless. Theoretical science is inadequate for the practice of life, both because it is concerned with the long run, not the short run of applications to practical life, and also because it is limited to fallible opinion and not actionable belief, and therefore does not go deeply enough to serve the interests of practical life, which require the availability of all the sentiments as well as practical judgment in making beliefs one acts upon. As Peirce the logician put it in describing observation, the "upper consciousness" can be guilty of "impertinent intermeddling" in practical reasoning if allowed a dominant role:

> That subconscious element of observation is, I am strongly inclined to think, the very most important of all the constituents of practical reasoning. The other part of observation consists in moulding in the upper

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> consciousness a more or less skeletonized idea until it is felt to respond to [the] object of observation. This last element is quite indispensable if one is trying to form a theory…but it goes a long way toward breaking down, denying, and pooh-poohing away, all the fineness of the subconscious observation. It is, therefore, a great art to be able to suppress it and put it into its proper place in cases where it attempts impertinent intermeddling. Do not allow yourself to be imposed upon by the egotism and conceit of the upper consciousness.[9]

Phronesis, whose etymological root *phren* traces literally to the heart, lungs, solar plexus area as the center of practical mind, seems a better center of gravity for the practice of living, if one thinks from awareness. Think martial arts, where the center of one's gravity is right there, with bent knees, capable of wide range of movement. Think of a heartfelt choice required in a practical exigency, emanating from the breathing, palpitating body-centered awareness, *phren*. Heart as locus of mind was also evident in early Chinese thought. As Harold D. Roth put it:

> The term *hsin* (literally, heart) is, for early Chinese, the locus of the entire range of conscious experience, including perception, thought, emotion, desire, and intuition. It is another of those key philosophical terms that spans our definitive split between mind and body and so is commonly translated as either "heart" or "mind" or some combination thereof. Just as the *Wu-tsang* include more than just physical organs, *hsin* means not just the physical heart but the entire sphere of vital energy that flows through and includes it. For this reason and because the *hsin* is not solely associated with emotion as it is for us, here the term is translated as "mind" and carries a concrete physiological connotation.[10]

The problem seems to me not so much Aristotle's distinction of *theoria* and *phronesis*, but of the rise of an idealizing and mechanizing mentality in the post-medieval West, one which inverted the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle's elevation of wisdom or s*ophia* as involving knowledge or *epistēmē* and demotion of *techné* or skill as lower suggests another avenue. *Techné* is skill that can be generalizable and taught, and "has an end other than itself." *Phronesis*, in contrast, cannot, "for good action itself is its end."[11] It is context-specific practical wisdom, not to be outsourced to a spectator or technician. Neither *epistēmē* nor *techné* could deliver the heartfelt reasonableness provided by *phronesis* in everyday life. Yet the rise of knowledge and technique as dominant pivots of the modern mind suggest exactly the mentality of the rational-mechanical worldview, the megamachine of modernity, and its displacement of the person alive

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to the living moment, centered in awareness rather than knowledge or repeatable technique. Thomas Hobbes exhibited this outlook on the very first page of his anti-Aristotelian book *Leviathan*: "For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer?"

"The way of knowledge," of knowledge for its own sake, the questioning consciousness of the "renouncers," both religious and philosophic, the ethicization of life, the theoretic attitude, marked an activation and foregrounding of cognitive capacities and idealizations, such as the ideal of universalism. But in my view the problem goes even deeper than a theoretic attitude that only eventually became ungrounded, as Bellah saw it. The problem is rather that the challenges the moral revolution posed to power civilization still remained an aspect of the mind that had sprung into being with civilization, rather than transcending it, bodying into being a kind of second stage of civilized mind, ultimately anthropocentric rather than panzooinist (albeit more so in the West early on), and ultimately fused to the furthering of rational-mechanical mind.

The critical view afforded by the theoretical attitude comes with some hidden costs. Bellah's nuanced progressivism allows the continuing presence of earlier mimetic and mythic attitudes in the axial "theoretic" framework, and treats the theoretic as an evolutionary development, as "a new cultural capacity." By the standard of knowledge, it may well be, but by the standard of awareness, it could just as well be devolutionary. The "lantern consciousness," that Bellah admits is common to all young children, but difficult for adults to attain,[12] may be not so much a new cultural capacity, but a reintroduction into contracted civilized mind of a consciousness common in our foraging ancestral past. Tracking, hunting, gathering all require the ability of meditative stillness in some situations where stealth is paramount, including breathing and heartbeat-rate control. They require what Ortega y Gasset termed "omnivorous attention," not only to the outer environment, but to the felt inner environment as well. This is not only a metaphor, but also a literal description of the reliance on peripheral vision and 360-degree hearing in these activities, as a practical matter of awareness that can mean life or death.

Think of being in the woods at night, using peripheral vision because it makes night vision better and improves seeing movement around you,

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such as possible predators. This is mind centered in awareness from one's center of gravity, but including the rest of the body and its perceptive organs, as well as in awareness with the surrounding habitat in which one is in transaction. All of that is where the practical mind of *phronesis* is located, as well as in the consequences of the transaction. As I see it the modern view of the mind in the head falsely leaves out real elements of mind as a transaction in an environment, especially in matters of *phronesis*. But there remain clear differences between this "lantern consciousness" and that describing the moral revolution: the aboriginal mind is immersed and passionately participant in the circumambient cosmos, the theoretic mind tends toward being a dispassionate, disengaged spectator of it.

Which is more true to life, the report of the *theoros* of the distant spectacle or the active participation of oneself in it here and now? What are the implications of elevating the spectator over the living participation; of making the social intelligence of participation, of directly and passionately experiencing the qualities of a festival secondary to the theorist's spectating report of it; of making the tactile secondary to the visual?

Bellah notes, as Jaspers had, that many of the axial figures were failures in their own times, and that the institutionalizing of their ideas often involved regressions from the theoretic attitude to manifestations of archaic culture. Could some such regressions be the much longer legacy of being human asserting itself over the thin theoretic veneer of axialism and only slightly thicker veneer of civilization? What if idealizing mind is the enemy of *phronesis*, shifting the center of gravity from heartfelt reasonableness to ideal reason as the basis for practical conduct, as though life could be lived from ideal reason?

Bellah does not address the many implications of the transformation from participation consciousness, characteristic of aboriginal peoples, to spectator consciousness, characteristic of civilized peoples from before the advent of the moral revolution. Spectral mind is walled off mind, literally and metaphorically: walled off from participation with the wild other in the sacred game, walled off in the city enclosures of livestock and grain fields and city walls, even walled off in the practice of literacy, gazing focally at fixed texts, holding beliefs based on sacred texts: paradise, from the Persian *pairidaeza*, derives etymologically from "walled enclosure."

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There have been a variety of interesting commentaries, such as that of Guy Debord, on the implications of "the society of the spectacle."[13] One of particular interest, though from an unlikely source perhaps, might be that of poet and visionary artist William Blake, who held that the theoretic, as "the reasoning power" or "spectre," should be secondary to creative intelligence in the balance of life. His view, though expressed in different language, is somewhat similar to Peirce's on the dangers of practical intelligence being dominated by theoretical mind. Blake's visionary work, among other things, revealed the flawed nature of modern rationalizing culture, in how it took the reasoning power as primary, and creative intelligence as subjective or unreal. He saw the tragic nature of rationalization dominating the modern mind, as when, in his poem *Jerusalem* he says:

> The Spectre is the Reasoning Power in Man; & when separated
> From Imagination, and closing itself as in steel, in a Ratio
> Of the Things of Memory, It thence frames Laws & Moralities
> To destroy Imagination, the Divine Body…

Blake envisioned the highjacking of mind by the "Reasoning Power," usurping its limited place in the community of passions. When abstracting reason, or in Blake's words "the Holy Reasoning Power," overreaches its secondary place in living to claim primacy it becomes:

> a murderer
> Of every Divine Member: it is the Reasoning Power,
> An Abstract objecting power that Negatives everything.
> This is the Spectre of Man, the Holy Reasoning Power

The Spectre of Man is something like rationality, critical consciousness, and Blake holds it as a secondary emanation, as circumscribed by the primacy of the poetic imagination and the passions. When humans began to live as though rational critical consciousness is primary, we began to live from spectral mind instead of from the passionate soul, which Blake viewed as unsustainably destructive. We became "theoretic" spectators of the idealization of life. The Spectre's crime is to "turn that which is soul and life into a mill or machine."[14] Blake's poetic anthropology, like that of D. H. Lawrence, as we will see, is in my view more than a romantic's lament. If the Reasoning Power stems from the newest portion of the human brain, the least mature, perhaps rather than functioning *maximally*, as the modern era of rationalization has assumed, there is good reason it needs to be kept in check to function *optimally*.

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More buried treasure?

Let us consider another unknown predecessor to Jaspers. Though known primarily as a novelist, D. H. Lawrence took a keen interest in the history of consciousness, and in a number of non-fiction works saw deeply into the gulf between aboriginal mind and that of civilized mind.[15] Remarkably, he also described the processes of the moral revolution independently of Stuart-Glennie, and decades before Jaspers wrote about the axial age. Lawrence, so ahead of his time in understanding the gap between aboriginal and civilized mind, should also be taken as another major theorist of the moral revolution/axial age, decades before Jaspers. He died at the age of 44 on March 2, 1930. I will briefly lay out his main ideas.

Lawrence also singled out the period around the sixth century B.C.E., but he came at it from a whole different perspective than the scholarly approaches of Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, or Mumford: one more intuitively stressing the inner transformative processes to bring out "a more spiritual or highly conscious self." It was the rise of what he called "the questioning method of consciousness," so at odds with the "older pagan consciousness," "to which the 'question' was obnoxious, or even impious, when applied to vital things or concepts."[16]

It is worth adding a few of his remarks into the mix, from his books, *Etruscan Places*, and especially the posthumously published, *Apocalypse*, his last major work, which was an extended and wide-ranging commentary on the *Book of Revelation* and civilization and consciousness more generally.[17] First, Lawrence noted a profound shift in this period, with some similarities to the civilized vestiges of panzooinism versus the supernaturalism Stuart-Glennie had described as "the Hell-Religions of Civilization" and moral revolution. Lawrence's framework is different from Stuart-Glennie's, but the parallels are interesting to consider. He saw the original Etruscan religion as a still continuing remnant of "the profound attempt of man to harmonize himself with nature" that characterized the oldest religions, in contrast to "the peoples of the idea" such as Greeks and the colonizing Romans who displaced the Etruscans. He also associated the idea of triumphing over nature with the rise of hell, in some ways parallel to Stuart-Glennie:

> The old religion of the profound attempt of man to harmonize himself with nature, and hold his own and come to flower in the great seething of life,

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> changed with the Greeks and Romans into a desire to resist nature, to produce a mental cunning and a mechanical force that would outwit Nature and chain her down completely, completely, till at last there should be nothing free in nature at all, all should be controlled, domesticated, put to man's meaner uses. Curiously enough, with the idea of the triumph over nature arose the idea of a gloomy Hades, a hell and purgatory. To the peoples of the great natural religions the after-life was a continuing of the wonder-journey of life. To the peoples of the Idea the afterlife is hell, or purgatory, or nothingness, and paradise is an inadequate fiction.[18]

To say that aboriginal and earliest civilizational religions, as expressions of panzooinism, are "nature religions" compresses a variety of beliefs, and also a variety of habitat relations, into a term that disguises more than it reveals. It disguises, as D. H. Lawrence put it, "the complex vitalities of what we feebly call Nature." As he put it, "From the shadow of the prehistoric world emerge dying religions that have not yet invented gods or goddesses, but live by the mystery of the elemental powers in the Universe, the complex vitalities of what we feebly call Nature."[19] This could virtually stand as a definition of Stuart-Glennie's panzooinism. And he states further in *Apocalypse*:

> The very ancient world was entirely religious and godless. While men still lived in close physical unison, like flocks of birds on the wing, in a close physical oneness, an ancient tribal unison in which the individual was hardly separated out, then the tribe lived breast to breast with the cosmos. The whole cosmos was alive and in contact with the flesh of man, there was no room for the god idea. It was not till the individual began to feel separated off… that the concept of a god arose, to intervene between man and the cosmos… God and gods enter when man has "fallen" into a sense of separateness and loneliness.[20]

Where Stuart-Glennie stressed the rise of the supernatural deities as a means of socially legitimizing the dominant power structure, Lawrence highlighted the metaphysical and psychological dimensions as providing new substitute intermediaries to make up for the separation from direct participation in cosmos. One can take these views as complementary understandings, and I will add another: that the new god figures represent means for upper mind to dominate the passions through idealizing them. The elevation of moralization as a basis for religion favors upper mind rule at the possible cost of downgrading the place of sensuous passionate mind in religious life.

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Lawrence also made suggestive connections between some of the earliest Greek philosophers, such as Anaximander and Anaximenes, and the original godless religious outlooks, calling attention to the moral turn of religion:

> This is the state of mind of great men in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ, strange and fascinating and a revelation of the old symbolic mind. Religion was already turning moralistic or ecstatic, with the Orphics the tedious idea of "escaping the wheel of birth" had begun to abstract men from life. But early science is a source of the purest and oldest religion. The mind of man recoiled, there in Ionia, to the oldest religious conception of the cosmos, from which to start thinking out the scientific cosmos. And the thing the oldest philosophers disliked was the new sort of religion, with its ecstasies and its escape and its purely *personal* nature: its loss of the cosmos.[21]

Commentators on the axial age usually don't question the rise in significance of the person as costing the loss of the cosmos, as "abstracting men from life," or the possibility that the rise of "transcendence" might involve ecstatic "escape." Lawrence, it seems to me, opened an alternative perspective of the legacy, still largely unexplored. One key exception is Morris Berman, who in his book, *Wandering God: A Study in Nomadic Spirituality*, argues that in larger groups of settled agriculture vertical sacrality increases, and especially through the rise of ecstatic mystery cults and axial figures, heightening the "sacred authority complex," while mirroring social hierarchies.[22]

In the posthumously and previously unpublished Fragment 1 of *Apocalypse*, Lawrence calls attention to a shift into "a new way of consciousness, the way of knowledge," beginning in the sixth century B.C.E., a shift away from "the way of Might and of Cosmic Power."

> But already in the sixth century before Christ came the first signs of the other necessity in man, the need to die in the immediate self, and be reborn in a greater self. Men had been very blind to one another. It needed an experience as of death to make them aware, a little more aware of one another, and of the other man's needs.
>
> It was in the sixth century men began, almost universally in the "known" world, to practice cults of the dying god. It was then that the Orphic mysteries began. The dying god may have symbolized the death and re-birth of vegetation, of corn, the rousing again with spring of the phallic power of fertility, throughout "nature." But it meant much more than this. It meant also, from far-off centuries, before Plato, long before Jesus, the need man

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> felt of death, the death-wish, so that a man might experience mystically, or ritually, the death in the body, the death of the known desires, and a resurrection in a new self, a more spiritual or highly conscious self. The great death-wish of the centuries following the sixth century B.C., which brought the tragic conception into life, and which has lasted to this day, was the wish to escape from the old way of consciousness, the way of Might and of Cosmic Power, into a new way of consciousness, the way of knowledge. Man has two supreme forms of consciousness, the consciousness that I AM, and that I am full of power; then the other way of consciousness, the awareness that IT IS, and that IT, which is the objective universe or the other person, has a separate existence from mine, even preponderant over mine. This latter is the way of knowledge: the loss of the sense of I AM, and the gaining of knowledge, or awareness, of the other thing, the other creature.[23]

He described the new ethos of the way of knowledge not in the usual way of experience of "higher" consciousness, but as the desire for transcendence through "deeper consciousness," that of the depths of death as transformative:

> About 600 B.C., the wish for pure knowledge became dominant in man, and carried with it the death wish. Men wanted to experience death, and come out on the other side, and know what was on the other side of death, all the time while they were still alive. This great wish for death and the adventure through death into the beyond took on many shapes in many different religions. The Olympians perhaps knew nothing of it. But into the Olympian religion came the Orphic mystery and the Dionysic ecstasy, ways of getting out of the body and of obtaining experience beyond, in the beyond of this world: ways of knowing as the gods knew, which is the same as knowing what lies beyond death. For the gods live beyond death. That world where the gods live is the world that men call death, and that world where men live is the world of the death of the gods.
>
> In all known countries sprang up the strange rituals called mysteries, which were first and foremost the ritual in which a man experienced death, and went through the dark horror of hades, to rise again in a new body, with a new consciousness and a new glory, god-like. These mysteries went far beyond any fertility cult, though they might embody that too. The ear of corn that was born was also the new body of a man with its new consciousness, god-like.
>
> In Greece it was the Orphic mystery, the mysteries of Dionysos, Iacchos, the Eleusinian mystery: in Egypt it was the mystery of Osiris and Isis: in the near East, the mysteries of Tammuz, the mysteries of Attis: and in Persia, the mystery of Mithras. In India, Buddha took his mystery to a different

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> conclusion, to Nirvana. But it was in the same spirit, with the same nostalgic wish for death in the body, and in the old way of consciousness, and the complete passing away of the old self into a final state of complete being, called Nirvana. With the Hindus, something the same happened. But with them it was a way through death to a new *power*, a new control of the vitalistic forces.[24]

Lawrence also provides an interesting variation on the idea of the moral revolution as a counter-culture to civilizational power, describing how mind would provide a new and universal means to "conquer the cosmos."

> Till now, till about 600 B.C., when the *real* change in the direction of man's consciousness definitely set in, the cosmos had consisted of Powers and Rulers. Now, it was to be proved subordinate and subject in itself to a greater rule. There was a new wild instinct on earth: to prove that all the great Rulers were subject to One Rule. The rule of kings was over, in the consciousness of man. The immediate connection with the cosmos was broken. Man and the cosmos came out of touch, they became, in a sense, enemies. Man set himself to *find out* the cosmos, and at last to dominate it…Henceforth it was the dominion of man over the cosmos, through the collective effort of Mind. Men must love one another, so that collectively Man could conquer the cosmos. And the conqueror was Mind. And Mind was One and indivisible.[25]

Lawrence shows how the gap between the supernaturalist religions of the moral revolution and the developing science of the Greeks that Stuart-Glennie drew attention to, which would continue in the rise of modern civilization, nevertheless shared the idea of a greater "One Rule" over earthly powers: the Mind as an unexpected connective tissue between religion and science through which the cosmos could be dominated.

The way of knowing, the critical consciousness, is a questioning consciousness. It can be seen as a contrast to "the primal way of consciousness," the way of affirmation, as Lawrence attempted to describe it:

> If we can accept the *unquestioning* way of consciousness, the way of direct impression, which proceeds from affirmation to affirmation, we shall be much better able to understand the older form of the pagan consciousness. Long before Christ, the questioning method of consciousness had arisen, in India and Ionia particularly. But everywhere it had to struggle against the older form of consciousness, to which the "question" was obnoxious, or even impious, when applied to vital things or concepts. It was impious to

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> question the gods. The feeling lasts to this day, and will always last, since the primitive consciousness, shall we say the primal way of consciousness in man is the unquestioning way of affirmation, and movement from affirmation to affirmation by way of image.[26]

To get a better sense of what Lawrence means by affirmative consciousness, imagine oneself engaged in music, wholly attentive. To question the experiencing of the music would be to disengage from it, from participation in the ongoing flow in which one is immersed. The questioning would be a distancing from primal impassioned participation to being something like a spectator, a real but secondary way of consciousness, not meant to displace primary affirmation.

Lawrence also describes a three-stage history that comes closer to Stuart-Glennie's than to Comte's, if we remember that Comte saw a progression from mere fiction to positive method. Lawrence, like Stuart-Glennie, allows a felt reality to the first stage, yet unlike Stuart-Glennie presents a tragic, rather than triumphalist, development:

> It seems to me, man has had, as far as we can tell, three great phases of consciousness, each carrying its own culture. The first was a far-off phase of purely collective consciousness, when men thought and felt instinctively *together*, like a great flock of birds or pack of wolves.... This feeling-in-unison is profound and is religious. At its highest it is purely religious: taking "religious" to mean the feeling of being *in connection*. And at its deepest, the early *unison* consciousness of man was aware of the cosmos, and aware of the immediate connection between itself and the vast, potent, terrible cosmos, that lived with all life.... This was the condition of prehistoric, or shadow-historic civilized man ... nakedly breast to breast with the cosmos, and the need for God had not arisen in the human soul.
>
> It did not arise till man felt himself cut off from the cosmos, till he became aware of himself as an apart, fragmentary, unfinished thing. This is the Fall, the fall into knowledge, or self-awareness.... it makes a God, or gods necessary to the consciousness. There must be an intermediary between man and the "lost" cosmos.... Then follows the great history of the gods.... The last state is the same as the first, godless. But now, instead of being naked vital man breast to breast with the vital cosmos, it is naked, disembodied mind losing itself in a naked and disembodied universe, a strange Nirvana. This is the final condition of science, of modern physics and modern physicists.
>
> These are the three states of man, cosmic-religious, god-religious, and philosophic-scientific. Jesus was the last manifestation of the god-religious state. We are at the end of the philosophic state. What next? We don't know.[27]

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The cosmic religious approximates to Stuart-Glennie's panzoonism, the god-religious overlaps with the moral revolution, and the philosophic-scientific with the mutual determinism of the third age of humanity Stuart-Glennie predicted. But Lawrence did not share Stuart-Glennie's optimism, and claimed already by 1930 that the philosophic-scientific was a culture of alienation rather than emancipation. He said he did not know what would be next, but suggested what the next state would be.

> The triumph of Mind over the cosmos progresses in small spasms: aeroplanes, radio, motor-traffic… And alas, everything has gone wrong. The destruction of the world seems not very far off, but the happiness of mankind has never seemed so remote.
>
> Man has made an enormous mistake. Mind is not a Ruler, mind is only an instrument…. The cosmos is alive, but it is not God. Nevertheless, when we are in touch with it, it gives us life. It is forever the grand volute reality, Life itself, the great Ruler. We are part of it, when we partake in it. But when we want to dominate it with Mind, then we are enemies of the great Cosmos, and woe betide us…
>
> How they long for the destruction of the cosmos, secretly, these men of mind and spirit! How they work for its domination and final annihilation! But alas, they only succeed in spoiling the earth, spoiling life, and in the end destroying mankind, instead of the cosmos… Man must inevitably destroy himself, in conflict with the cosmos.[28]

Lawrence's outlook is bleak. This was, after all, a commentary on the apocalypse. But he was gleaning far more from history than simply a commentary on a religious book. The legacy of the new way of knowledge, as Lawrence saw it, was self-destructively tragic. And though the possibility of succeeding in "spoiling the earth, spoiling life" may have seemed fanciful in the pre-atomic days he wrote those words, it no longer is in our progressively unsustainable biosphere today.

The great world religions had lost the touch of the earth, as he saw it, as did science. The great contrast between religion and science in the modern world appears as only two sides of Mind seeking domination of the cosmos, suicidally. Lawrence's dark view is remote from the optimism of Stuart-Glennie, or from Jaspers' belief in the continuing validity of the axial age, or from Bellah's belief that the theoretic mind only went off kilter in the past few hundred years, or from many other commentators who view the axial age legacy as retaining contemporary validity. Perhaps Mumford's concern that megatechnic civilization could

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very well implode without a transformation to a bio-organic worldview comes closest to Lawrence's views. But Lawrence did hold a way out of the tragic destiny, one involving a harnessing of mind to its proper limited place in the conduct of life as a way to regain the touch of the cosmos:

> The cosmos is certainly conscious, but it is conscious with the consciousness of tigers and kangaroos, fishes, polyps, seaweed, dandelions, lilies, slugs, and men: to say nothing of the consciousness of water, rock, sun and stars. Real consciousness is touch. Thought is getting out of touch.
>
> The crux of the whole problem lies here, in the duality of man's consciousness. Touch, the being in touch, is the basis of all consciousness, and it is the basis of enduring happiness. Thought is a secondary form of consciousness, Mind is a secondary form of existence, a getting out of touch, a standing clear, in order to come to a better adjustment in touch.
>
> Man, poor man, has to learn to function in these two ways of consciousness. When a man is *in touch*, he is non-mental, his mind is quiescent, his bodily centers are active. When a man's *mind* is active in real mental activity, the bodily centres are quiescent, switched off, the man is out of touch. The animals remain always in touch. And man, poor modern man, with his worship of his own god, which is his own mind glorified, is permanently out of touch.[29]

Lawrence's way out involves establishing a new balance between the contraries of bodily being in touch and the being of thinking mind as out of touch, a learning to "function in these two ways of consciousness," rather than either/or.[30] This is not simply a unification of body versus mind, as though they are discrete, but an acknowledgement of the primacy of the haptic, the tactile, the palpable, to practical consciousness and of the danger of allowing ideal mind a dominant position over that primacy, as Lawrence believed "poor modern man" had done. As he put it elsewhere, "It's a question of awareness, as Buddha said. But even he fought shy of the bodily awareness, and that natural physical tenderness, which is the best . . . it's tenderness, really . . . it's touch we're afraid of. We're only half-conscious, and half alive. We've got to come alive and aware."[31]

The problem of modern idealization involves what Max Weber called rationalization, but it also involves the colonization of the sentiments by idealizing rationality, in effect, disabling the spontaneous self and its spontaneous reasonableness.[32] The idealizing of the passions by "thought," in which sentiment becomes a value rather than passionate

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reasonableness, produces what Milan Kundera described as *Homo sentimentalis*. *Homo sentimentalis* is a creature who acts from the performance of idealized emotions and is removed from real feelings; its real feelings, walled off by idealization, remain infantilized. I take unanchored rational mind, the culmination of rationalization, as not only repressive of the passions, but as having the effect of not allowing sufficient practice of the passions, so that they remain infantilized: infantilization is the seldom acknowledged underbelly of rationalization. By contrast, cultivating a center of gravity stemming from one's passions rather than from one's rational thought allows that deeper center of gravity to sense practical situations and speak freely in the dialogue of mind. Yet a center of gravity rooted in the passions by no means insures correct conduct, but only a potential openness to a broader base of information on which to act. Like rationality, the resources of passionate reasonableness must be cultivated in experience, practiced in felt situations. And even there they remain fallible.

The words, prehension, and its variant, comprehension, perhaps help us to "grasp" Lawrence's point about being in touch as primary: their etymological root means to grasp. The oldest human sense is tactile, the earliest sense to develop in a fetus. Without physical touch, infants will die by the age of two, even if well-nourished.[33] Linguist Dan Moonhawk Alford reported a native Blackfoot speaker Amethyst First Rider "telling us that when she says even the simplest things in English, such as 'The man is riding a horse,' pictures come up in her head; but when she says the equivalent in Blackfoot, no pictures: just feelings of riding (using horse-riding body motion)."[34] In other words, she experienced language in Blackfoot kinesthetically and as verb-centered rather than through noun-based images, suggesting the gulf of consciousness between aboriginal languages and the Indo-Aryan civilizational languages such as English.

Comprehension can also be taken metaphorically as distant grasping, whose goal is "to come to a better adjustment in touch." Yet comprehension taken as a metaphor for knowing as a way of life might also suggest, in the words of anthropologist Ashley Montagu: "The impersonality of life in the Western world has become such that we have produced a race of untouchables….not only avoiding but even warding off all forms of 'unnecessary' physical contact, faceless figures in a crowded landscape, lonely and afraid of intimacy."[35] Montagu wrote this in 1986, a whole generation before Facebook.

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The elevation of the person and the devaluation of the wild other

There may be hidden Malthusian costs from decentering from the relationship with the ecologically sustainable wild habitat to domesticated ones focused on maximizing human values. In considering future generations, how does that habitat call us to heed and act upon the need to restrict human population, or to allow wild populations of animals and plants to prosper as part of a greater sacredness of a sustainable flourishing earth? How could maintaining relatively sustainable populations be taken as a sacred task, as it was, albeit with exceptions, in the religious outlooks of many foraging peoples.

The elevation of the person as a genuine achievement of the moral revolution in the face of power-centered civilization came at the cost of furthering the development of an anthropocentric mind that overvalued the human and undervalued the wild others and habitat. The wild habitat was the chief source of physical and spiritual sustenance in the course of evolution, the means, through our close attunement to and internalization of its varieties of life, of developmental passage to maturity.

In becoming institutionalized, and later serving as the basis for the rise of the modern worldview, it continued the civilizational turn to the desacralization of the Wild Other, of the animals and plants and the living wild habitat that we have become distant from in living in cities. I asked Bellah about this point after a lecture he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 2013 on "The Modern Project in Light of Human Evolution." Though acknowledging the problem of false "triumphalism," in which humans could act "like rulers of the universe," he went on to cite Saint Francis and Buddhism as examples of the opposite. Francis was, as he put it,

> One of the greatest Christians who ever lived. And who had a profound sense of the commonality of human personhood and the need to respect all sentient beings. And of course saying that is also Buddhist terminology; the Buddhists from the beginning were concerned with all sentient beings. So I think that a broader understanding of the sacredness of the person to include the natural environment is a potentiality in every axial tradition.[36]

While taking his point of that potentiality, I would reply that Christians call Francis a saint, but exclude the natural environment, the wild nonhuman, from the possibility of saintliness, as incarnate manifestation

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of the spiritual. In stories about Francis birds alighted on his shoulders as he preached to them and he brought a wolf which had been eating livestock to a town to make a deal with the townspeople. He was a figure of domestication, in a sense. But Christians do not say Saint Wolf, or Saint Birds. They do not accept the wolf's wild hunger as sacred, though they do think that domesticating that wild hunger is saintly. Similarly Buddhists regard rebirth as an animal to be a lower kind of rebirth.[37] Despite a greater Buddhist connection to non-human "sentient beings," as Bellah put it, a greater sense of panzoonism in Stuart-Glennie's terms, Christians and Buddhists are focalized around human figures as sources of religious belief, not circumambient life. Perhaps the same might be said of Stuart-Glennie's proposed term for religion in the age of science: humanitarianism.

From my point of view neither Bellah, Jaspers, nor Stuart-Glennie sufficiently acknowledge the possible costs of what could, only half-fancifully, be called "prefrontal-cortex-centrism," the shifting of the ideational center of gravity to the kinds of executive functions and capacities that stem from our vaunted, but also newest and in that sense potentially least mature portion of our brains. From my perspective the full costs of the moral revolution or axial age involve a continuation of the distancing from and destructive domination of wild habitat originally begun by the agricultural revolution and its legacy as civilization. The "agricultural revolution" never ended; its unbounded population explosion and habitat exploitation march forward today, perhaps nowhere more clearly than in Africa.

The increased elevation of abstraction per se, apart from its axial avatar's specific purpose, may also represent the elevation of the most unmatured brain region, the prefrontal cortex, in the sense of the newest evolved part of the brain, to a dominant position it did not exercise in the foraging life through which it came into being. Does the development and global institutionalization of "theoretic culture" represent a kind of fruition of the self, or does it bring about an over-developed, over-dominant ego and underdevelopment of the passions in the balance of self?

Take the idea, associated with Teilhard de Chardin but also developed earlier by Vladimir I. Vernadsky, that evolution is in the process of building a life-saving "noosphere" (like the atmosphere, stratosphere, et cetera; noosphere meaning literally "mind sphere"), a planetary film of intelligence, the "thinking envelope" of the biosphere, in which "life's

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domain" would be ruled by reason.[38] Chardin thought that the liberation of rational mind would free the body and soul as well, producing a universal, nature-mastering intelligence in harmony with Christian ideals, whose ultimate destination was the "omega point" of complexity and consciousness. But he did not consider whether nature should be served rather than mastered, and whether thinking mind, one small portion of reasonable mind, should trump the myriad and interconnected systems of life, as though they could be encompassed as functions of abstract intelligence. What could be worse than the perfection of the rule of rationalized reason, contracted by the idealized mythos of the machine and its manifestations in technology and bureaucratic maximizing capitalism, over life's domain—as though life could be encompassed by rationality?

The ethereal "noosphere" of mind is indeed a globalizing power today. If you want to see Chardin's noosphere literally, take the toxic gases of industrial civilization that burned out the ozone shield in the Antarctic and are now doing the same to the arctic, unabated. That is but one concrete manifestation of the globalized "thinking envelope," product of thinking abstracted from the animate earth, not mastering, but destroying it. In 2012, according to the World Health Organization estimates, 7 million people, or one out of every eight deaths globally, died due to air pollution, more than double previous estimates, making air pollution "the world's largest single environmental health risk."[39]

The enlargement of the prefrontal cortex arose in the context of practices—practical, reverential, and ritual—of encounter with the wild others, which included undomesticated fellow humans, and found its place through natural selection as a junior member of the community of passions in the human brain. As the newest portion of the brain, it remains the least mature, one more example of the more generalized neoteny, or prolonged "newborn" like qualities requiring longer time to mature that characterize human beings. As such, in my opinion, it finds its optimum in practical life through allowing its connections to the deeper inner community of passions and the balanced engagement with life which that makes possible. Yet in the progressive development of rationality, of the rationalization of life particularly characteristic of the modern era, it becomes a *maximizing* rather than *optimizing* organ of mind.

That process already began with the rise of the original megamachine that manifested similar systemic properties in the earliest civilizations.

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As Mumford described it, it reappeared in the building of the modern worldview, in the rational-mechanical outlook that was visible earliest in the mechanical clock, and later in the rise of rational and industrial capitalism and the scientific worldview in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It can be seen today in the proliferation of technical devices in everyday life and mind, in a globally networked internet which, along with its great conveniences and access to information, also entrances as it enscreens almost 3 billion regular digit-tapping users like a vast synaptic matrix of a prefrontal cortex-centric brain: the electronic termitary.[40]

The renewal of panzoonism?

There has been growing interest in the evolutionary conditions through which humans emerged as indicating possibilities for contemporary life today. Psychologist John Bowlby has characterized the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" to draw attention to how natural selection honed bodily capacities and needs in ways that remain with us.[41] What has been called the Paleolithic Diet, for example, has been shown in its numerous variations to be an optimal human diet, superior to the grain-based Neolithic diets on which most of the world population lives today. It exemplifies how the past remains embedded in us, but in ways that require activation through awareness. It also implies possibilities for changing local agriculture from the mega-agri-complex in place.

Evolutionary models reveal how "the deep human need for profuse sociality" is tempered out of our long proto- and pre-human past, and, though plastic, still exhibits optimal conditions for certain social and socializing activities.[42] Ethnographic studies of foraging peoples, for example, reveal much that can be learned from their early childhood parenting practices, of tactile, empathic, and social connectedness.[43]

What Jaspers was unaware of, and Stuart-Glennie partially aware of in his conception of panzoonism, and Mumford more aware in his account of the communicative processes of the body as perhaps the key tools propelling human evolution, was that humans emerged through the rise of symboling as creatures attuning to the signs of ecological life surrounding them. The animals, plants, and environing conditions held significant intelligence that could be tapped by close attunement and incorporated into social practices, ranging from early childhood socialization through practical dietary and spiritual ritual life.

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Ecological mind, manifest in the instinctive intelligence of surrounding life, was truly greater than the emerging human mind, and our ancestors understood that and revered it through attunement and ritual. Domestication, settlement, and cities changed all of that, fostering an anthropocentric mind, which I view as a contraction from the animate mind that brought us into our humanity.[44]

Let me lay out briefly my own alternative view of history as involving progress in precision, counteracted by a contraction in mind. I too take a simple three-stage process, but in a different direction from the models discussed already. The initial mind of humanity, in my view, was not simply "mythology," but a consciousness that I will call *animate mind*. I mean this not in Tylor's sense of animism, for the reasons Stuart-Glennie criticized that view, but in a sense closer to Stuart-Glennie's panzooinism, a sense of the powers inherent in circumambient life.

Animate mind is the evolved outlook and consciousness that bodied our foraging human ancestors into being, attuned to the animate earth, immersed in passionate, ritualizing participation with their habitat. Animate mind is, in this sense, the internalization and incorporation of the intelligible signs emanating from the animate earth, for example, the internalized categories and "vocabulary" of thousands of plants, their states of development, and possible uses. Those signs represented mature, in the sense of ecologically balanced, ecological mind, to evolving neotenous humans, and provided the means to bring "unfinished" human neoteny to maturity. Human evolution involved an evolutionary generalization of the place of immatures in the daily activities of the small bands that constituted human societies, rooted in progressively cooperative social behaviors. Prolonged neoteny is a mark of increased cooperative behaviors such as parenting in humans and some other species.[45] This extension of immature characteristics became a part of the human genome and bio-social interaction, such as mother-infant attachment and also adolescence. It became part of the human "software," and as such, required developmentally appropriate socializing practices. As such, humans were literally "children of the earth" in attuning to the perceived intelligence of the animate earth and in incorporating the ways of the creatures and powers into socializing, ritual, and everyday practices. It was biologist Lynn Margulis who suggested I add *animate earth* as the largest sphere in my diagram of concentric circles after a presentation I gave on it in 2006, as she literally put a book in my hand titled *Animate Earth*.

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

FIGURE 1 *Contractions of the mind*

By *anthropocentric mind* I mean the outlook in which the human element progressively became a focal point, the legacy of detachment from the wild other through domestication of plants and animals in agriculture, settlement, and especially the rise of cities, civilizations, and their deities and religions. The presence of animals still remains pronounced in a number of the earliest civilizations in stories, myths, and rituals, for example, though gradually fading as anthropocentrism (and especially later in monotheism) makes the human other increasingly central to the mind's eye, whether as half-human half-animal, or as supernatural deity, even when projected onto a pharaoh or king, or as history, the elevation of the human story as central. Paradoxically, the loss of the wild other as chief source of attunement in favor of the human as model, as "the domesticated other," coincides with the beginnings of dehumanization in early civilizations, with increased inequality, work, warfare, and slavery. As we humanized the settled habitat we progressively humanized our minds, developing an even more human, all-too-humanified world.

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With the moral revolution the privileging of the reflective forebrain became even more pronounced, enhancing the conditions for the rise of rationalization. Ecological philosopher Paul Shepard wrote extensively on the implications of the distancing from wild habitat by civilized humanity, and also included some psycho-historical critiques. He claimed that the effect of Hebrew and Greek idealizing of adolescence was to "amputate and *cauterize* pubertal epigenesis" (1998b: 126). He argued that the idealizing mind in these cultures changed the rules of socialization; that adolescent development, which should be a temporary passageway to adulthood marked by increased idealizing, was, in effect, frozen into perpetual patriarchal idealizing.[46] The pre-teen into adolescent brain undergoes a secondary "exuberance" or synaptic growth process and pruning similar to that of the previous one in early childhood, but primarily in the prefrontal cortex.[47] One sees here perhaps why rites of passage are so important for adolescence, as the brain is sculpting its newer and later to mature prefrontal cortex region for what will be its adult configuration. In Shepard's view the permanently idealizing adolescent mind served anthropocentric interests better than a fully matured mind would, like the Janissary soldiers who were indoctrinated from early childhood to be loyal to the state. Whether Shepard was correct or not concerning the psychosocial dimension as an element of anthropocentrism, the rise of the human-centered outlook that began with civilization became more prominent with the institutionalizations of the moral revolution, especially in the West.

The rise of the modern mechanical worldview represented a further contraction, which I term *mechanico-centric mind*, characterized by the view that the universe is like a vast machine. Like the moral revolution, these transformations were processes involving extended periods between initial manifestations to their institutionalization and worldview.

The moral revolution, valuable as the insights of its avatars, tended to serve the furthering of anthropocentric mind, even to the point of enabling the birth of its successor, mechanico-centric mind, that great and potentially final contraction of mind that is the modern era. The inward and ascetic turn made possible by the Greco-Judaic fusion of Christianity eventually found its way, even with papal Romanized "kingship," to the medieval Benedictine monasteries, otherworldly retreats of rational existence which would give birth to the symbol of a new world, the mechanical clock. As the culture of the clock took hold, it would expand

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the outer universe to a vast clockwork machine, even as it contracted consciousness to the idea that the living universe is but a machine.

What has been called progress can also be viewed as a real progress in technical, scientific, rational, and bureaucratic varieties of precision, yet embedded within a regressive contraction of mind, falsely excluding realities of nature that do not fit it, such as qualitative dimensions of experience. The culture of the clock, for example, relentlessly expanding increasingly precise measurements of time, also expanded the culture of mechanical precision as a world view, as Mumford pointed out in his 1934 *Technics and Civilization*. As he put it: "In time-keeping, in trading, in fighting, men counted numbers; and finally, as the habit grew, only the numbers counted."[48]

This new outlook accomplished amazing discoveries and applications, yet its cost, I am arguing, was ultimately a contraction to *mechanicocentrism*, the view that the universe is like a vast machine. It's not that the world cannot be so characterized to great effect. The human body can be so characterized, as many neuroscientists do in viewing it on the model of a computer. But life, unlike a machine, is not reversible: human processes of growth involve organic development, spontaneity, subjective experience involving qualities not directly quantifiable, and the realization of an identity capable of self-direction and growth of purpose. If the moral revolution raised the *supernatural* to centrality in the form of deities and beliefs, as Stuart-Glennie and Lawrence argued, then perhaps modern science can be criticized for establishing a *subnatural* theory of nature, precise but procrustean, in excluding real dimensions of nature as though they were merely subjective and therefore unreal, or as reducible to mechanistic materialist explanation. So-called scientific realism, for example, treats signs, the lifeblood of science, as ultimately unreal "additives" to nature, in this sense as literally super-natural. Yet this nominalist view of signs would make science impossible, as Peirce argued, for signs comprise the very medium of science itself, and are not reducible to dyadic materialist relations.

The problem is that the characterization, the map, is taken to explain fully the territory of which it is an abstraction. That is why, in my view, the rise of the modern scientific worldview marked real progress in precision in mapping out precise aspects of nature (though ignoring others), while that precision was embedded within a delusional world view that the universe is some variation of a giant schizoid machine, an unfeeling clock. Contemporary science still operates largely under the

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aegis of scientific realism, a view that inverts the medieval term "reality," which held, for scholastic realists, that some generals are real qua generals. Contemporary science has trouble allowing that generality, or signs, can be real as signs, not reducible to simple materiality. Yet, as Peirce argued, science requires more than materialism can deliver; it requires an understanding of generals and of the conditional as the locus of reality and scientific prediction. The life of signs, as generals, in Peirce's broad scientific logic, is more than the existence they determine.

Our foraging ancestors bodied into being believing in a living universe that could, with all of its perils, be loved. Our modern civilization bodied into being believing in a dead universe that is a vast machine, again, in Kepler's words, "not a kind of divine, live being, but a kind of clockwork." The key to understanding the proper place for technics lies between those perspectives, it seems to me.

Scientific-technical civilization today is not only powered by rationalized megatechnics, but by the crypto-religious dream of *deus ex machina*, of the god out of the machine through whose actions humanity can achieve perfection, as though independent of human purpose and ecological constraints. Yet the megamachine of modernity, as Mumford saw it, is a system and worldview seemingly bent on replacing living human qualities by electro-mechanical substitutes. The ancient megamachine that was agriculturally based civilization powered humans into regimented centralized power systems, for which the moral revolution / axial age provided a genuinely more humane alternative. But that revolutionary centering of the human person in the face of civilizational power, especially in the West, did not ultimately offset that power so much as become fused with it, and continued the neglect of the wild habitat as the *fons et origo* of human society, of original economic and religious life, of human development and socialization.

The modern global megamachine is powering humans into an even more regimented bureaucratic power system, even though now, in the post-totalitarian age, it has increasingly transferred to pleasure instead of pain as a controlling mechanism. It is a system, as Aldous Huxley characterized it, in which people come to "love their servitude." Yet despite its pleasures, it does not seem to provide deep human satisfaction or sustainable global lifestyles.[49]

The rise of the scientific rational-mechanical world-view by the seventeenth century, and the industrial revolution since the eighteenth century, marked the radical turn to mechanico-centrism that still characterizes

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our time. Its revolutionary effect can be seen as analogous to that of the advent of agricultural civilization. Indeed, if we take the earth as focal point, we have been undergoing a comparable transformation of food again in the past half century, from agriculture dependent on sun power to rationalized industrial agriculture increasingly dependent on fossil fuel, fertilizer, and maximized monoculture. The food itself has become machine. The depletion of wild species, habitat, and biological diversity is inversely and perversely mirrored in the globally spreading obesity epidemic, which has been occurring side-by-side with global food shortages and chronic undernourishment.

Indeed, there is good reason to suspect that the consequences of progressive mechanico-centrism are priming some kind of response, though not necessarily analogous to the moral revolution/axial age, as Stuart-Glennie, Jaspers, and Mumford all intimated. But what could that be? A transformation to sustainable global population, food production, and clean-enough energy consumption may be possible, but each year of non-action brings the greater likelihood of a dark alternative: transformation through a "mass extinction" period of cascading collapse. Unsustainability scenarios suggest weather extremes influencing water and food availability, political instability as leading to more vulnerable human hosts of pandemics, variations of outbreaks quickly dispersed by disease-spreading jet travel leading to pandemics, followed by quickly declining economies and communications.[50] The global house of cards does not require much of a finger tap to collapse in a quickly progressing cascade.

The return of Stuart-Glennie and Company

Jaspers' claim that the axial age will remain central to a further transformation seems doubtful to me, simply because it falsely overvalues one of a series of transformations as key to them all. Yet roughly 4 billion people are believers in moral revolution/axial age religions today, more than half the humans on the planet. To question the sustainability of these world religions may seem at first far-fetched. But let us remember that these same believers are part of the globalized belief system that is rapidly depleting resources of the biosphere in unsustainable ways, through technology and rampant materialism. Both the religious outlooks of

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much of the dominant world religions, as well as the dominant globalized science, technologies, and economies are facets of an unsustainable way of life. Yet it is also true that there is in Buddhism a greater appreciation of non-human sentient life, such as one sees in the term "gross national happiness [GNH]," which was coined in 1972 by the then 16-year-old king of Bhutan, Jigme Singye Wangchuk. He saw it as more consistent with Buddhist beliefs than GNP (gross national product), and took as two of the four pillars of Bhutan's conception of GNH, "equitable and sustainable socioeconomic development" and "conservation of the natural environment."

The unsustainable approach to habitat has progressively ratcheted into high gear since the industrial age began, from expanding global population to diminishing natural resources. But it is also simply a continuation of the habitat-destroying tendencies that began with the advent of agricultural civilizations, albeit far more ubiquitous and consequential. The practical meaning of "unsustainable" is that the belief system of the global economy and politics will have to change, so why suppose that the religious beliefs will not be affected, or that they may not undergo transformations to sustainability. In the best case scenario the beliefs brought about through the moral revolution, both religious and scientific, will be able to self-correct. But the task seems to me daunting, for it involves building a new kind of civilization that, for the first time, and rapidly, must face globally the limits of the biosphere, in politics and economic practices, in population and ecological management, in science and technology, and in the religious beliefs through which the majority of humans encounter the world.

How can deeply habituated traditions, blinkered by anthropocentrism and mechanico-centrism, meet the looming demands not only of rapidly depleting resources, from fresh water to wild fish, but of human spawned instabilities, from the still exploding populations of Africa through the Middle East and the political and economic crises they feed, to potential pandemics resulting from industrial confined animal agribusiness, whether avian or swine flu epidemics? Swine flu outbreaks such as the one that emanated from LaGloria, Mexico, in 2009, where manure lagoons from Smithfield Foods potentially contained swine, human, and, from another nearby large poultry plant, bird DNA, are likely to become more common as the toxic methods of production spread globally. Or one can take the seemingly robust, but actually fragile, dependence on

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only a few main crops globally, such as corn, wheat, or rice, grown in vast monocultural tracts of land, increasingly controlled by patent-limiting agribusiness giants; or the climate changing effects of global warming, now overwhelmingly confirmed by climate scientists; or the 2011 meltdown of the Japanese nuclear reactor at Fukushima, with yet unknown amounts of melted nuclear fuel that will require years to contain in order to prevent further catastrophic meltdown. In these indicators of potential and already actualized trauma to the earth and to the humans on it are perhaps affirmative answers to Jaspers' question: "Is it possible for technology, released from human meaning, to become a frenzy in the hands of monsters?"

Mumford held out one possibility: that history is punctuated by unanticipated, relatively sudden transformations. That potential transformation, it seems to me, must address our 2-million-year long-term evolutionary legacy, not just our 10,000-year-short-term settlement-civilizing history or 2500-year legacy of the moral revolution, or 200-year legacy of the industrial revolution.

Let me be clear: I am not invoking some nostalgic idea of a naïve "noble savage," but rather the 2-million-year-old evolved human body and its genome and bio-social developmental needs. It's not about some "innocent" past, but about the actual conditions through which humans evolved into being and which generously sustained that being.

The institutions and legacies of the moral revolution/axial age may still play a role, not as the pivot on which our age must continue to turn, but as a call to open the contemporary worldview to our full evolutionary past, to realize the very subjective possibilities opened by the moral revolution also have a long prehistory in the human body; a call to renew the "fibrous structure of history" still alive with possibilities for the present, as well as the depth of our Pleistocene panzooinist legacy, still vitally alive in our genome and bodies, psyches and brains and bio-social needs. Mindfulness practices, for example, the legacy of Buddhism, reintroduce ways of being deeply aware in the present, as do many of the concerns with nature in Taoism.

Perhaps there is more in the Panzooinist conception than Stuart-Glennie was aware of, namely, that the human body, evolved over hundreds of millennia to attune to the surrounding living habitat, retains long-term tempered needs and capacities that can be tapped to offset the mechanization of life. As Lawrence put it: "And whether we are a store clerk or a bus conductor, we can still choose between the living universe

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of Pan, and the mechanical conquered universe of modern humanity. The machine has no windows. But even the most mechanized human being has only got his windows nailed up, or bricked in."[51] Perhaps one of the oldest and deepest human needs is to connect with wild intelligence, with the flow lines of the living habitat, manifest in the original sacred game.

There is good reason to suspect that the practices through which we evolved into anatomically modern being not only forged the body-minds we inhabit today but remain as deeply embedded resources. This does not mean that people should nostalgically revert to hunter-gatherer ways. But it does mean seriously reconsidering what was done right in the long course of evolution into humankind, some of which can be gleaned from nutritional and child rearing practices of still living foragers today. The task is to find the moral equivalent of such primal needs in contemporary form, not only in human practices such as parenting or diet, but also in habitat relations, in developing real limits to human ecological destruction and real promotion of the biosphere as a sacred trust.

It would involve reversing the contraction of mind, not by eliminating mechanico-centrism and anthropocentrism, but by re-incorporating them into a larger outlook inclusive of animate mind and the animate earth as motive source and end of human development.

The panzoonist revering of "all life," of aliveness, is the larger context in which the human mind finds its motive purpose and means to mature well-being, as well as its limitations, just as the human and larger biosphere are the more encompassing contexts for which mechanico-centric precision finds its purposes.

The end of unsustainable living will be some kind of re-establishment of ecological balance, with or without humans as participants in it. The task is to re-envision for today the original human evolutionary relation to all life as the greater good that sustains us, which aboriginal mind intuited and practiced.

This would involve redirecting our science, technology, and civilization today away from the idealization and worship of the machine and inflated projections of the human and the hierarchical, and toward an idea that the further creation and pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty involves a re-attunement to all-surrounding ongoing life, not isolation from it. It would involve bringing to awareness the realization that humankind's destiny is tied to its origins, and that it must, perhaps for

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the first time, come to terms with itself as a neotenous primate requiring self-controlling, sustainable limits to its civilization at all levels of institutions and beliefs, toward the purpose of a sustainable, proliferating planet of life. Such a *sustainable revolution* would involve scientifically, technically, economically, and even religiously, relating to the earth not as something put here for humans to take, but as something marvelous out of which humans were bodied forth to serve. Such a transformation would indeed be as revolutionary as it seems unlikely, given entrenched maximizing materialism today.

What might be more likely is what Aldous Huxley already called attention to in 1962 as *the ultimate revolution*: "Today we are faced, I think, with the approach of what may be called the ultimate revolution, the final revolution, where man can act directly on the mind-body of his fellows…we are in process of developing a whole series of techniques which will enable the controlling oligarchy who have always existed and presumably will always exist to get people to love their servitude. This is…the ultimate in malevolent revolutions." Huxley saw that control by pleasuring through an unlimited plethora of commodities and propagandizing for the desire of them, similar to what he outlined in *Brave New World* in 1932, was already underway and would replace Orwell's *1984* style of control by negative conditioning: a world of people loving their servitude to oligarchical control under the delusion of pleasurable consumptive commodification.[52]

However the future of the moral revolution/axial age should turn out, with perhaps new forerunners yet to be unearthed, it is clear that Jaspers did not originate the fully articulated theory, but that some 75 years earlier, in 1873, Stuart-Glennie did. And as we have seen, Stuart-Glennie devoted much attention to developing his theory of the moral revolution over the next 30 or so years, as well as other original ideas, such as panzooinism. It is also clear that D. H. Lawrence articulated an independent interpretation and theory, though he did not give it a name, almost 20 years before Jaspers.

Despite the acknowledgment given to Stuart-Glennie by Mumford, himself one of the earliest writers on the axial age, Stuart-Glennie remained ignored, as has Mumford and Lawrence as well. Hopefully now all three can find a place in the continuing dialogue. It is long since time to give Stuart-Glennie his due, and to revise the history of this fascinating theory.

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Notes

1 Robert Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 138.
2 Tim Ingold, David Riches, James Woodburn, eds. *Hunters and Gatherers, Volume 1: History, Evolution and Social Change* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1997).
3 Barry S. Hewlett and Michael E. Lamb, eds. *Hunter-Gatherer Childhoods* (New Brunswick, NJ: AldineTransaction, 2005).
4 Robert Bellah, "The Heritage of the Axial Age: Heritage or Burden?", *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, ed. Bellah and Joas (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).
5 Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution*, 278.
6 Ibid., 593.
7 Ibid., 594. Philosopher Joseph Ransdell expressed another interesting perspective, dealing with Plato rather than Aristotle, to the online Peirce email list from May 27, 2003: "From one point of view, Plato's philosophy can be regarded as a last ditch—and unsuccessful—effort at maintaining the tradition of understanding all knowledge to be craft-knowledge, to which he opposed, not propositional knowledge, but rather mechanistic understanding, which was for him exemplified by the Sophists, whose activity can be understood to be the creation of special purpose linguistic machines, designed as instruments of persuasion. If modernism can be identified with the acceptance of mechanistic science as paradigmatic, then the Sophists were the forerunners of modernism, perhaps! But that is only a provocative half-truth, needless to say."
8 In an email to me from January 28, 2013, Bellah replied to an email from me in which I stated that I thought the axial avatars themselves were not exempt from the co-optation and corruption of the originating ideas by power institutions, and the legacy should not be wholesale thrown out, but rather re-balanced by accepting the enduring primacy of our Pleistocene bodies and needs. He stated, "I am not optimistic. Ungrounded theory, cut loose from our bodies and our stories, has powerful global suicidal tendencies. I am only trying to argue that from the axial age the theoretic was not cut loose, but by the 17th c., at least in the West, it was, with disastrous consequences. I don't want to give up theory either, but the challenge is how to reconnect it with the rest of our historical bio-social selves."
9 C.S. Peirce, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things,* ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 182–183.
10 Harold D. Roth, *Original Tao: Inward Training* (Nei-yeh) *and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 42–43.
11 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book 6, chapter 5.

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12 Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution*, p. 593.

13 I have explored the phenomenon of what I call "enscreening" in "From the Emergent Drama of Interpretation to Enscreenment," in *Ancestral Landscapes in Human Evolution: Culture, Childrearing and Social Wellbeing*, ed. Darcia Narvaez, Kristin Valentino, Agustin Fuentes, James McKenna and Peter Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 307–330.

14 Alexander Gilchrist and Anne Burrows Gilchrist, *Life of William Blake* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1863), 149.

15 Some of these writings can be found in, for example, his book *Mornings in Mexico* (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1982b), based on his experiences living in new Mexico and attending a variety of Pueblo, Apache, and Hopi dances and rituals in the region. More of these writings can also be found in the posthumously published collections, *Phoenix* (New York, Viking, 1936), and *Phoenix 2* (New York: Viking, 1968b).

16 D. H. Lawrence, *Apocalypse* (New York: Viking Press, 1982a), 164.

17 *Apocalypse* was first published in 1931. A more complete version, correcting errors and omissions, and including some key missing chapters, was published in 1980.

18 D. H. Lawrence, *Etruscan Places* (New York: Viking, [1932] 1968a), 123.

19 Ibid., 43.

20 Lawrence, *Apocalypse*, 87–88.

21 Ibid., 89.

22 In Berman's view the paradoxical consciousness of hunter-gatherers, as present-oriented, horizontally organized over hierarchy, and surround-oriented awareness, gave way to hierarchy: "Trance, in particular, is binding energy, and for the most part it and the [sacred authority complex] are not particularly adaptive when [hunter-gatherers] are not sedentary or circumscribed and can freely make use of the fission-and-fusion option. When [that] is no longer possible, vertical 'sacred' relationships come forward and serve as a homeostatic buffer, in much the same way that social inequality does… Unitive trance keeps communities together that ordinarily wouldn't stay together, *and* it serves to validate the hierarchy at the same time. In addition, magical systems arise to provide certainty, while ritual serves to reinforce group participation in hierarchies." Morris Berman, *Wandering God: A Study in Nomadic Spirituality* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 79–80.

Berman sees the axial heroic self as the apogee of the "sacred authority complex," as having lost the paradox of fission-fusion social relations for the elevation of fusion. The elevation of the "person" is one still fused to a dependency complex involving obedience over contextual awareness in the living moment, whether psychologically to parent figures, especially the

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mother, or to sacred authority. Axiality as a way of life "transcends" the felt cosmos at the cost of self and societal deformation.

23 Lawrence, *Apocalypse*, 133–134.

24 Ibid., 134–135.

25 Ibid., 168.

26 Ibid., 164.

27 Ibid., 149–151.

28 Ibid., 171–174.

29 Ibid., 172–173.

30 Ibid., 165–166: "There is the method of association and unison, and the method of contrast and distinction. The whole way of spiritual, rational, and mental consciousness is a way of contrast . . . .there need be no quarrel between our two ways of consciousness. There *is* a quarrel, there always has been, perhaps there always will be, since human nature is *ab ovo* quarrelsome. But there need not be.

So let us leave the way of question, and try to take again the older way of affirmation. We shall find that our mind now definitely moves in images, from image to image, and no longer is there a logical process, but a curious flitting motion from image to image according to some power of attraction, some *sensuous* association between images."

31 D. H. Lawrence, *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (New York: Signet Classic, 1962), 259.

32 A curious note of history is that Lawrence's wife Frieda had a sister, Else von Richtofen, who was a lover of both Max Weber and his brother Alfred, both of whom were influences on Jaspers.

33 As anthropologist Ashley Montagu states: "As late as the second decade of the twentieth century the death rate for infants under one year of age in various foundling institutions throughout the United States was nearly 100 percent. It was in 1915 that Dr. Henry Dwight Chapin, the distinguished New York pediatrician, in a report on children's institutions in ten different cities made the staggering disclosure that in all but one institution every infant under two years of age had died . . . .What the child requires if it is to prosper, it was found, is to be handled, and carried, and caressed, and cuddled, and cooed to, even if it isn't breastfed." Ashley Montagu, *Touching: The Human Significance of the Skin* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 97, 99.

34 Dan Moonhawk Alford, "Nurturing a Faint Call in the Blood: A Linguist Encounters Languages of Ancient America," http://hilgart.org/enformy/moonhawk-nurturing01.htm, no date. Accessed March 25, 2002.

35 Ibid., xiv.

36 Robert Bellah, "The Modern Project in Light of Human Evolution." Lecture, University of Notre Dame, March 19, 2013. Video recording of lecture at: http://csrs.nd.edu/events/special-event----robert-bellah-to-lecture-at-notre-dame/. Accessed August 20, 2014.

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37 In a reply to an email (March 24, 2013), Japanese Studies scholar Kerim Yasar drew my attention to this point: "Even Buddhism, arguably the least anthropocentric of the axial traditions, idealizes human rebirth as the optimal circumstance for the attainment of enlightenment. Even if this is ultimately pragmatic *upaya*, expedient means intended to goad the student not to waste precious time, it is dismissive of non-human intelligence in a way quite characteristic of axial anthropocentrism."

38 Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 251.

39 "7 Million Premature Deaths Annually Linked to Air Pollution," 2014. World Health Organization News Release. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-pollution/en/. Accessed March 26, 2014.

40 A Kaiser Foundation study in 2010 found that American children 8 to 18 years of age reported spending 7 hours and 38 minutes of media time per day, 7 days per week, not counting multitasking or schoolwork. Those between 11 and 14 years old, the age of identity transition, spend 8 hours and 40 minutes per day. V. J. Rideout, and E. Hamel, *Generation M2: Media in the Lives of 8- to 18-Year-Olds*, (Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation. January, 2010), accessed September 16, 2013, from http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf.

41 John Bowlby, *Attachment: Attachment and Loss, Volume One*, 2nd edn (New York: Basic Books, [1969] 1999).

42 Darcia Narvaez et al., *Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development: From Research to Practice and Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.

43 Sarah B. Hrdy, *Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

44 Halton 2005, 2007, 2014.

45 Hrdy, *Mothers and Others*, 80.

46 Shepard was interested in how historical development could also alter and distort psychosocial development regressively: "The West is a vast testimony to childhood botched to serve its own purposes, where history, masquerading as myth, authorizes men of action and men of thought to alter the world to match their regressive moods of omnipotence and insecurity." Paul Shepard, *Nature and Madness* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998b), p. 126.

47 As adolescent brain researcher Jay Giedd states: "But the pruning-down phase is perhaps even more interesting, because our leading hypothesis for that is the 'Use it or lose it' principle. Those cells and connections that are used will survive and flourish. Those cells and connections that are not used will wither and die. So if a teen is doing music or sports or academics, those are the cells and connections that will be hard-wired. If they're lying on the

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couch or playing video games or MTV, those are the cells and connections that are going [to] survive." Interviewed for *Inside the Teenage Brain*. PBS, January 31, 2002. Accessed February 22, 2014. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html

48 Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1934), 22.

49 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited* (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2005); Shepard, *Nature and Madness*.

50 James Lovelock, the climatologist perhaps better known for his "Gaia hypothesis," also invented an "electron capture detector" and was the first to detect the widespread presence of CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbons) in the atmosphere. He has come to the conclusion that wide-scale collapse is inevitable, involving a significant kill-off of much of the human population by 2100 or earlier: "I am not a willing Cassandra and in the past have been publicly sceptical about doom stories, but this time we do have to take seriously the possibility that global heating might all but eliminate people from Earth." Roger Highfield, "The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning by James Lovelock, review," *The Telegraph*, March 2, 2009. www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/5017620/The-Vanishing-Face-of-Gaia-A-Final-Warning-by-James-Lovelock-review.html, accessed February 23, 2014.

And elsewhere, "There have been seven disasters since humans came on the earth, very similar to the one that's just about to happen. I think these events keep separating the wheat from the chaff. And eventually we'll have a human on the planet that really does understand it and can live with it properly. That's the source of my optimism. Enjoy life while you can. Because if you're lucky it's going to be 20 years before it hits the fan." Decca Aitkenhead, "James Lovelock: 'enjoy life while you can: in 20 years global warming will hit the fan,'" *The Guardian*, February 29, 2008. http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2008/mar/01/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange, accessed February 23, 2014.

51 D. H. Lawrence, *Phoenix* (New York: Viking, 1936), 31.

52 Huxley, *The Ultimate Revolution*. Transcript of lecture March 20, 1962 Berkeley Language Center—Speech Archive SA 0269. Accessed July 4, 2010. http://pulsemedia.org/2009/02/02/aldous-huxley-the-ultimate-revolution/.

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